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Abstract
Big data has great potential to revolutionize our lives through its predictive power
and provide insights far beyond what we know about ourselves. It has become a
necessity in todays world. It is expected to grow exponentially in the coming years.
Big data has brought us great benefits, for example, advertisements focused on what
you actually want to buy, wearable or implantable devices that can monitor your
health and notify your doctor if something is going wrong. However, it can also cause
great privacy issues. As more and more personal information is collected by service
providers, the data collected reveals personal sensitive information, such as where
they are, who they communicate with, what they buy, what they watch, what disease
they have, and so on. Huge data sets can be used not only for legitimate purposes
but also for abuse. Due to the possibility of malicious use, people pay more attention
to the security and privacy threats while enjoying the benefits. Besides, the data
privacy problem may create obstacles to the anticipated growth and opportunities
of Big Data. How should we address these privacy concerns without denying the
benefits of big data? This thesis aims to find out privacy issues in various modern
applications, such as recommendation system, Internet of Things, location- based
service and crowdsourcing, improve privacy protection levels, and at the same time
maintain the availability of data.
First, we explore the privacy problem in the recommendation system. Neighbourhood-
based collaborative filtering is a popular recommendation method that is particularly
vulnerable to k nearest neighbour (KNN) attack, that the attacker can obtain the
rating history of the victim by searching the list of recommended items. To solve
xiv
this problem. We propose a Johnson-Lindenstrauss-based method to preserve the
information of individual users while improving the performance of the recommender
system.
Second, we explore the privacy problem in the Internet of Things. Data aggre-
gation is considered to be an essential research topic in the Internet of Things, and
privacy is an important issue for data aggregation, as the sensory data may be sen-
sitive. For example, the health data, such as blood pressure, the temperature can
disclose the user’s health status, and the utility data, such as the electricity, can be
used to profiling the customers’ life pattern and routine. To solve the problem, we
propose a machine learning based privacy preserving multifunctional data aggregation
method, which allows multiple aggregation functions calculation without disclosing
the user’s privacy.
Third, we explore the privacy problem in the location-based services. A typical
example of location-based services is POI query service, as users have to submit their
own location in exchange of services. Their location information will be disclosed to
the service provider, which can be untrusted. To hide the user’s location information,
we propose a new privacy framework that includes a semi-trusted third party. Under
our privacy framework, neither the server nor the third party knows the exact location
of the user.
Finally, we explore the privacy problem in the crowdsourcing applications. The
workers contribute data collected by their mobile devices to employers for rewards.
However, to be able to assign tasks more efficiently, workers need to submit their exact
location to the Server as well. Different from traditional location privacy-preserving,
the overall workers’ position distribution need to be considered in task assignment
stage. To solve the privacy problem in the crowdsourcing application, we propose a
worker’s density based privacy preserving data release method. The method achieves
differential privacy that enables the participation of workers without disclosing their
location privacy.
xv
In summary, this thesis makes following contributions: 1) propose a privacy-
preserving multifunctional data aggregation method solve the privacy problem in
Internet of things; 2) propose a Johnson-Lindenstrauss-based method and personal-
ized privacy-preserving collaborative filtering method solve the privacy problem in
recommendation system; 3) propose a new semi-trusted third party based privacy
framework that protects the user’s location information in POI query services; 4)
propose a worker’s density based privacy-preserving data release method that enable
effective task allocation without disclosing worker’s privacy in crowdsourcing appli-
cation. These contributions enable rapid development of big data applications.
Keywords: Privacy-preserving, Recommendation system, Internet of Things,
Location-based services, Crowdsensing applications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Due to the rapid growth of computers and the technology that is capable of captur-
ing data, the data is increasing exponentially, they are collected from the everyday
interactions with digital products or services, including mobile devices, information
sensing, social media and so on. The big data allows today’s advanced analytic tech-
nology to reveal hidden patterns or identify secret correlations that enable us to learn
and make smarter decisions. For example, companies can now accurately predict
what their customers want to buy, and when. In addition, the big data change our
world in a number of ways. For example, data-driven medicine help to spot disease
early by analysing a large number of medical records; sensor data can be analysed to
predict and response to natural and man-made disasters.
Big Data gives us unprecedented insights and opportunities, but the collected
big data contains a large amount of personal or sensitive information, which raises
big privacy concerns. For example, website cookies have been used to track web
browsing for a long time, which can be used to see what the user has been doing on
1
the web; services like Google Maps track the user’s location information at real time
by default, which could disclose the user’s life pattern; on the social network, many
users regularly post pictures with their location tagged, which let people know where
they are. These privacy threats limit the development of big data when the user’s
private information is not properly protected.
A variety of techniques have been proposed to protect the privacy information.
k-anonymity [125] is the most popular privacy-preserving technique. It guarantees
that the information for each person cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1
other records. The k-anonymity can be achieved by suppression or generalization
method. l-diversity [90] requires the group of records to contain at last l different
sensitive values. l-diversity handles the weakness of the k-anonymity that protects
the identity is not enough to protect the sensitive attributes of the individual. To
prevent skewness attack, Li et al. proposed a privacy model, called t-closeness [77],
which requires the distribution of the sensitive attributes in the group to be close
to the distribution of the attribute in the overall dataset. Many other extensions
based on these techniques were also proposed, such as (X, Y )-anonymity [149], (c, l)-
diversity [90], (X, Y )-privacy [149] and so on. Generally, these methods can only
defend one kind of specific attack and have no ability to resist the newly developed
approaches and multiple background knowledge attacks.
Differential privacy, which is proposed by Dwork [32] in 2006, is a mechanism
that makes little difference to the results of the query with the addition or deletion
of any tuple by adding random noise on the output. It works well on the tabular
dataset preserving privacy, and also be applied to many other application scenar-
ios [92, 160, 165, 178], because it does not need to model background knowledge that
2
is still a challenge for traditional anonymization methods. In other word, differential
privacy has a very strong assumption about the attacker’s background knowledge that
it assumes the attacker knows everything except the information he wants to know.
Therefore, differential privacy can defend the various kinds of background knowledge
attack. Besides, differential privacy is based on mathematics, which provides a quan-
titative assessment method and makes the level of privacy protection comparable.
However, differential privacy introduces lots of noise to hide the differences between
the query results, which affects the utility of the perturbed dataset.
1.2 Research Questions
This thesis studies the privacy problems in four application scenarios, recommenda-
tion system, Internet of Things, location-based services and crowdsensing system. We
introduce the research questions examined in each application scenario in detail as
follow.
Recommendation system. Recommendation systems have become increasingly
popular as a result of the significant growth in online information. Instead of ex-
ploring the entire content of the Web, users can easily obtain related information via
recommendation. However, a recommendation system requires a substantial amount
of historical user data to generate accurate predictions. The release of such data
to a recommendation system raises concerns over user privacy. We focus on the
neighbourhood-based collaborative filtering method, which is particularly vulnerable
to attacks on privacy. There are many protection methods are proposed including
differential privacy protection. Unfortunately, existing privacy preservation methods
3
based on differential privacy protect user privacy at the cost of utility, aspects of
which have to be sacrificed to ensure that privacy is maintained. How to protect
the user’s privacy properly, while enhancing the utility is an essential challenge for
differential privacy in the recommendation system.
The traditional way of achieving differential privacy is adding noise, such as the
Laplace mechanism, which inevitably reduces the utility of the dataset. Can we find a
solution that defuses the conflict between privacy and utility in the recommendation
system?
Internet of Things. Data aggregation plays an important role in the Internet of
Things. The study and analysis of aggregated data provide various services and ben-
efits for people. However, the privacy raises a big concern, as the raw sensory data
may be sensitive and disclose the users sensitive information. To achieve the object
that preserves the users data privacy, numerous schemes have been proposed in the
last decades. Most methods are based on encryption technology, which computation-
ally and communicationally expensive. In addition, most methods only can calculate
a single aggregation function. While in practice, the idea aggregation scheme should
allow the flexible aggregation queries to meet the diversified aggregation goals. How
to achieve multifunctional aggregation within only one round communication and
reduce system overhead, while preserving the data privacy is a challenge.
We prefer to apply differential privacy technology to guarantee the data privacy.
However, for multifunctional aggregation, the correlations between queries increase
the sensitivity significantly, which reduces the accuracy of the aggregation result.
How can we increase the utility without consuming the privacy-preserving level?
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Location-based Services. The growing popularity of location-based services is
giving untrusted servers relatively free reign to collect huge amounts of location in-
formation from mobile users. This information can reveal far more than just a users
location but other sensitive information, such as the users interests or daily routines,
which raises strong privacy concerns. A typical application of location-based services
is Point of Interest (PoI) query that returns the users nearby PoIs. Existing solutions
based on differential privacy are to add a large amount of noise to hide the worker’s
real location, which reduces the accuracy of returned POIs. Especially for high level
privacy protection. Can we improve the accuracy of returned PoIs without lowering
the level of privacy protection?
Crowdsensing system. Mobile crowdsensing techniques use workers with mobile
devices to collect data and send it to the task requester for rewards. However, to
ensure the optimal allocation of tasks, a centralized server needs to know the precise
location of each user, but exposing the workers exact locations raises privacy concerns.
A typical solution of differential privacy protects location privacy in the crowdsensing
system by introducing a trusted third party. The third party partitions the domain of
worker locations into small cells and release the perturbed statistical results of each
cell to the crowdsensing server. However, the method is based on the assumption
that the distribution of workers is uniform, which is not practical in real life and this
uneven distribution would cause significant errors during the task assignment process.
How should we solve the problem of uneven distribution of workers and improve the
success rate of task assignment?
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1.3 Thesis Outline
This section aims to establish the structural organization of the thesis. According
to four research issues addressed in this thesis: privacy-preserving in the recommen-
dation system, privacy-preserving in the Internet of Things, privacy-preserving in
location-based services and privacy-preserving in crowdsensing system, the chapters
are organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 discusses the related privacy-preserving works in the following ap-
plication scenarios, recommendation system, Internet of Things, location-based
services and crowdsensing system, including the privacy techniques used, ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the proposed method.
• Chapter 3 addresses the privacy-preserving problem in the recommendation sys-
tem, mainly focuses on the neighbourhood-based collaborative filtering method.
This chapter adopts a novel data perturbation method, which perfectly com-
bined with the neighbourhood-based collaborative filtering recommendation
method. Specifically, the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform is used to project
the original rating dataset to a lower dimensional space. This process not only
maintains the relative distance between records, we theoretically prove that this
transform on the rating dataset satisfies differential privacy. In addition, this
randomized process enhanced the accuracy of the recommendation.
• Chapter 4 proposes a privacy-preserving method for data aggregation, which
plays an important role in the Internet of Things. This chapter proposes a mul-
tifunctional data aggregation method under differential privacy. The proposed
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method is based on machine learning and can support a wide range of statisti-
cal aggregation functions, including both additive and non-additive aggregation.
Also, the method is designed under fog computing architecture, which extends
the cloud computing to the edge of the network that alleviates the cloud burden
and improves the communication efficiency by reporting the aggregation results
only to the cloud server.
• Chapter 5 presents a new privacy framework to protect the location privacy in
the Point of Interest query service. The proposed privacy framework includes
a semi-trusted third party. Under the privacy framework, both the server and
the third party only hold a part of the users location information. Neither the
server nor the third party knows the exact location of the user. In addition,
benefit from the character of Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform, though the real
location information is perturbed, the relative distances between the user and
PoIs are nearly not changes. Therefore, the proposed method improves the
performance significantly, while providing a strict privacy guarantee.
• Chapter 6 proposes a data release mechanism for crowdsensing techniques that
satisfies differential privacy, providing rigorous protection of worker locations.
The partitioning method is based on worker density and considers non-uniform
worker distribution. In addition, this chapter proposes a geocast region selection
method for task assignment that effectively balances the task assignment success
rate with worker travel distances and system overheads.
• Chapter 7 summarizes the contributions of this thesis, and presents some pos-
sible suggestions and extensions for further research.
7
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter provides an extensive literature review on privacy attack models, privacy-
preserving technologies and privacy metrics. We systematically analysis how the data
privacy can be disclosed, what kind of privacy technology should be used in a spe-
cific application scenario, and how to evaluate the privacy provided by the proposed
solution.
2.1 Privacy Attacks
We classify the privacy attack models according to the type of the dataset. Specifi-
cally, we survey the privacy attacks for the tabular dataset, graph dataset, location
dataset and other applications.
2.1.1 Tabular Data Attack
The tabular dataset is an arrangement of data in rows and columns, each row repre-
sents a record of an individual and each column is an attribute of the person. The
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form of the table is
D(Explicite−identifier,Quasi−identifier, Sensitive−attributes,Non−sensitiveattributes),
(2.1.1)
where Explicit-identifier is a set of attributes can identify the person’s identity di-
rectly, such as the name. Quasi-identifier is a set of attributes can potentially identify
the person’s identity. Sensitive-attributes is a set of sensitive attributes such as dis-
ease and salary. Non-sensitive attributes is a set of attributes outside of previous
scopes.
Normally, the dataset is published without the Explicit-identifier, however, it is
not enough to protect the individual’s privacy. Various attack model can be used to
identify the person’s identity or the sensitive information. We summaries the typical
attack models as follows.
Record Linkage Attack. Record linkage attack identifies the victim’s record in
one table by linking the record to a record in another public table.
(a) Patient table (b) External table
Figure 2.1: A degree attack [148]
For example, a hospital published the patient records as shown in Fig. 2.1a,
assume the attacker has access to an external table shown in Fig. 2.1b, and the
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person who has the record in table a has the record in table b. Combining the tables
in the common attributes will link the victim’s identity to his disease. For example,
Bob is identified as a hepatitis patient by linking attributes < Engineer,Male, 35 >
after the join. Minkus et al. [96] successfully identified the Facebook user who resides
in the city by linking the Facebook user’s social ties to the city’s voter registration
records.
Attributes Linkage Attack. Attributes linkage attack may not identify the record
of the victim, but can infer the victim’s sensitive value by observing the sensitive val-
ues belong to the same group. For example, from table a, the attacker can confidently
infer that all the female writers at age 30 have Flu, and all the female dancers at age
30 have HIV.
Both record and attribute linkage attack assume the attacker already knows that
the victim’s record already exists in the released table.
Table Linkage Attack. Table linkage attack identifies whether the victim’s record
exists in the released table. As in some cases, the presence or absence of the victim’s
record already reveals his sensitive information.
For example, assume the table a ⊆ table b. There are three records in table b with
attributes < Dancer, Female, 30 >, and two records in table a with same attributes.
Therefore, the attacker can infer that Emily’s record has 2/3 probability presents in
table a. The presence of her records reveals that she is an HIV patient.
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2.1.2 Graph Data Attack
The social network is a very popular platform where people make new friends and
share their interests. More and more social network data are published for many
applications, such as social network analysis and data mining. Unlike the case in
traditional relational datasets, all identities in the social network are connected with
each other by edges, which allow the attackers to launch the structural based attacks.
Background knowledge plays an important role in modelling privacy attacks. This
section summaries the background knowledge can be used by the attacker to launch
structure attack.
Vertices Degree. Vertices degree represents how many direct connections be-
tween a node and its neighbours. Once the degree of the user is different from others
in the graph, the vertex is re-identified. For example, in Fig. 2.2, node 3 and node
4 can be identified directly if the adversary knows Carl has three friends and Danna
has only one friend.
Alice
Bob
Carl
Dana
1
2
4
3
Figure 2.2: A degree attack
Tai et al. [137] identified a new attack called friendship attack, which is based
on degree pair of an edge. They launched both degree and friendship attacks on
the 20Top-Conf dataset and proved that the friendship attack causes a much more
privacy disclosure than the degree attack.
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Neighbourhood. Neighbourhood refers to the neighbours of an individual who
have connections with each other. Attackers make use of this kind of structural
information to identify individuals [179]. For example, in Fig. 2.3, if attackers know
Bob has three friends and two neighbours and they connected with each other, Bob
can be recognized in the anonymized graph.
Alice Bob Carl
Dana Elva Ford
1 2 3
4 5 6
Figure 2.3: A neighbourhood attack
Ninggal et al. [103] proposed another kind of attack called neighbourhood-pair
attack, which uses a pair of neighbourhood structural information as background
knowledge to identify victims. Such attacks assume attackers know more information
than neighbourhood attacks do, so attackers have a higher chance to distinguish users
in a dataset.
Embedded sub-graph. Sub-graph refers to a subset of the whole graph. Some
adversaries create few fake nodes and build links using a specific way before the data
is published, and then match the target graph with a reference graph based on the
sub-graph which has been planted. In Fig. 2.4, the grey part is the original graph,
the black part is the sub-graph embedded by the adversary. Normally, the embedded
sub-graph is unique and easy for attackers to identify after the dataset is released.
Link Relationship. The relationship between two vertices also can be acquired by
an adversary. Wang et al. [155] considered that the public users’ identities are public
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Figure 2.4: An embedded sub-graph attack
and not sensitive. They utilized the connection between victims and public users to
perform attacks. For example, in Fig. 2.5, A, B, and C are public users, such as BBC
and Michael Jackson. Their identities are publicity, and if attackers know vertex d
has one hop to A and C and two hops to B, d can be identified.
A B C
d
e f g
Figure 2.5: A fingerprint attack
Sun et al. [134] committed a mutual friend attack. Their algorithm identifies a
pair of users who connect to each other based on the number of mutual friends. For
example, in Fig. 2.6, the numbers on the edge represent the number of mutual friends
between two nodes. If the adversary knows Alice and Ford have two mutual friends,
then she/he can identify a and c combined with other reference information (e.g.
degree).
Attributes of Vertices. Attributes of individuals in a social network are repre-
sented as labels to vertices. Attackers may get the attributes of victims, such as age,
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Alice
Bob Carl
Elva
Dana
Ford
1
1
1 0
0
0
0
1
2
(a) A
f e
b
d
c
1
1
1 0
0
0
0
1
2
(b) B
Figure 2.6: A mutual friends attack
sex and occupation. Such information can be helpful for adversaries to compromise
users’ privacy. For example, in Fig. 2.6, if the attacker knows Alice is a girl, Ford is
a boy, he can identify them specifically by checking labelled sex information.
2.1.3 Location Privacy Attack
Location privacy disclosure happens when the location information leaves the user’s
sensing device. To hide the user’s exact location information, privacy-preserving
technologies are performed on it. Even though, the user location information still can
be inferred. We surveyed the location attack models in this section as follows.
Context Linking Attack. In the context linking attack, the attacker utilises the
context information of the victim to decrease the privacy. For example, Gruteser and
Grunwald [48] proposed a personal context linking attack, which is based on personal
context information, such as personal preferences and habits. For example, if the
attacker knows the victim would like to visit the club at a certain time, and the
victim simply protects his location by cloaking region, the attacker can increase the
infer accuracy simply by decreasing the cloaking region to the club within the region.
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Krumm [74] proposed a map matching attack that decrease the obfuscated area by
removing the irrelevant areas, such as lakes. Shokri et al. [131] proposed a probability
distribution attack, which utilize the victim’s distribution context information to infer
the victim’s location. Specifically, the attacker gets a probability distribution function
of the user position in the obfuscated area. Then, the attacker can identify the area
where the victim located at with high probability.
Region Intersection Attack. Region intersection attack [138] increases the pre-
cision of the obfuscated location by calculating the intersections between the user’s
multiple imprecise position updates or queries. The intersection can be used to infer
the user’s sensitive region. For trajectory privacy protection, a series of obfuscated
regions are generated when the user reaches a spot, the intersection between the
obfuscated regions reduces the user’s privacy significantly.
Machine Learning based Attack. Li et al. [76] proposed a machine learning
based attack method to infer users’ demographics from the disclosed locations. To
infer a specific attribute of a user, they identify a group of users who have similar
location traces with each other, and check the attributes of the users in the same
group who set their attributes as public. Murakami and Watanabe [98] proposed a
learning method, which uses matrix factorization to accurately estimate personalized
transition matrices from a small amount of training data. They applied the proposed
learning method to the localization attack, which identifies the real location of a user
at a given time instant from an obfuscated trace.
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2.1.4 Attacks for Other Applications
Various attack models are designed according to different application scenario. Except
for the aforementioned attacks for tabular data, graph data and location privacy,
privacy attacks happen in other applications as well.
For example, smart meters have been wildly used in more and more households. It
brings convenience while raising privacy concern. The purpose of attacks in the smart
meter is to infer the user’s behaviour and habits by observing the power usage data.
Dinesh et al. [29] utilized the uncorrelated spectral information of active power signals
with low sampling rate to identify the turned-on residential appliances and estimate
their energy consumption, which further discloses the user’s behaviour. Greveler et al.
[47] showed that the personal TV watching habits can be inferred by simply analysing
the electricity usage profile. And in many cases, the view content also can be identified
based on the smart meter power consumption data. Fan et al. [39] proposed a reactive
power based attack, which extracts reactive power-based appliance signatures, and
identifies the turned-on events of the appliance based on each appliance’s unique
signature.
Privacy attack also happens in the recommendation system. The most popular
one is the k nearest neighbour attack. Suppose the attacker knows m ratings of the
items of an intended victim, the attacker can then compromise the victim’s privacy
by creating k− 1 fake users with the same ratings to replicate their recommendation
list. In addition, Van [145] proposed an attack on contactless payments. Liu and
Li [87] identified a collusion privacy attack against online friend search engine.
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2.2 Privacy Technologies
Various privacy technologies have been proposed in the past few decades. This section
mainly surveys three categories: the encryption-based methods, anonymization meth-
ods, and differential privacy related methods. We also discussed other new developed
privacy technologies in the last section.
2.2.1 Encryption
Encryption is a direct method to protect the user’s data. Nobody can know the other
user’s data without description. Therefore, the user’s data can be stored safely in the
application server or the cloud. However, the encrypted data cannot contribute to
the various services and meaningless to the researchers.
One class of approaches is to release these encrypted data is that adding access
control protocol. For example, Qian et al. [117] proposed the personal health record
(PHR) should be encrypted before outsourcing it to the cloud, and the patent should
be able to decide who can access what kind of PHR. Only the users with the corre-
sponding secret keys can access the corresponding encrypted PHRs. Ruj et al. [124]
proposed a decentralized access control scheme for secure data storage in the cloud,
and the proposed scheme supports anonymous authentication that the cloud verifies
the authenticity of the user without knowing his identity.
Another class of methods is utilising some encryption technologies that allows
performance over encrypted data. There are mainly two technologies: secure multi-
party computing and homomorphic encryption.
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Secure Multi-party Computing. Secure multi-party computing was originally
introduced by Yao [166], and it allows different parties to jointly collaborate to com-
pute a specific function on their private data, while preserving the data privacy of
each party. The secure multi-party computing ensures the independence of the input
and the correctness of the calculation without disclosing the input value to other par-
ticipants in the calculation. Secure multi-party computation has many applications
in the area where people need to operate numbers which are sensitive and private.
Tso et al. [144] introduced a method to prevent data disclosure from inside at-
tack in wireless medical sensor networks. The proposed method is based on the se-
cure multi-party computation protocol and has been implemented in the FairplayMp
framework. Also, the proposed approach supports private-preserving data mining for
medical data stored in the distributed hospitals or institutions. Wang et al. [154] pro-
posed a privacy-preserving protocol to estimate the edit distance between two genome
sequence. The secure multi-party computation technology is used to compute the set
intersection. Secure multi-party is also used in Point of Interest recommendation [153]
that provide the users with accurate PoIs without disclosing their real location infor-
mation.
Secure multi-party computing is designed for few sides security calculations, and it
is not easy to expand to a collaborative environment that has many users, because the
cost of calculation increases exponentially. Therefore, secure multi-party computing
is not widely used for deep learning techniques.
Homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryption was proposed by Rivest et
al. [123] in 1987. It is a way of encryption method that allows the computation
over ciphertexts. The calculation result over ciphertexts, when decrypted, matches
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the result of the operation performed on the plaintext. The purpose of homomorphic
encryption is to allow the certain operations can be performed on the encrypted data,
which preserves the original data information.
Homomorphic encryption is widely used in various areas. For example, Alabdulatif
et al. [7] applied it to the data clustering tasks. They introduced a distributed data
processing framework, which is based on a fully homomorphic. The proposed frame-
work utilizes MapReduce to perform distributed computations on a large number of
cloud Virtual Machines. Abdallah and Shen [4] proposed a lightweight lattice-based
homomorphic privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for the residential electric-
ity consumers in the smart grid. Kim et al. [73] studied the privacy problem in
matrix factorization-based recommendation system, and proposed the first privacy-
preserving matrix factorization using fully homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic
encryption is also used for privacy preserving anomaly detection [7], outsourced cal-
culation of rational numbers [86], and location-based services [38]. However, due to
the large computational overhead, most of them are still far from being ready to use
in practical applications.
2.2.2 Anonymization
Data anonymization is a very important method for preserving data. It’s a type of
information sanitization that removes the personally identifiable information, so that
the person cannot be identified from the data or the sensitive attributes can not be
matched to the specific person.
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k-anonymity. k-anonymity [125] is the most popular anonymity technology, which
was first introduced by Sweeney and Samarati in 1998. We say the release data satisfy
k-anonymity if the information for each person cannot be distinguished from at least
k − 1 other individuals in the same dataset. In other word, the personal information
is hidden in a group that each individual in the group has the same information with
others and cannot be distinguished. The group is referred to the equivalence class.
k-anonymity can be used in various application domains, which including location-
based service [80,105], clustering [85], Internet of Things [14] and so on. For location-
based services, multiple ways can be used to achieve k-anonymity. For example, Niu
et al. [105] proposed a dummy-location selection algorithm to protect user’s location
privacy against adversaries with side information. In the dummy locations methods,
k − 1 false locations are reported together with the user’s real location to guarantee
k-anonymity. Song et al. [133] protected the private location by applying cloaking
region technology that satisfies k-anonymity by including at k users’ locations in the
cloaked region.
k-anonymity is easy to achieve and widely used, however, it only considers the
identity without considering the sensitive attributes. If all the sensitive value in the
equivalence class are the same, the user’s sensitive information will be disclosed.
l-diversity. l-diversity solves the weakness the k-anonymity by requiring the equiv-
alence class has at least l different sensitive values. That is, l-diversity protect the
user’s sensitive information by increasing the diversity of the sensitivity value in the
equivalence class.
A stronger notation of l-diverse is the definition of entropy l-diversity, which is
defined as follow:
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Definition 1 (Entropy l-diverse). An equivalence class is entropy l-diverse if the en-
tropy of the distribution of the sensitive value is at least log(l).
−
∑
s∈S
P (QID, s)log(P (QID, s)) ≥ log(l), (2.2.1)
where s indicate the sensitive value, and the P (QID, s) indicate the proportion
of s in equivalence class.
Though the l-diversity considers the diversity of sensitive values in the equivalence
class, it does not consider the distribution of the sensitive values. Though the released
data satisfy the l-diversity, if one sensitive value accounts for a large proportion in the
equivalence class, the user’s information will be easily disclosed by skewness attack.
t-closeness. t-closeness [77] improves the l-diversity by requiring the distribution
of the sensitive value in the equivalence class close to the corresponding distribution
in the original dataset. That is, the distance between the distribution of the sensitive
value in the original dataset and equivalence class is bounded by t.
Many other extensions are also be proposed, for example, (α, k)-anonymity [150],(k, e)-
anonymity [172] and m-invariance [158]. Most of these methods add the different
constraint on the sensitive values in the equivalence class, which enhanced the pri-
vacy protection. However, the anonymization method does not consider the attacker’s
background knowledge. User’s sensitive information and even the identity can easily
be disclosed once the attacker holds the corresponding background knowledge.
2.2.3 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy. Differential privacy is a provable privacy notation, developed
by Dwork et al. [35] that has emerged as an essential standard for preserving privacy
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in a variety of areas. It was originally introduced for statistical databases, requiring
that changes to a single data record should result in no statistical differences to a
query’s output. The formal definition of differential privacy is:
Definition 2 (-Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm M gives -differential
privacy for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D
′
where, for every set of outcomes
Ω, M satisfies
Pr[M(D) ∈ Ω] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D′) ∈ Ω] . (2.2.2)
Datasets D and D′ are neighbouring datasets, which only differ in one individual
record. This definition ensures that the presence or absence of an individual will not
significantly affect the output of the query.
Normally the differential privacy can be achieved by adding random noise to the
results of the query. Laplace mechanism and Exponential mechanism are two mech-
anisms that usually used. The definitions are shown as follows.
Definition 3 (Laplace mechanism). Given a function f : D → R over a dataset D, 3
provides -differential privacy.
f̂(D) = f(D) + Laplace(
s

). (2.2.3)
Definition 4 (Exponential mechanism). Let q(D, r) be a score function of the dataset
D that measures the score of outputting r. Then the exponential mechanism M
satisfy -differential privacy if:
M(D) = return ∝ exp(q(D, r)
2∆q
), (2.2.4)
where ∆q = max‖q(D, r)− q(D′, r)‖, which is the sensitivity of q.
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A Laplace mechanism is used for numeric output, and a Exponential mechanism
is used for non-numeric output. Both mechanisms are associated with the sensitivity,
which determines how much perturbation is needed. Two types of sensitivity are
usually used in differential privacy: the global sensitivity [136], which measures the
maximal change over all the neighbour datasets, and the local sensitivity [104], which
measures the change over the records related to the query. The details are shown as
follows.
Definition 5 (Global sensitivity). For a query Q : D → R, the global sensitivity of Q
is defined as follow:
GS = maxD,D′‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖1. (2.2.5)
Definition 6 (Local sensitivity). For a query Q : D → R, the global sensitivity of Q
is defined as follow:
LS = maxD′‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖1. (2.2.6)
Observe that the global sensitivity from Definition 5 is GS = maxxLS. The
global sensitivity is widely used, but it only considers the worst-case that induces
much redundant noise to the output. Local sensitivity avoids the unnecessary noise
by only considering the query related records.
Two privacy budget compositions [94] are widely used in the design of mechanisms
[63]: the sequential composition and the parallel composition, as defined in Definition
7 and Definition 8, respectively.
Definition 7. Sequential Composition: Suppose a method M = {M1, ...Mm} has m
steps, and each stepMi provides  privacy guarantee, the sequence ofM will provide
(m ∗ )-differential privacy.
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Definition 8. Parallel Composition: Suppose a method M = {M1, ...Mm} has m
steps, and each step Mi provides  privacy guarantee on a disjointed subset of the
entire dataset, the parallel of M will provide max1, ..., m-differential privacy.
The sequential composition measures the privacy level for a sequence of differ-
entially private computations. When a series of randomized mechanisms have been
performed sequentially on the same dataset, the total privacy guarantee proposed will
be calculated by adding up the privacy budgets for each step. The parallel compo-
sition applies to the situation where each Mi is applied on disjointed subsets of the
dataset. The ultimate level of privacy guarantee only depends on the largest privacy
budget.
Extensions of Differential Privacy. With the application of the traditional dif-
ferential privacy, many extensions are proposed to solve more complex problems. We
review the proposed new differential privacy mechanisms in this section.
Approximate Differential Privacy [34]. For a given metric on the input space,
differential privacy requires that the distance between two neighbouring inputs at
most 1, the probability that the outputs of performing the random algorithm differs at
most exp(). Approximate differential privacy relaxes this requirement by additionally
allowing for an additive slack δ. Specifically,
Definition 9 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm M gives (, δ)-
differential privacy for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D
′
where, for every set
of outcomes Ω, M satisfies
Pr[M(D) ∈ Ω] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D′) ∈ Ω] + δ . (2.2.7)
Approximate differential privacy weakens the privacy guarantee but allows data
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release results more accurate. Many privacy-preserving methods are based on ap-
proximate differential privacy, for example, Du et al. [31] proposed a differential
privacy-based query model for sustainable fog computing supported data center. Lin
et al. [81] designed two frameworks for privacy-preserving auction-based incentive
mechanisms that achieve approximate social cost minimization.
Distributed Differential Privacy [34]. Traditional differential privacy considers
a trusted aggregator who can access the participants’ real data and release the per-
turbed statistics. However, the aggregator might be untrusted. To solve this problem,
Emura and Keita [37] proposed the concept of distributed differential privacy, which
extended the approximate differential privacy to a setting that the distributed enti-
ties contribute the perturbed data to the control aggregator. The aggregator can be
untrusted and possibly colludes with a subset of the participants.
Definition 10 ((, δ)-Distributed Differential Privacy). Suppose  > 0, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
and 0 < γ ≤ 1. We say that the data randomization procedure, given by the joint
distribution r := (r1, ..., rn) and the randomization mechanism M achieves (, δ)-
distributed differential privacy with respect to the mechanismM and under γ fraction
of uncompromised participants if the following condition holds.
Pr[M(D) ∈ Ω] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D′) ∈ Ω] + δ . (2.2.8)
Joy [66] believed that the released aggregate information under distributed privacy
protection only reveals the underlying ground truth distribution and nothing else,
and they proposed a sampling mechanism, which achieves differential privacy in the
distributed setting. Distributed differential privacy is also widely used in the situation
that answering queries about the privacy data that is spread across multiple different
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databases. Narayan and Haeberlen [100] introduced two new primitives, BN-PSI-
CA and DCR, that can be used to answer queries over distributed databases with
differential privacy guarantees. Zhang et al. [171] addressed the problem of distributed
knowledge extraction with differential privacy guarantee in the data mining.
Joint Differential Privacy [34]. Private matching and allocation problems have
not been considered in the differential privacy literature. While, Kearns et al. [70]
introduced a variant which they call joint differential privacy, which requires that
simultaneously for every player i, the joint distribution on the suggested actions to
all players j 6= i be differentially private in the type of agent i.
Definition 11 (Joint Differential Privacy). A mechanism M satisfies (, δ)-joint dif-
ferential privacy if for every i, any pair of i-neighbours D,D′, and for every subset of
outputs Ω ⊆ Rn−1,
Pr[M(D)−i ∈ Ω] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D′−i) ∈ Ω] + δ . (2.2.9)
Later, Hsu et al. [57] gave algorithms to accurately solve the private allocation
problem when bidders have gross substitute valuations using joint differential privacy.
Tong et al. [143] studied the location privacy problem in the scheduling of rideshar-
ing services. They proposed a jointly differentially private scheduling protocol for
protecting riders’ location information and minimizing the total additional vehicle
mileage in the ridesharing system.
Geo-Indistinguishability. Andres et.al [11] proposed the concept of Geo-indistinguishability,
which extended the traditional differential privacy to the location privacy scenarios.
The main idea behind this notion is that, for any radius r > 0, the user enjoys r-
privacy within r. The level of privacy is proportional to the radius r. The details of
definition is shown as follow.
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Definition 12 (Geo-Indistinguishability). A mechanismK satisfies -geo-indistinguishability
if for all x, x′:
dp(K(x), K(x
′)) ≤ d(x, x′) (2.2.10)
For all points x′ within a radius r from x, the definition forces the corresponding
distributions to be at most r distant.
Geo-indistinguishability is widely used for protecting the location privacy [132,
156, 161, 169]. For example, Wang et al. [156] solved the location privacy problem in
the mobile crowdsensing application. The uploaded locations for optimal task alloca-
tion are protected under geo-indistinguishability guarantee. Mao et al. [91] presented
a scheme for aggregating the installation ratio for applications with privacy-preserving
on mobile devices. Hua et al. [59] proposed an improved geo-indistinguishability loca-
tion perturbation mechanism for location-based services, which significantly reduced
the privacy cost and can support multiple queries.
2.2.4 Other Technologies
Caching. Caching system has been proposed to enhance the privacy in various
application scenario by pre-fetching the data on a device before it is actually needed
[9]. The data can be accessed locally when it is needed, which reduces the interaction
between the user and the service providers and reduces the risk of privacy information
exposure. Caching method is widely used in location-based services.
Peng et al. [113] proposed a collaborative trajectory privacy preserving scheme
for continuous queries, in which trajectory privacy is ensured by caching-aware col-
laboration between users, and no need for any fully trusted parties. The main idea
behind the proposed algorithm is that it allows the mobile user to communicate with
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multi-hop neighbours and share the valid information between each other. Users’ col-
laborative caching reduces the number of queries sent to the server, thereby reducing
the amount of private information exposed to the server. Zhang et al. [177] proposed
a caching-based method to protect location privacy in continuous location-based ser-
vices. The proposed scheme adopts a two-level caching mechanism to cache the users’
result data at both the client and the anonymizer sides. Liu et al. [82] proposed a
framework which enhances the privacy of location-based services by actively caching
in the wireless vehicular network scenario. Niu et al. [106] proposed a privacy metric
to model the effect of caching. In addition, the proposed a caching-aware dummy
selection algorithm, which is combined with multiple privacy technologies and side
information to achieve a higher privacy degree.
Game Theory. Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic
interaction between rational decision-makers [99]. Game theory answers the question
of how the defender reacts to the attacker. The strategic interaction between them
is captured by a two-player game where each player tries to maximize his or her own
interests. The effectiveness of a defence mechanism relies on both of the defender’s
and attacker’s strategic behaviours.
Recent years, game theory has been applied in privacy-preserving area. For exam-
ple, Wu et al. [157] studied the privacy problem in correlated data publishing. They
modelled the trade-off problem between privacy and utility as a game problem, and
analysed the utility efficiency of the proposed method from the point of game theory.
Khaledi et al. [71] investigated attacks where person location can be inferred using the
radio characteristics of wireless links and modelled the radio network leakage attack
using a Stackelberg game. They used a greedy method to obtain the optimal strategy
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for the defender. The experimental results showed that the proposed game theoretic
solution significantly reduces the chance of an attacker infer the user’s location.
2.3 Privacy Metrics
The privacy metrics are used to evaluate the privacy level in a system or the privacy
protection level provided by the proposed privacy protection method. A large number
of metrics have been proposed in the literature. We category the existing privacy
metrics according to the output of the algorithms.
2.3.1 Uncertainty
Uncertainty means the situation in which something is not known or not certain. The
uncertainty metrics in the privacy area evaluate how far the attacker’s estimation is to
the certain correct value. Most uncertainty metrics are built on anonymity parameter
and entropy. We review the related matrices as follows.
Anonymity parameter. Some literature protects the user’s privacy by hiding an
individual or the sensitive attribute in an anonymity set in which the attacker cannot
identify the correct one. The most popular one is the k-anonymity. The size of the
anonymity set is k, the user’s information cannot be identified to the other k − 1
users. Therefore, the privacy level can be measured by the size of the anonymity set
as
PM = k; (2.3.1)
Similar to k-anonymity, the extensions of k-anonymity try to protect the sensitive
attributes by adding some qualifications. The qualification can be used to evaluate
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the privacy-preserving level.
For example, (α, k)-anonymity [150] requires the frequency of the single sensitive
value in the equivalence class has to be less than α. Therefore, the privacy level can
be evaluated by
PM = (α, k) (2.3.2)
Smaller α indicate higher privacy protection, as the probability of inferring the vic-
tim’s sensitive attributes becomes lower.
(k, e)-anonymity [172] additionally requires the range of the attributes in the
equivalence class must be greater than e. Bigger e and k indicate higher privacy
level. Therefore,
PM = (k, e) (2.3.3)
l-diversity bounds the diversity of sensitive information. Similar with (k, e)-
anonymity, l-diversity requires l distinct values in each equivalence class. Therefore,
the privacy level can be evaluated by
PM = l; (2.3.4)
The main weakness of this metric is that it only counts the number of records
in the anonymity set, doesn’t consider the attacker’s background knowledge. If the
attacker holds some background knowledge, it cannot provide the corresponding level
of privacy protected measured by the anonymity set size.
Entropy. The entropy in the information theory refers to disorder or uncertainty.
When a lower-probability event occurs, the event carries more information than the
higher-probability event happens. As a privacy metric, the entropy measures the
uncertainty associated with inferring the sensitive value of an individual.
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Shannon entropy [127] is the basis for many other metrics. The Shannon entropy
is defined as follow.
H(X) = −
∑
xi∈X
p(xi)log2p(xi), (2.3.5)
where xi is the value in the set of all possible values, p(xi) is the probability of
the value p(xi) to be the target.
Max-entropy [25] is the upper bound of the Shannon entropy. It is a conservative
measure of how certain the adversary is of his estimate. Specifically,
Hmax = log2|X| (2.3.6)
The max-entropy only depend on the size of the variable values set, which represents
the ideal privacy situation for the user.
Min-entropy is the lower bound of Shannon entropy, which is the worst-case sce-
nario because it only depends on the user for whom the adversary has the highest
probability regardless of whether this is also the true outcome [26]. Specifically,
Hmin = −log2maxpx∈X(x) (2.3.7)
Silvia et al. [116] used Shannon’s entropy as the measure of user privacy in social
tagging systems. Javier et al. [111] investigated mathematically the privacy utility
trade-off posed by the suppression of tags, measuring privacy as Shannons entropy of
the perturbed profile. Peters and Maxemchuk [114] used Shannon entropy to compare
the performance of the distributed application to a centralized one regarding storing
and processing electronic health records. In [51] and [131], min-entropy is considered
rather than the usual Shannon entropy.
Re´nyi, Alfre´d [122] introduced Re´nyi entropy, which is a more general metric that
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based on Shannon entropy. The formula is shown as follow.
Hα(X) =
1
1− αlog2
∑
x∈X
p(x)α (2.3.8)
The Shannon entropy is the special case when α→ 1. Also, the more α grows the
more Re´nyi entropy approaches to min-entropy, and the more α reduces to zero, the
more Re´nyi entropy approaches to max-entropy.
Conditional entropy is used to measure the attacker’s uncertainty about the user’s
real sensitive information when the prior knowledge is known. The uncertainty of the
attacker regarding the value of x given z can be measures as the entropy of the
posterior as follow:
H(x|z) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x|z)log(p(x|z)) (2.3.9)
Oya et al. [108] utilized the conditional entropy to justify the defences created by
the proposed strategies for location privacy-preserving. Wang and Jia [147] used it to
quantify the degree of disclosure risk in a medical data publishing. Osia et al. [107]
verified and evaluated the privacy of the features extracted by the private feature
extractor using conditional entropy.
There are also many other entropy-based metrics, such as unreliability that mea-
sures the attacker’s uncertainty about which items are related, cross-entropy that
measures the uncertainty in predicting the original dataset from the clustered model
and Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [119] evaluates the distance between two dis-
tribution. Readers can refer to paper [146] for more entropy-based metrics.
Although entropy has an intuitive interpretation of the information that the at-
tacker needs, the value of entropy does not convey many meaning [51]. The entropy
indicates the attacker’s uncertainty, but does not state how accurate the attacker’s
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estimation is [131]. In addition, many works of literature argue that the entropy is
strongly influenced by outlier values as the privacy metric (i.e., if some element of
the probability distribution is very unlikely, the entropy of the source increases very
much [26]).
2.3.2 Error/Accuracy
Error. The error metrics quantify the error the attacker makes to infer the user the
real information. This type of metrics are applicable to all domains and widely used
in recommendation system and location privacy.
Mean square error (MSE) describes the error between observations x by the at-
tacker and the true output x′ of the query.
MAE =
1
|X|
∑
x∈X
‖ x− x′ ‖2 (2.3.10)
Meng et al. [95] used MSE to evaluate the privacy protection level by conducting
reconstruction attack on the rating dataset. MSE is also used in reconstructing user
data in participatory sensing [43]. In addition, the MSE is widely used as the utility
metric in the literature as well. For example, Tan et al. [139] used it to evaluate
the image quality and Wang et al. [152] used MSE to measure the utility loss in
anonymized mobile context streams.
Similar metrics, such as root mean square error (RMSE) [20] and mean absolute
error (MAE) [20], are also used to measure the accuracy. For example, Polatidis et
al. [115] used both RMSE and MAE to measure the accuracy of generated recom-
mendations of the proposed protection method.
Expected estimation error [131] measures the expected distance between the real
value and estimated value. The estimation is computed over the posterior probability
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of the attacker’s estimation x on his or her observation y. Specifically,
Error =
∑
x∈X
p(x|y)d(x, x′), (2.3.11)
where d(·) is the distance metric. In location privacy, d(·) measures the distance
between the estimated location and the true location, p(x|y) means the probability
that the attacker infers the location is x. The bigger the value error, the stronger the
protection of the user’s location.
Hoh and Gruteser [55] proposed a similar distance error, called expectation of
distance error, which captures how accurate the attacker can estimate the user’s
position. The metric is defined as follow:
Error =
1
nT
∑
t∈T
∑
h∈H
ph,t(x)dh,t(x, x
′), (2.3.12)
where n is the number of users and T is the total observation time. dh,t(x, x
′) indicates
the distance error between the real location and the location in hypothesis space H
at time step t.
These distance-based privacy metrics can also be used in other application sce-
narios if an appropriate distance metric is available. For example, the distance metric
used in paper [61] depends on how the values of genetic variations are encoded.
Percentage incorrectly classified measures the percentage of incorrectly classified
users or events. This metric is wildly used in machine learning area for classification
application.
Error =
|I ′|
|I| , (2.3.13)
where I ′ indicates the incorrect classification. |I| is the size of the instance set.
Kalyani and Aniket [68] studies the privacy preserving data mining problem and
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evaluate the performance of the proposed method by analysing the incorrectly clas-
sified instance. Narayanan and Shmatikov [101] used it to measure how often the
highest probability in the attacker’s estimate does not correspond to true genotype.
Accuracy. Accuracy metrics quantify the accuracy of the attacker’s estimation.
The inaccurate estimate indicates higher privacy protection. Most metrics in this
category are used to measure the geographic precision in location-based services.
Size of Uncertainty Region [22] represents the minimum region that the attacker
can narrow down to locate the target user’s location. This metric is used for the
cloaking region based location privacy-preserving method. The user’s location is
hiding in a cloaking region, the bigger size of the final region for the attacker, the
higher level of protection provided.
PM = Area(R), (2.3.14)
where R refers to the cloaking region.
Coverage of Sensitive Region is another expression form, which is shown as follow.
PM = Area(
Rs ∩R
R
), (2.3.15)
where Rs is the sensitive region for a user and R is the attacker’s uncertainty region.
Eq. 2.3.15 indicates the proportion that the attacker can link the user’s location to
his sensitive region.
Confidence Interval Width [6] is a type of interval estimate, computed from the
statistics of the observed data, that might contain the true value of an unknown
variable. The privacy at confidence coefficient γ is given by the width of confidence
region [u(X), v(X)] for the attacker’s estimation.
PM = |u(X)− v(X)|, p(u(X) ≤ x ≤ v(X)) = γ/100 (2.3.16)
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The confidence level is designated prior to examining the data. Most commonly,
the 95% confidence level is used.
2.3.3 Indistinguishability
Indistinguishability metrics indicate whether the attacker can distinguish the real
sensitive value of the user from the other values. Most of these metrics are associated
with differential privacy mechanism.
Differential privacy states that the outputs of the random mechanism performed
on the two neighbour datasets differ by at most e. That is to say, the value of a
variable to be protected cannot be distinguished with other values under differential
privacy protection. The  measures the biggest difference between the true value and
the other values. The smaller value of  indicates higher privacy protection.
Most extensions of differential privacy are based on the approximate differential
privacy that introduces a slack parameter δ relaxes the requirement of traditional
differential privacy. For example, distributed differential privacy and joint differential
privacy. The smaller  and δ, the more difficult for the attacker to identify the real
value of the variable. When δ = 0, the method satisfies pure differential privacy.
Geo-indistinguishability is also an extension of the traditional differential privacy,
and it is applied to the location privacy scenarios. The privacy level depends on
the privacy budget  and the radius r. The user’s location is protected under geo-
indistinguishability guarantee means the user’s true location cannot be distinguished
with other locations in the region with radius r by the attacker.
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2.4 Summary
This chapter surveys various attacks happened on different types of dataset and dif-
ferent application scenarios, the privacy technologies and privacy metrics that how to
evaluate the privacy level based on different privacy-preserving methods. This thesis
studies the privacy problems in four application scenarios: recommendation system,
Internet of Things, location-based services and crowdsensing system. We identify the
privacy problems first, and propose the correspondence solutions based on existing
privacy-preserving technologies according to the possible attacks. The analysis based
on the privacy metrics proved the effectiveness of the proposed solutions.
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Chapter 3
Privacy-preserving in
Recommendation System
3.1 Introduction
The boom in web-based services has caused an exponential increase in the number
of users of these services, resulting in a significant growth in the amount of online
information. This information growth has triggered the need for personalized recom-
mendations, which are the key business drivers for many companies. Research shows
that 75% of users’ Netflix choices are driven by recommendations [62]. This person-
alized recommendation is derived from users’ personal data, such as purchase records
and browsing history, raising significant concerns about maintaining privacy [120].
Neighbourhood-based collaborative filtering, for example, is a popular recommen-
dation method that is particularly vulnerable to attacks on privacy [181]. The liter-
ature shows that continuous observation of recommendations with a certain amount
of background information makes it possible for an individual’s transaction history to
be inferred, known as a k nearest neighbour (KNN) attack [19]. If attackers know m
items of user u, they can create k fake users with the same rating as victim u on these
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m items. Such attackers can obtain the rating history of user u by directly searching
the list of recommended items directly. Other recommender methods, such as matrix
factorization, also suffer from privacy breach problems [15,41].
It is highly desirable to devise a solution that will guarantee user privacy. Dif-
ferential privacy, a powerful privacy model, is widely accepted for providing rigorous
privacy guarantees for aggregate data analysis. Differential privacy ensures that one
individual cannot significantly affect the output of a query. This is normally achieved
by injecting random noise, calibrated according to the sensitivity to the result of
the query. This process was first introduced to collaborative filtering by McSherry
and Mironov [93] in 2009. Shen et al. [129, 130] and Zhu et al. [181] subsequently
contributed to the privacy preservation problem in recommendation systems via dif-
ferential privacy. However, all existing methods guarantee user privacy at the cost
of analytical utility, since accuracy is decreased as a result of the privacy operation.
Privacy and utility are inherently conflicting concepts in the literature. Can we find
a solution that defuses this conflict, while supporting the same goals?
Introducing randomization improves performance in some research areas [24, 42],
and we have also identified randomization as the major mechanism for achieving
differential privacy. Is it possible to adopt a particular randomization method in
the collaborative filter, not only to guarantee user privacy, but also to enhance the
accuracy of prediction?
There are two challenges to achieve this goal:
1. Selecting randomization method: Neighbours are of the utmost importance for
utility in neighbourhood-based collaborative filtering. However, randomized
methods can destroy the distance between users, reducing the quality of the
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neighbours selected, and decreasing the accuracy of the prediction. How can
we retain the distance between users? What kind of randomization should be
chosen?
2. Achieving differential privacy: Unlike traditional differential privacy methods,
which add noise to the result of the query, randomized methods directly per-
turb the original dataset. How can we make sure this randomization achieves
differential privacy objectives?
For the first challenge, we observe that the Johnson-Lindenstrauss-transform is
an excellent solution for retaining the utility. It is a linear transformation that
preserves the distance property, which is important for neighbourhood-based col-
laborative filtering. For the second challenge, Jeremias et al. [16] prove that the
Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform preserves edge differential privacy in graph saniti-
zation. Based on this finding, we prove that it also guarantees differential privacy
in a rating dataset. The extensive experiments show that this transform not only
maintains distance, but also enhances the accuracy of the final prediction.
The contributions in this chapter are as follows:
• We propose a privacy preserving collaborative filtering method that guarantees
differential privacy without compromising prediction accuracy.
• We theoretically prove that the proposed method satisfies -differential privacy,
where  is related to the dataset. In addition, we theoretically analyse the utility
of the proposed method.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss the
related work and Section 3.3 introduce the preliminaries. We propose our privacy
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preservation method and theoretically analyse the privacy and utility in Section 3.4
and Section 3.5 respectively. Section 3.6 details the results of the experiments, and
Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Related Work
Notation for differential privacy was first proposed by Dwork [32] in 2006. Since it
provides rigorous privacy preservation and can be proven by mathematical theory,
differential privacy has become an important standard for evaluating privacy levels
and been applied in several areas. It was first introduced to collaborative filtering in
2009 by McSherry and Mironov [93], who adapted four leading collaborative filtering
algorithms to differential privacy. User privacy was guaranteed by directly adding
noise to the aggregated query results.
Zhu et al. [181] proposed an effective privacy preserving algorithm for neighbourhood-
based collaborative filtering. They held that it is not only the ratings of the user that
should be protected, but also ’who the neighbour is’ should not be inferred by ad-
versaries. The Exponential mechanism was adopted to find k-nearest neighbours
and Laplace noise was added to mask the rating given by a certain neighbour with
recommendation-aware sensitivity.
Rachid et al. [49] proposed a distance-based differential privacy to preserve user
profiles in a recommendation system. They replaced each item probabilistically with
a random or related item within a certain distance. The distance between any two
items is calculated on the basis of similarity. Defining an upper bound, there is a
high probability that each item will be replaced by an item with a distance of less
than the upper bound and a low probability that the replacement will be a random
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item. This method is not suitable for sparse datasets since there is insufficient data
to identify truly similar items; The replacement items would be too distant in the
original file, which can reduce utility.
Shen et al. [130] designed a practical privacy framework for personalized recom-
mendation via differential privacy. They consider service providers to be untrustwor-
thy and perturb the users’ data before it leaves the device. The proposed method is
based on the Laplace mechanism and guarantees user privacy by injecting calibrated
Laplace noise into each item category. Noise calibration is based on the underly-
ing data properties through correlation between categories. Good performance is
achieved as a result of minimizing noise.
The Stretching mechanism proposed by Mohammad et al. [8] is much closer to
our method. The original dataset was mapped onto another with different direction
by multiplying a shrinkage matrix whose diagonal coefficients are a user’s privacy
preferences. Laplace noise is added to query outcomes with a fixed privacy parameter.
The works described above provide a rigorous privacy guarantee for users, but
all existing methods have to sacrifice elements of utility in varying proportions to
preserve user privacy. Unlike these methods, our method not only guarantees user
privacy, but also improves performance.
3.3 Preliminaries
3.3.1 Notation
The dataset D is a user×item numerical rating dataset. Let U = {u1, u2, ..., un} be
the set of users and T = {t1, t2, ..., td} be the set of items. The dataset D can be
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represented as a n × d matrix, where n is the number of users and d is the number
of items. We put this in the form of a vector, then D = [u1,u2, ...,un]
T, where
ui = [rui1, rui2, ..., ruid]. ruit is the rating that user ui gives to item t, so that vector
ui represent user ui’s rating records for all items. Tco = {t ∈ T |rit 6= 0, rjt 6= 0} is
the set of co-rated items by user ui and uj. We use s(ui, uj) to denote the similarity
between user ui and uj and Nk(ui) to denote the set of ui’s k nearest neighbours.
More notations are shown in Table 3.1.
3.3.2 Collaborative Filtering
Collaborative filtering predicts user interests on specific items by collecting preference
information from users closely share their interests. Collaborative filtering methods
can be divided into two categories: neighbourhood-based methods and model-based
methods. In this chapter, we consider the user-based nearest neighbour algorithm;
two stages are involved:
• Neighbour Selection: All pairs of users’ similarity are calculated. Choose the k
users with the highest similarity as the closest neighbours.
• Rating Prediction: Uses ratings from the k-closest neighbours selected in Step
1 to calculated possible ratings that the predicted user may give to the item.
Many measurement metrics have been proposed to estimate the similarity be-
tween two users. We use two popular metrics, Cosine-based Similarity and Pearson’s
Correlation Coefficient. The cosine similarity between two users is defined as follows:
COS sim(ui, uj) =
ui · uj
‖ui‖‖uj‖ (3.3.1)
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Table 3.1: Notations
Symbol Description
n Number of users
d Number of items
D Original dataset
D′ Neighbouring dataset
ui Users in dataset D
u′i Users in dataset D′
s(ui, uj) Similarity between ui and uj
Nk(ui) Neighbour set of user ui
ruit Ratings that user ui gives to item t
rmax The maximum rating
Tco Set of co-rated items
k Number of neighbours
X Transfer matrix
m Dimension of transfer matrix
Xc Column of matrix X
Xci Entries of matrix Xc
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The Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient is defined as follows:
PCC sim(ui, uj) =
(ua − ua)(ub − ub)T
‖ ua − ua ‖‖ ub − ub ‖ (3.3.2)
where ua =
⋃
t∈Tco rat. The ratings of co-rated items are used to estimate the simi-
larity. Items that are not rated by either user are not considered.
In step two, all the ratings for item tj from users in Nk(ui) contribute to the
prediction. The specific calculation method is as follows:
ruit =
∑
uj∈Nk(ui) s(ui, uj)rujt∑
uj∈Nk(ui) rujt
(3.3.3)
3.3.3 Differential Privacy
Notation for differential privacy was first proposed by Dwork [32] in 2006. Since it
provides rigorous privacy preservation and can be proven by mathematical theory,
differential privacy has become an important standard for evaluating privacy levels
and been applied in several areas. Consider the input is privacy dataset D, which
is a collection of data from different individuals. We say that datasets D and D′
are neighbouring datasets if they only differ in one individual record. Differential
privacy provides a strong privacy guarantee that the outputs of the queries on the
neighbouring datasets will be statistically similar. The formal definition of differential
privacy is presented as follows:
Definition 13 (-Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithmM gives -differential
privacy for any pair of neighbouring datasets D and D′, and for every set of outcomes
Ω, M satisfies:
Pr[M(D) ∈ Ω] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D′) ∈ Ω] (3.3.4)
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 is the privacy parameter, which is defined as the privacy budget [33]. It controls
the privacy preservation level. A smaller  represents the greater privacy.
Definition 14 (Neighbouring Dataset). The datasets D and D′ are neighbouring
datasets if and only if they differ in one record. This is denoted as D ⊕D′ = 1.
′⊕′ indicates the difference between two datasets. To make the problem much
clearer and easier to understand, we assume the two corresponding records in D and
D′ have different t ratings.
3.3.4 Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transform
The Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform projects the points in a high dimension to a
lower dimensional space while the Euclidean distances between any pair of points
are preserved [65]. The Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma has been used in many areas,
such as dimensionality reduction, compressed sensing and graph embedding.
Lemma 3.3.1 (Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma [65]). For any set S of n points in Rd,
given 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/2, m = Ω(log(n)/δ2), there is a matrix X ∈ Rm×d, for all u, v ∈ S,
there is a map f : Rd → Rm, such that
(1− δ)‖u− v‖2≤ ‖f(u)− f(v)‖2≤ (1 + δ)‖u− v‖2 (3.3.5)
in which, f(u) = Xu, f(v) = Xv.
The Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma states that a random matrixX can project the
dataset from d dimension to k while maintaining the relative distance and retaining
f(du,v)/du,v in the range (1−δ, 1+δ). Several constructions for X have been proposed
[5, 63]. We use Gaussian distribution to generate random matrix X.
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Gaussian Distribution Gaussian distribution is also called normal distribution.
It’s probability density is as follow:
PX(x) =
1√
2σ2pi
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 (3.3.6)
Normal distribution is often denoted by N(µ, σ2), where µ is mean or expectation of
the distribution and σ2 is variance. When a random variable X is distributed with
mean µ and variance σ2, we write X v N(µ, σ2).
Theorem 1. If we take two random variables N1 v N(µ1, σ21), N2 v N(µ2, σ22),
then the linear combination N = aN1 + bN2 follows Gaussian distribution N(aµ1 +
bµ2, a
2σ21 + b
2σ22).
Theorem 2. For any matrix X ∈ Rd×n, x ∈ X suppose the random matrix A ∈ Rk×d
and A v N(µ, σ2), we have E(‖Ax‖2) = ‖x‖2.
Proof. Suppose the entries of A are N(0, 1/τ),
(‖Ax‖1)2 = (
d∑
i=1
Aixi)
2
by the theorem, we get
d∑
i=1
Aixi v N(0,
∑d
i=1 x
2
i
τ
)
so,
E[(
d∑
i=1
Aixi)
2] =
∑d
i=1 x
2
i
τ
=
‖x‖2
τ
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then,
E[‖Ax‖2] = τE[(‖Ax‖1)2]
= τ × ‖x‖
2
τ
= ‖x‖2
Theorem 3. If the random matrix A v N(µ, σ2), then, for any fixed matrix X, x ∈ X,
it satisfies Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma with a very high probability.
Proof. Suppose the entries of A are N(0, 1/k),
For the upper bound:
Pr[‖Ax‖2> (1 + ε)‖x‖2]
= Pr[
k∑
i=1
M2i > (1 + ε)‖x‖2],M v N(0,
‖x‖2
k
)
= Pr[
k∑
i=1
N2i > (1 + ε)k], N v N(0, 1)
by Lemma,
Pr[
k∑
i=1
N2i > (1 + ε)k] ≤ e−k(ε
2−ε3)
= e−O((1−ε)log(n))
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which means:
Pr[‖Ax‖2> (1 + ε)‖x‖2] 6 e−O((1−ε)log(n))
We can see that the probability Pr[‖Ax‖2> (1 + ε)‖x‖2] is very small, similar
proof to the lower bound.
3.4 Privacy-preserving Collaborative Filtering
In this section, we present our solution for the privacy preservation issue in neighbourhood-
based collaborative filtering. Defending against KNN attack. We first define the prob-
lem and describe the specific algorithm used to solve this problem, then we provide the
theoretical analysis of how our method guarantees users’ privacy, while maintaining
utility for recommendation purposes.
3.4.1 Problem Definition
Given a rating dataset D, each record is a user’s item rating vector Ui. The objec-
tive is to perturb the dataset and predict user ui’s interest in items that ui has not
rated, such that (a) the perturbation satisfies −differential privacy, which strictly
preserves the users’ privacy information and prevent KNN attack; and (b) the simi-
larity calculated on the perturbed dataset is not very different to that calculated on
the original dataset; that is, the neighbours selected are almost the same as those
in the non-privacy operation. This enables greater utility to be retained and more
accurate predictions to be made.
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3.4.2 Scheme Overview
The data in recommendation systems are stored as user profiles, and item profiles
include the ratings. We absorb the users’ ratings on the items and represent tehm
in user × item matrix form. The proposed method directly perturbs the dataset
(matrix) rather than the query result. The following operations are conducted on the
perturbed dataset, and the process is shown in Fig. 3.1.
Data 
Perturbation
Neighbourhood 
Selection
Data 
Collection
Data 
Processing
Make 
Prediction
Recommendation 
output
Figure 3.1: The Johnson˙Lindenstrauss recommendation process
The key step is data perturbation. We explore a linear transformation method
that changes the original dataset while retaining the important elements for recom-
mendation purposes. Details are presented in the next section.
3.4.3 The Algorithm of Private Neighbour Collaborative Fil-
tering
raditional differential privacy methods are achieved by adding random noise to the
results of queries. The most commonly used mechanisms are Laplace and Exponent.
Select the k-nearest neighbours through Exponent mechanism, make sure it impossible
for attackers to figure out who the neighbours are. Add Laplace noise to the similarity
between users, make sure the attacker cannot infer the rating given by a specific
person. In this section, we introduce a Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform-based
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privacy preserving collaborative filtering method (JLCF) that applies a Johnson-
Lindenstrauss transform to the privacy dataset to preserve users’ rating history and
resist a KNN attack. JLCF preserves users privacy by perturbing the original dataset
through linear transformation. It acquires a new matrix by multiplying the original
dataset to obtain a transition matrix. The similarity calculation and neighbourhood
selection operations are reflected in the new matrix; the steps are shown in Algorithm
1.
Algorithm 1 shows the proposed preservation method for neighbourhood-based
collaborative filtering. The transition matrix X is constructed in Steps 3 to 7. X is
a d×m matrix and the entries of X are sampled from 0 mean Gaussian distribution,
which has been proven to satisfy the construction of ′X ′ in the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
Lemma. We obtain a new perturbed matrix by multiplying the original dataset with
X at Step 8. The new matrix A has the property of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
transform; that is, it maintains the relative distances of the original dataset. The l2
distance between any two users in A is compared with D, and the error is fixed in the
range of [1 − δ, 1 + δ], which guarantees the utility of the new matrix for prediction
purposes as the calculation of similarity has a linear relationship with l2 distance.
Following transformation, we calculate the user similarity with the other users in
Steps 10 to 15, and the top k users are classified as user ui’s k-nearest neighbours
in Steps 16 and 17. Step 18 predicts the ratings of user ui on item t based on its
neighbours’ rating records. Lastly, the rating prediction is returned.
Neighbours play a crucial role in neighbourhood-based collaborative filtering, be-
cause prediction is based entirely on the ratings or purchase history of those neigh-
bours. A KNN attack is able to disclose a users’ identity because the attackers only
51
Algorithm 1 Johnson Lindenstrass Privacy Preserving Collaborative Filter-
ing(JLCF)
Require: Dataset D ∈ Rn×d, projected dimension m d, number of neighbours k
Ensure: ruit.
1: Nk(ui)← 0
2: rbt← 0
3: for i = 1 to d do
4: for j = 1 to m do
5: X[i, j]← normrnd(1, 1/m, 1, 1);
6: end for
7: end for
8: A← DX;
9: for i = 1 to n do
10: for j = 1 to n do
11: if j 6= i then
12: S(ui, uj).sim← cos(u′i, u′j)/pcc(u′i, u′j)
13: S(ui, uj).user ← uj
14: end if
15: end for
16: S(ui, uj)← sort(S)
17: Nk(ui)← uj ∈ S(1 : k)
18: ruit ←
∑
uj∈Nk(ui) S(ui,uj).simrujt∑
uj∈Nk(ui) rujt
19: end for
20:
21: return ruit
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need a small amount of background knowledge to target the neighbours of the victim.
In the proposed method, the original dataset is perturbed by the transfer matrix.
Even though the attackers have the information, they cannot identify the k-nearest
neighbours of the victim, demonstrating that the proposed method is capable of re-
sisting KNN attack.
3.5 Privacy and Utility Analysis
The main privacy operation and core technique of our method is to perturb the
original dataset with a transition matrix. In this section, we theoretically analyse how
this operation contributes to differential privacy preservation and why it maintains
prediction utility.
3.5.1 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we prove that our method satisfies -differential privacy according to
the following definition, where  = 1
2
r2maxn
tr(L)
.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 guarantee -differential privacy.
Proof. To prove that Algorithm 1 satisfies -differential privacy, we need to
prove that:
Pr[f(D) ∈ Ω] ≤ exp() · Pr[f(D′) ∈ Ω] (3.5.1)
We observe that the output of perturbed matrix A is composed of m identically
distributed columns. Each column is created by multiplying the original data with a
vector Xc ∈ Rd, whose entries are sampled from iid Gaussian distribution N(0, σ2),
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where σ2 = 1/m. Therefore, we prove Theorem 4 by showing that each column of
the perturbed matrix satisfies Equation 3.5.1.
Let Xci denote the entries of vector Xc, where, 1 ≤ i ≤ d. As Xci ∼ N(0, σ2),
therefore, Xc follows multi-dimensional Gaussian distribution, denote it as {Xci v
N(0,Σ)|0 ≤ i ≤ m}, where Σ =

σ2
...
σ2
. According to the linear combination
property of multi-dimensional Gaussian distribution, the transformed matrix A v
N(0, DΣDT), let L = DΣDT, L′ = D′ΣD′T. We have
Pr[f(D) ∈ Ω]
Pr[f(D′) ∈ Ω] =
PDFD(x)
PDF ′D(x)
=
1√
(2pi)rank(L)|L|
exp(−1
2
xTL−1)
1√
(2pi)rank(L
′)|L′|
exp(−1
2
xTL′−1x)
=
√
|L′|
|L| exp(−
1
2
(xTL−1x− xTL′−1x)) (3.5.2)
If L is full rank, the inverse matrix of L is L−1. However, when L is not full-
rank, there is no inverse matrix for L. Instead, we can use a pseudo-inverse L+ to
denote the generalization of the inverse matrix. The most widely used is the Moore-
Penrose pseudoinverse. It is clear that L−1 = L+ when L is full-rank according to the
definition of the Moore-Penrose inverse [89]. The pseudo-determinant of L is |L|+,
when L is full-rank, |A|+= |A|. Therefore, we have
Pr[f(D) ∈ Ω]
Pr[f(D′) ∈ Ω] =
√
|L′|+
|L|+ exp(−
1
2
(xTL+x− xTL′+x)) (3.5.3)
x ∈ Rn is a column vector with n dimension. L = DΣDT = σ2DDT. Let
F = D′−D, which is a matrix with less than t non-zero entries on the same row. We
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have
xTL′x = σ2xTD′D′Tx
= σ2xT(D + F )(D + F )Tx
= σ2xTDDTx+ xT(FDT +DFT + FFT)x
Given both matrix F and D are sparse, matrix F only has t non-zero entries.
Therefore, the matrix FDT and DFT are both zero matrices with a high probabil-
ity. Matrix FFT only has one non-negative entry on the main diagonal. Therefore,
xTFFTx ≥ 0. We have
xTL′x > σ2xTDDTx = xTLx (3.5.4)
The result of 3.5.4 can be rewritten as xT(L′ − L)x > 0, meaning that L′ − L is a
positive semi-definite matrix. L and L′ are the real symmetric matrices and satisfy
the definition of a Hermitian matrix. Therefore, we can write L′  L. Roughly, we
can deduce that L+  L′+. Further, L+ − L′+ is positive semi-definite, therefore,
xT(L+ − L′+)x ≥ 0. For further details, please refer to the literature [56]. Equation
3.5.3 can be written as follow:
Pr[f(D) ∈ Ω]
Pr[f(D′) ∈ Ω] ≤
√
|L′|+
|L|+ (3.5.5)
As L is a n×n Hermitian matrix, its singular value decomposition is L = UΣV∗.
U and V∗ are n × n unitary matrices, and Σ is a n × n diagonal matrix with non-
negative real numbers on its main diagonal, denoted as σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The entries σi
of Σ are known as single values of L and listed in descending order. If rank(L) = z,
|L|+= Πri=1σi. Matrix L′ is also a Hermitian matrix. We denote its single values as ξi,
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1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, ∑zi=1 ξi = tr(L′) ≤ tr(L) + tr(Q) ≤∑zi=1 σi + r2maxn. tr(L) is
the trace of the matrix L. It is defined as the sum of the values on the main diagonal.
Denote δi = ξi − σi,
∑z
i=1 δi ≤ r2maxn. It holds that
Pr[f(D) ∈ Ω]
Pr[f(D′) ∈ Ω] ≤
√
Πri=1(1 + δi/σi)
≤ e 12
∑z
i=1
δi
σi = e
1
2
r2maxn
tr(L) (3.5.6)
Let  = 1
2
r2maxn
tr(L)
, and we have Pr[f(D) ∈ Ω] ≤ ePr[f(D′) ∈ Ω] and, therefore, the
proposed method satisfies -differential privacy.
3.5.2 Utility Analysis
The utility in this chapter is measured by the accuracy of prediction, which in turn
is based on the quality of the neighbours, defined on COS and PCC. We use COS as
an example, and apply a well known utility definition suggested by Blum et al. [17].
Definition 15 ((α, β)-useful). A database access mechanism M is (α, β)-useful with
respect to COS query, if for every database D, with probability at least 1 − β, the
output of the mechanism M satisfies:
Pr[max|cos(u′, v′)− cos(u, v)|≤ α] ≥ 1− β (3.5.7)
Based on this definition, we prove that the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform is
bounded by α with high probability.
Theorem 5. For COS query on any pair of users, the output error caused by the
Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform is less than α with the probability at least 1 − β.
The proposed method is satisfied with (α, β)-useful when α <
√
d
2
lnβ
2
δ−1 .
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Proof.
The relationship between l2 Euclidean distance and cosine similarity is:
‖u− v‖ = ‖u‖+‖v‖−2uTv
= ‖u‖+‖v‖−2‖u‖‖v‖cos(u, v)
According to Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma 3.3.1, we get
cos(u, v) ≥ (‖u‖+‖v‖)(1− δ)− ‖u
′ − v′‖
2‖u‖‖v‖(1− δ)
Then, we have
max|cos(u′, v′)− cos(u, v)|
≤ ‖u
′‖+‖v′‖−‖u′ − v′‖
2‖u′‖‖v′‖ +
‖u′ − v′‖−(‖u‖+‖v‖)(1− δ)
2‖u‖‖v‖(1− δ)
≤ ‖u
′‖+‖v′‖−(‖u‖+‖v‖)(1− δ)
2‖u‖‖v‖(1− δ)
≤ ‖u
′‖+‖v′‖
2(‖u‖+‖v‖)(1− δ) −
1
2
≤ (‖u‖+‖v‖)‖X‖
2(‖u‖+‖v‖)(1− δ) −
1
2
=
‖X‖
2(1− δ) −
1
2
Accordingly,
Pr[max|cos(u′, v′)− cos(u, v)|> α]
= Pr[
‖X‖
2(1− δ) −
1
2
> α]
= Pr[
√
dm|x|> 2(α + 1
2
)(1− δ)]
= Pr[|x|> 2(α +
1
2
)(1− δ)√
dm
]
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Because variable x ∼ N(0, 1/m), according to the property of Gaussian distribu-
tion, we have
Pr[max|cos(u′, v′)− cos(u, v)|> α]
= 2
∫ ∞ √m√
2pi
e−
m
2
x2dx
=
2
√
m√
2pi
√∫∫
e−
m
2
r2rdrdθ
=
2
√
m√
2pi
√
2pi
∫
e−
m
2
r2rdr
=
2
√
m√
2pi
√
−2pi
m
e−
m
2
r2|∞
2
√
2(α+12 )(1−δ)√
dm
= 2e
− 2√
d
(α+ 1
2
)(1−δ)
let 2e
− 2√
d
(α+ 1
2
)(1−δ)
= β, we have
e
− 2√
d
(α+ 1
2
)(1−δ)
=
β
2
⇒ 2√
d
(α +
1
2
)(1− δ) = −lnβ
2
⇒ α =
√
d
2
lnβ
2
δ − 1 −
1
2
<
√
d
2
lnβ
2
δ − 1 (3.5.8)
et 2e−
√
2
d
(α+ 1
2
)(1−δ) ≤ β, we have
e−
√
2
d
(α+ 1
2
)(1−δ) ≤ β
2
⇒
√
2
d
(α +
1
2
)(1− δ) ≥ −lnβ
2
⇒ α ≥
√
d
2
lnβ
2
δ − 1 −
1
2
(3.5.9)
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Equation. 3.5.8 shows that the error introduced by Johnson-Lindenstrauss is
proportional to the square root of parameter d, which is the dimension of dataset
D and inversely proportionate to δ. This means that a lower dimension dataset
contributes to smaller error and a higher value of δ indicates that the similarity is
closer to the original one. As m = Ω(log(n)/δ2), in the experiment part, we observe in
the experiment section that with the decrease in the value of m, prediction accuracy is
closer to the traditional collaborative filtering method without the privacy operation.
or neighbourhood-based method, the quality of neighbours is decisive inaccuracy,
because the prediction is based on the neighbours’ rating history. In proposed method,
the neighbours of user ui are selected based on Cosine Similarity, which is a two norm
distance that is kept by Johnson Lindenstrass transform. It controls the error in the
range of [−δ, δ], where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/2. Science the original rating dataset is sparse,
the neighbours selected based on Cosine Similarity might not the best ones that have
the same taste with user ui. In proposed method, Johnson Lindenstrass transform
tighten the original dataset, make it have more reference for neighbour selecting. It
is possible to help to choose much closer neighbours, which can contribute to better
prediction. In experiment part, we apply Root Mean Square Error (RMSE ) as the
error metric to prove the utility of our method. The RMSE is defined as follows:
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
u=1
(rut − rˆut)2 (3.5.10)
RMSE represents the performance of prediction algorithm. A lower value implies
a better performance. Obviously, when the predict ratings are very close to the true
answer, the RMSE closes to 0.
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3.5.3 Time Complexity Analysis
Given n vectors with d dimension, compute all distance pairs. The time complexity
for traditional methods is O(n2d), while, for our method of applying the Johnson-
Lindenstrauss transform, the time complexity is O(n
2log(n)
δ2
+ dnlog(n)
δ2
). If we map down
the dimension from the originally very large space to a new much smaller dimensional
space. log(n)
δ2
would be very small, reducing the time complexity significantly.
3.6 Experiment and Analysis
3.6.1 Datasets
In the experiments, we used the Netflix1 and MovieLens2 datasets. The Netflix Prize
dataset is a real dataset released by Netflix, consisting of about 100 million movie
ratings accumulated over several years, which is sufficient to evaluate the performance
of the proposed method. Each movie was rated by 20−250 users and each user rated
at least 20 movies. The MovieLens dataset has about 1 million ratings rated by 6040
users on 3900 movies. We randomly chose one rating per user as the test dataset and
delete it from the original dataset. Our objective is to predict the missing ratings of
each user using the remaining ratings, and we applied root mean square error (RMSE )
to show the effectiveness of our method. RMSE is defined as follows:
RMSE =
√∑
ui,t∈T (ruit − ˆruit)2
|T | (3.6.1)
where ruit is the true rating user ui gives to item t, and ˆruit is the predicted rating.
T is the test dataset and |T | is its size. A lower RMSE represent a higher accuracy.
1http://www.netflixprize.com
2http://www.grouplens.org
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of the datasets
Dataset Number of item
Number of rated item
20-500 501-1000 >1000
Netflix 5000 4826 164 10
MovieLens 3952 5644 356 40
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Figure 3.2: Description of item rating
Table 3.3 and the Fig. 3.2 show the characteristics of the datasets we used. We
can see that the datasets are high dimensional and the rating records are very sparse.
Most users rated fewer than 500 items.
3.6.2 Experimental Setup
We conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of our methods by
answering the following questions:
• How does parameter m affect the prediction?
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m is the dimension of the transfer matrix, which is an important parameter for
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform. It determines the error introduced to the
result of the query. A smaller m means a lower dimension, which reduces the
computation complexity, but at the cost of accuracy. We test the effect of m in
terms of RMSE in the experiment.
• How does our method perform compared to related work?
To show the advantage of our method, we compared it to many other meth-
ods. We applied traditional differential privacy as the baseline mechanism, then
compared it with the work by Mohammad’s [8] work.
• How does our privacy operation affect prediction accuracy?
To determine how the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform affects the final predic-
tion, we compared it with a traditional collaborative filtering method that has
no privacy operations in terms of RMSE. In addition, we compared the Laplace
and Stretching mechanisms with a traditional collaborative filtering method to
illustrate the effect of these methods on prediction accuracy.
For a fair comparison, all the experiments were deployed with the same privacy
parameters. Section 3.4 shows that our method provides -differential privacy, where
 = 1
2
r2maxn
tr(L)
. Refer to the parameters of used datasets, The  < 1
2
. We define  = 1
2
for all other methods to make them comparable. Stretching method [8] works by
multiplying a scaling factor vi to rescale each tuple, then releasing the perturbed query
results with privacy parameter ε. We make vi =
1
2
and ε = 1. The Stretching method
satisfies -differential privacy, where  = viε =
1
2
. Table 3.3 lists the parameters
and default values used in our experiment. In addition, the sensitivity used in the
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experiments is global sensitivity. The neighbours are selected based on two popular
measurement metrics, Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) and Cosine Similarity
(COS).
Table 3.3: Values of various parameters
Parameters Description Values
m perturbed matrix dimension 500
k number of neighbours 10
 privacy parameter 0.5
µ expectation 0
σ2 variance 1
3.6.3 Effect of Dimension m
In the proposed method, m is an important parameter that determines the dimen-
sion of the new matrix. It directly impacts the performance of the prediction. To
determine how m contributes to the final prediction, we change the value of m from
100 to 5000 with a step of 100 for Netflix, and from 100 to 3900 with a step of
100 for MovieLens. The transfer matrix entries are sampled from standard normal
distribution N(0, 1).
Fig. 3.3 shows the results on Netflix and MovieLens, illustrating that the per-
formance of the proposed method is greatly improved by increasing the value of m.
When the dimension of the perturbed dataset increases, the RMSE shows a down-
ward trend on both Netflix and MovieLens. As shown in Fig. 3.3a, when m = 10 on
Netflix, an RMSE of 0.9833 is achieved. When m is increased, the RMSE decreases
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Figure 3.3: Impact of m on prediction performance
rapidly. When m = 1000, the RMSE is at 0.9422. After that, the performance starts
to level off. A similar result can be seen on MovieLens. As shown in Fig. 3.3b, when
m is in the range [10, 1000], the changes in RMSE is obvious. The prediction is much
more accurate when the dimension is much higher. When it reaches a threshold, the
performance is not expected to improve dramatically.
According to the Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma, the error caused by the linear
transform is related to the dimension of the perturbed dataset. Give a distance
error Er < 2δ, the bigger m becomes, the smaller δ becomes, and the error would be
controlled in a much smaller range. Therefore, if m is given a large value, performance
is better than if m is smaller.
It is clear that the RMSE achieved by the proposed method achieved is very close
to that of the non-privacy method, but the value is smaller. This means that when
k = 10 (10 neighbours are selected), the performance of the proposed method is even
better than traditional collaborative filtering without a privacy operation, whether
on Netflix or Movielens. Traditional collaborative filtering achieves RMSE of 0.9873
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on Netflix. As shown in Fig. 3.3a, when m > 20, all the values of RMSE achieved
by our method are smaller than 0.9873. This means that the proposed method even
outperforms non-privacy method when m > 20. When m < 20, the RMSE achieved
by our method is only 1% bigger than the non-privacy method. The results on the
MovieLens dataset are shown in Fig. 3.3b. We observe that whatever the value of
m (m ≥ 10 in the experiment), the performance of the proposed method was always
better than traditional collaborative filtering. This means that our method achieves
its privacy preservation objective while enhancing prediction accuracy, which can
be attributed to the randomized operation that contributes to the improvement in
performance.
3.6.4 Comparison with Other Related Methods
In this section, we examine the performance of the proposed method in relation to
state-of-art methods in terms of RMSE. We compared our method with the traditional
Laplace and Stretching mechanisms, using the same privacy parameters. We defined
the dimension of the transformed matrix as m = 500. As shown in Fig. 3.3, when m =
500, k = 10, the proposed method had lower computational complexity and achieved
good performance on both Netflix and MovieLens. To conduct a comprehensive
examination, we varied the number of neighbours between 5 and 50 in Step 5 on two
datasets, and defined the neighbours in both COS and PCC.
Fig. 3.4 shows the results of the comparison. It is clear that the proposed method
outperforms all other methods in all configurations. Fig. 3.5a and 3.5b show the
performance of all methods with the COS matrix on Netflix and MovieLens respec-
tively. Fig. 3.5c and 3.5d show the performance of these methods with the PCC
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Figure 3.4: Comparison with other related works
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matrix on each of these datasets. As shown in Fig. 3.5a, all four methods achieve
better RMSE as k increases. This is because the quality of the prediction depends
on the quality of the selected neighbours. The greater the number of neighbours, the
more likelihood there is of selecting good quality neighbours. When the number of
neighbours exceeds a certain value, however, selecting too many bad neighbours can
reduce prediction accuracy. Our method performed much better than the Laplace
and Stretching mechanisms in all cases and across all k values. When k = 15 on
Netflix with the COS metric, The Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform method achieves
RMSE at 0.9344, outperforming the result of 0.9845 by the Stretching mechanism by
5.01% and the result of 0.9876 by the Laplace mechanism by 5.32%. When k > 25,
the values of RMSE stabilize and remain at level, but the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
transform method still outperforms the other two methods. A similar result can be
observed on Netflix with the PCC matrix in Fig. 3.5c.
Fig. 3.5b and 3.5d show the results on the MovieLens dataset. It is observed that
the performance of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform also outperforms the other
two methods across all k values. When k = 20, the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform
method outperforms other methods by around 4% in terms of RMSE regardless of
whether the COS metric or PCC metric is used. This advantage is retained no matter
how many neighbours are selected.
3.6.5 Comparison with Non-privacy Collaborative Filtering
To examine the effect of all these methods on prediction accuracy, we compare them
with a traditional collaborative filtering method without a privacy operation. We call
this the non-privacy method. As in Section 3.6.4, we vary the value k from 5 to 50
67
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
k
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
R
M
SE
JL Transform
No Privacy
Laplace
Stretching
(a) Netflix/COS
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
k
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
R
M
SE
JL Transform
No Privacy
Laplace
Stretching
(b) MovieLens/COS
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
k
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
R
M
SE
JL Transform
No Privacy
Laplace
Stretching
(c) Netflix/PCC
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
k
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
R
M
SE
JL Transform
No Privacy
Laplace
Stretching
(d) MovieLens/PCC
Figure 3.5: Comparison with non-privacy method
in Step 5 on Netflix and MovieLens. The neighbours are still defined on both COS
and PCC and m is assigned a value of 500.
Fig. 3.5 shows the results on Netflix and MovieLens when m = 500. It is clear that
the performance of both the Laplace and Stretching mechanisms is very close to the
performance of the non-privacy method, but not as good. This means that although
these two mechanisms can preserve users’ privacy, It is at the cost of utility. However,
it is observed that the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform significantly outperforms the
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non-privacy method across all k values. The utility of the dataset is not sacrificed, and
the accuracy of the prediction is enhanced. When k = 15, the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
transform method outperforms the non-privacy method by more than 4% on Netflix
with the COS metric, and by around 3% with the PCC metric. In contrast, the
prediction accuracy achieved by the other two methods is not as good as that achieved
by non-privacy methods. Similar results can be seen on MovieLens with both the COS
metric and the PCC metric, shown in Fig. 3.5b and Fig. 3.5d respectively.
The results of the experiments show that when m = 500, the proposed method
is always better than the non-privacy method, no matter how many neighbours are
selected. As mentioned in Section 3.6.3, the positive result is due to the randomized
operation, which contributes to improved performance.
3.7 Summary
The privacy problem is a big concern in recommendation systems. Users would be
more likely to contribute more extensively to systems if their personal information
could be preserved. Differential privacy has become a proven, well-accepted pri-
vacy model for guaranteeing user privacy in recent years. In spite of this strong
privacy guarantee, however, existing differential privacy methods preserve users’ pri-
vacy at the cost of utility. This chapter studies the privacy preservation problem in
neighbourhood-based collaborative filtering, and proposes a Johnson-Lindenstrauss-
based method to preserve the information of individual users while improving the per-
formance of the recommender system. Theoretical analysis shows that the proposed
method satisfies -differential privacy. In addition, the proposed method outperforms
the state-of-the-art methods.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-Preserving in the Internet
of Things
4.1 Introduction
Data aggregation is considered to be an essential research topic in the Internet of
Things (IoT). For example, energy companies collect and aggregate utility data from
sensors installed at customer sites, which is used to improve the overall reliability
and efficiency of their infrastructure [79]. Likewise, in traffic monitoring systems,
traffic flow data is collected by road-side sensors and used to analyze the network
to improve services for drivers [163]. In wireless body area networks, health data is
collected through mobile or wearable devices to monitor a user’s health indicators,
but aggregated data is needed for medical research [52].
Given the often sensitive nature of the data involved, privacy is an important
issue in data aggregation. For instance, health data, such as blood pressure and
temperature, can reveal a user’s health status, and electricity usage patterns can be
used to profile a customer’s lifestyle and daily routines [135]. For this reason, many
people choose not to participate in sensory systems without a strong guarantee of
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privacy.
Methods to preserve the privacy of aggregated data have been developed by several
scholars [54,64,118,168,173]. However, most are based on encryption technology, such
as homomorphic encryption. For example, Dong et al.’s [30] data aggregation method
for smart grids is based on EIGamal-based homomorphic privacy preservation, while
Abdallah et al.’s scheme [3] introduce lightweight lattice-based homomorphic privacy
preservation. Despite these efforts, there are many problems with the existing meth-
ods.
• Computation overhead. Homomorphic encryption typically results in massive
computational overheads [79], which increases the burden of processing and
analysis on cloud services. Additionally, these methods are not practical for
sensors with limited energy.
• Communication efficiency. The communication overheads are high, especially
when the system contains thousands of sensors with high reporting frequency,
because each sensor needs to report its encrypted data to the cloud at the same
time.
• Single aggregation function calculation. Most existing methods can only cal-
culate a single aggregation function. In practice, the ideal aggregation scheme
would allow flexible aggregation queries to meet diversified aggregation goals
with only one round of communication.
To solve these problems, we propose a privacy-preserving data aggregation method
based on machine learning within a fog computing architecture. Fog computing ar-
chitectures distribute computation and data storage to the edge of the network, i.e.,
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to devices that sit between the data source and the cloud server. This type of ar-
chitecture reduces the amount of data transported to the cloud, improving efficiency
and alleviating much of the burden on the server itself. Additionally, in our method,
the aggregator resides at the center of the fog and only the aggregation results are
reported to the cloud server, which significantly increases communication efficiency.
Aggregation queries are answered by learning a model, which is trained to predict
the query results through a process that satisfies differential privacy. Multiple aggre-
gation functions can be calculated, including additive aggregation and non-additive
aggregation. Finally, the method does not apply encryption technology, so the sensors
only need to report raw data without the need for a complex cipher process.
In summary, this chapter offers the following contributions.
• We propose a novel privacy-preserving data aggregation method under fog com-
puting architecture, which reduces the communication overhead and releases the
cloud burdens.
• The proposed privacy-preserving data aggregation method is based on machine
learning. The trained learning model can be used to predict the aggregation
query results and supports multiple aggregation functions, which allows the
server provides various services.
• The proposed data aggregation method satisfies differential privacy, which pro-
vides rigorous privacy protection for sensory data. Efficiently defend the differ-
ential attack that appears in most aggregation functions.
• We theoretically analyse the privacy and utility of proposed methods and ex-
tensive experimental results show that the proposed method generates highly
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accurate aggregated results.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 proposes the research
problem. We present our privacy preservation method and theoretically analyze its
privacy and utility in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Section 4.5 details the results
of the experiments. Section 4.6 discusses the related work, and Section 4.7 concludes
the chapter.
4.2 Problem Statement
4.2.1 Notations
LetSfc = {s1, s2, ..., sg} be a group of sensors. These sensors report the sensory data
to the fog nodes f1 and f2. The fog node trains a learning model M using the
collected data and predicts the query results. Let Q{q1, q2, ..., qt} be a set of queries
which generated by the fog center. Additional notations are shown in Table 4.1.
4.2.2 System Model
As shown in Fig. 4.1, the system model is composed of four entities: sensors, fog
nodes, the fog center, and a cloud server. A description of each entity follows.
• Sensors : The sensors, which might be embedded in smart devices, collect the
data. To address privacy concerns, the original data is partitioned and sepa-
rately reported to two fixed fog nodes.
• Fog nodes : The fog nodes are efficient devices for computing and storing data
that extend the edge of the cloud service. These devices serve as storage to
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Table 4.1: Notations
Notation Description
q query
Q query set
si sensor
fi fog node
SQ query sensitivity
Smax biggest value of query sensitivity
QA query results
QˆA perturbed query results
M training model
answer aggregation queries sent from the fog center.
• Fog center : The fog center is in charge of three important tasks. First, it
transfers queries to the appropriate aggregation query set to be answered by
the fog nodes. Second, it gathers the returned query results from the fog nodes.
Third, it calculates the original query results and reports them to the cloud
server.
• Cloud server : The cloud server is managed by the service provider and deployed
as the aggregation application. This server is powerful and is used to process
and analyze large amounts of aggregation data to provide information and assist
with a wide range of services.
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Figure 4.1: The private multifunctional aggregation system model
4.2.3 Adversary Model
In this chapter, we assume that the cloud server and the fog center are untrusted.
Both will try to acquire the true values of the collected data, which is either sensitive
or could be used to infer private information about the service users, or both. The
fog nodes are semi-trusted, which means they are curious about the collected data
but are not able to collude with each other.
4.2.4 Design Objectives
Our objective is to design an efficient data aggregation method that preserves the
privacy of the users’ data and allows for multifunctional aggregation queries in an
IoT setting. Within this problem, there are three primary objectives:
• to ensure multifunctional aggregation is implemented correctly. To suit practical
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requirements, the method must include flexible aggregation functions to meet
diverse analysis requirements for a wide and diverse range of services. There-
fore, a mechanism that can satisfy multifunctional aggregation requirements
and flexibly answer a range of data aggregation queries is highly desirable.
• to guarantee the privacy of the collected user data. Adversarial models consider
possible privacy threats to an individual’s privacy and, given that the data
collected often pertains to a user’s health or behavioral habits, the aggregation
scheme developed must satisfy each individual’s privacy with a guarantee of
-differential privacy.
• to ensure the aggregation results are close to the results without privacy protec-
tion. As the proposed system needs to satisfy  - differential privacy, any noise
added to the training set will reduce the accuracy of the aggregation results.
(How accuracy is evaluated is defined in Definition 17.) Hence, the method
must include a way to adjust the sensitivity and the amount of added noise to
ensure the accuracy of the aggregation results are (α, β)-useful.
4.3 Proposed Scheme
In this chapter, we propose a multifunctional aggregation framework based on ma-
chine learning. In general, the data collected from each region are used to train a
learning model, which, in turn, is used to predict multiple query results. The pre-
dicted query results are then further processed to calculate the required aggregation
function. This framework is able to deliver multifunctional aggregation in one round
of communication without disclosing the sensory data to any party.
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Fig. 4.2 illustrates the complete aggregation process. Within the framework, two
fog nodes are in charge of collecting data from each region. Once a sensor collects some
information, it randomly partitions the data into two parts and separately transmits
one part to each of the two fog nodes. Because the fog nodes cannot collude, neither
node can integrate or infer the true values of the sensor data. Each fog node receives
data from many sensors, and once assembled, the fog node trains a learning model
using the data it has received. Once trained, the learning model is able to predict the
summation of any sensor’s value. To defend against differential attacks, the training
dataset is generated using a process that satisfies differential privacy. The fog center
fetches the query results from the two fog nodes, calculates the aggregation results,
and returns those results to the cloud server.
Collect data 
Answer queries got 
from cloud server 
and sent back to 
cloud server
Sending the queries Q 
for multifunction
Generate query set 
QS according to 
the queries got 
from cloud server
Gather the 
query 
results QA
Training learning 
model M2
Training learning 
model M1
Partition the 
collected data to 
two parts ( si1,si2) 
Sensors Fog nodes Fog center Cloud server
si1
si2
QS
QS
Predict query 
result QA1
Predict query 
result QA2
QA1
QA2
Q
Query 
results
Figure 4.2: Aggregation process
4.3.1 Data Aggregation Protocol
This section presents the proposed privacy-preserving data aggregation method. The
method includes three stages: processing the query, generating the sensor report, and
predicting the query results while preserving privacy.
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Query Processing
As previously mentioned, this method supports multiple functions simultaneously.
Allowable query functions are min, max, medium, σ-percentile, average, and summa-
tion aggregation. The cloud server sends all these queries together to the fog center.
The fog center sends each newly generated query set to a fog node to be answered,
and the fog node returns the results to the cloud server. In detail, the process is as
follows:
• Step 1: Query set generation. The fog nodes cannot answer min, max, medium,
σ-percentile, and average queries directly, which means the fog center must
generate the proper queries first. To illustrate this process, consider a min
aggregation as an example. Assuming the query q = min(s1, s3, s4) represents
the min value of sensors s1, s3 and s4, the fog center generates three independent
queries to determine the value of each sensor, as shown in Table II. The same
method is used for max, medium, and σ-percentile queries.
Table 4.2: New query generation
New Query s1 s2 s3 s4
q1 1 0 0 0
q2 0 0 1 0
q3 0 0 0 1
To calculate average queries, we simply sum the values of the queried sensor.
• Calculating the original query results. Assume a query set Q(q1, q2, ...qn) is a
newly generated query that requires different aggregation functions, say, min,
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max, medium, σ-percentile and average. The methods for calculating the corre-
sponding query results are shown below:
– Min: minD = min{q1(D), q2(D), ...qn(D)}
– Max: maxD = max{q1(D), q2(D), ...qn(D)}
– Medium: If n is odd, medD = qi(D), where |[min, qi(D)|≥ (n+ 1)/2|[qi(D),max|) ≥ (n+ 1)/2
If n is even, medD = (qi(D) + qj(D))/2, where
|[min, qi(D)]|≥ n/2
|[qi(D),max]|≥ n/2 + 1
|[min, qj(D)]|≥ n/2 + 1
|[qj(D),max]|≥ n/2
– σ-percentile: perD = qi(D), where
 |[min, qi(D)]|≥ bσn/100c|[qi(D),max]|≥ b(100− σ)n/100c
– Average: aveD =
∑
qi(D)
n
– Summation: sumD =
∑n
i=1 qi(D)
In the above, min, max, medium, σ-percentile, and average of a dataset D are
denoted as minD, maxD, medD, perD, and aveD, respectively. |[a, b]| refers to the
number of values that fall within the range [a, b]. Once calculated, the fog center
sends the aggregation results back to the cloud server for further processing.
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Sensor Report Generation
Assume that the sensors report their sensory data to the fog nodes every 15 minutes.
And to provide the required range of services, they must report their data simultane-
ously. To avoid disclosing any real information to the fog nodes, a simple algorithm
that resides on the sensor device partitions the data before it is sent. Specifically,
each sensor si ∈ Sfc gathers sensory data m at time point tγ and carries out the
following protocol:
• Step 1: A random number κ ∈ 0 m is generated for the current time point tγ.
• Step 2: The sensor reports κ to the fog node f1 through a wireless network.
• Step 3: The sensor calculates the value of ι and reports it to the fog node f2,
where ι = m− κ.
Predicting the query results while preserving privacy
After receiving all the reported data from the sensors, the fog node predicts the query
results according to the following steps:
• Step 1: Generate a training set.
The fog node generates a query set QS with ν queries. Each query includes
Sfc features, which are the features of the sensory data. Sensitivity needs to be
considered during the process of generating the training set because, without
proper calibration, substantial errors can occur. Query sensitivity is defined as
follows:
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Definition 4.3.1 (Query sensitivity:). Given a group of queries Q(q1, q2, ..., qν)
over a data set D, the query sensitivity SQ is defined as follow:
SQ = max
ν∑
i=1
sign(| qi(D)− qi(D′) |), (4.3.1)
where D′ is the neighbouring dataset of D.
Query sensitivity evaluates how many queries results are affected by a single
record. To reduce the query sensitivity, the feature being queried is controlled
within Smax times in each query set, where Smax ≤ ν.
To ensure the model satisfies differential privacy and can defend against dif-
ferential attacks, Laplace noise is added to the query results. Specifically, the
noisy answer QˆA = QA+ {Lap(Smax/), Lap(Smax/), ..., Lap(Smax/)}, where
QA represents the vector of the query results.
• Step 2: Training the learning model.
The training set generated in the last step < Q, QˆA > is used to train the
learning model. Given the sensory data is made up of numerical values, the
model M could be trained using a variety of regression algorithms. In this
chapter, we used a simple linear regression algorithm that demonstrated good
performance during the experiments.
• Step 3: Predicting the query results.
The trained model is then used to predict the results of fresh queries Q sent by
fog center. Specifically, ˆQ(D) = MQ, ˆQ(D) is the noisy answers of queries.
In summary, the proposed method addresses the three challenges mentioned in
Section 4.1 - computation overheads, communication overheads, and multifunctional
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aggregation. The lack of required encryption technology ameliorates the computation
overhead, and introducing a machine learning process coupled with a fog architecture
allows for more powerful computing power and greater storage capabilities. As such,
the sensor nodes only need to report raw, unprocessed data, and the fog center dis-
tributes tasks to a number of fog nodes, which reduces the burden on the cloud server.
Communication efficiency is improved by only reporting the aggregation results to the
cloud server rather than all the sensory data. And the last section demonstrates the
power of multifunctional aggregation within the proposed protocol.
4.4 Privacy and Utility
In this section, we theoretically analyze the privacy and utility of our method.
4.4.1 Privacy Analysis
In the proposed method, generating the training set is the only process that consumes
the privacy budget. Theorem 10 shows that the proposed data release method satisfies
-differential privacy.
Theorem 6. Each record in a given datasetD represents the sensory data of one sensor,
and each record is independent of the others. Thus, the proposed privacy-preserving
aggregation method can provide  - differential privacy.
Proof.
Let Q be a set of training queries. Laplace noise is added to the query results,
generating a noisy answer ˆQ(D) = Q(D) + Laplace(smax/). Throughout the entire
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process, the original dataset D can only be accessed by the training queries. The pro-
cess for training the model is based on the training dataset, whereas the prediction
process is based on the trained learning model. These processes do not consume any
of the privacy budget and cannot disclose any private information because the orig-
inal dataset is not interrogated. Therefore, every aspect of this aggregation method
satisfies -differential privacy. Additionally, the original sensory data is divided into
two parts and reported separately to the two fog nodes. Each fog node conducts its
protocols independently. Hence, each fog node also satisfies -differential privacy.
In the analysis below, we examine the composite property of the privacy budget
for the entire dataset to determine the privacy guarantee is satisfied.
Theorem 7 (Parallel Composition [93]). Assume we have a set of privacy mechanisms
M = {M1,M2, ...,Mm}, and each M〉 provides i privacy guarantee on a disjoint
subset of the entire dataset, M provides max(i) - differential privacy.
Theorem. 11 directly illustrates the privacy guarantee in the proposed method.
The sensory data is sliced into two parts; therefore, the data received by the fog nodes
are disjoint and independent of each other. According to Theorem. 11, the set of
privacy mechanisms {M1,M2, ...,Mm} will consume the max{1, 2, ..., m} of the
privacy budget. In our method, each fog node is assigned the same privacy budget;
therefore, the proposed method preserves differential privacy.
4.4.2 Utility Analysis
In this section, we apply a well-known utility definition suggested by Blum et al. [17]
to measure the accuracy of the proposed privacy framework.
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Definition 16 ((α, β)-useful). A mechanism M is (α, β)-useful with respect to a set
of queries, if for every data set D, with a probability of at least 1− β, the output of
the mechanism M satisfies
Pr[max| ˆM(celli)−M(celli)|≤ α] ≥ 1− β . (4.4.1)
Based on the definition of accuracy (Definition 17), we demonstrate that a certain
value of α bounds the errors caused by our method with a high probability.
Theorem 8. The output errors of a set of the queries on collected data caused by the
proposed method is bounded by α with a probability of at least 1− β. The proposed
method is satisfied with (α, β)-usefulness when α < max{
√
4sln
2|H|
β
m
,
√
n2ln
|H|
β
m
}.
Proof.
The errors caused by the proposed method occur when noise is added to the
training set and when training the model. Suppose the chosen learning algorithm for
the model has a hypothesis set H = {h1, h2, ..., hi} of size |H|. The error probability
is denoted as follows:
Pr[error] ≤ Pr[errorn] + Pr[errorm], (4.4.2)
where errorn refers to the errors caused by adding noise, and errorm refers to the
errors caused by the training model.
To satisfy differential privacy, Laplace noise is added to the entire training set.
The level of error can be calculated using the properties of Laplace noise, presented
as sums of Laplace random variables, as shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Sums of Laplace random Variables [67]). . Let λ1, λ2, ..., λm be a set of
independent random variables drawn from Laplace(σ). Then for every α > 0,
Pr(|
∑
λi
m
|> α) = exp(−mα
2
4σ
). (4.4.3)
84
As errorn =
∑
i| ˆfi(D)−fi(D)|
m
, we have Pr[errorn > α] = Pr[
∑
i| ˆfi(D)−fi(D)|
m
< α].
For each fi, the number of errors are equal to the random variable λi sampled from
Laplace( s

). Therefore, Pr[errorn > α] = Pr(|
∑
λi
m
|> α). According to the Lemma 1,
Pr[errorn > α] = exp(−mα
2
4σ
) = exp(−mα
2
4s
) (4.4.4)
For all hypotheses h ∈ H, we then have
Pr[errorn > α] = |H|exp(−mα
2
4s
). (4.4.5)
Let β = 2|H|exp(−mα2
4s
), we have α =
√
4sln
2|H|
β
m
.
The error errorm can be analyzed with the help of the Chernoff˙Hoeffding bound
[67], shown as follow.
Lemma 2 (Real-valued Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound [67]). Let X1, ..., Xm be indepen-
dent random variables with E[Xi] = u and a ≤ Xi ≤ b for all i, then for every
α > 0,
Pr(|
∑
iXi
m
|> α) ≤ 2exp(−2α
2m
(b− a)2 ). (4.4.6)
All queries to train the model are range queries. If the dataset has n records and
each value is 1, the output of the query range from 0 to n. As errorm =
∑
i|fi(D)−fi(M)|
m
,
Pr[errorm > α] = Pr[
∑
i|fi(D)−fi(M)|
m
) > α]. According to Lemma 2, for each hypothe-
sis h ∈ H, we have Pr[errorm > α] = Pr[
∑
i|fi(D)−fi(M)|
m
) > α] ≤ 2exp(−2α2m
n2
). Thus,
for all hypothesis, we then have
Pr[errorm > α] ≤ 2|H|exp(−2α
2m
n2
). (4.4.7)
Let β = 2× 2|H|exp(−2α2m
n2
), we have α =
√
n2ln
|H|
β
m
.
Therefore,
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Pr[error > α] ≤ Pr[errorn > α] + Pr[errorm > α]]
≤ |H|exp(−mα
2
4s
) + 2|H|exp(−2α
2m
n2
) (4.4.8)
Let β = |H|exp(−mα2
4s
)+2|H|exp(−2α2m
n2
), we get that when α < max{
√
4sln
2|H|
β
m
,
√
n2ln
|H|
β
m
},
the accuracy of proposed method satisfies the (α, β) − useful definition. In other
worlds, the error is controlled by α = max{
√
4sln
2|H|
β
m
,
√
n2ln
|H|
β
m
} with a probability of
at least 1− β.
4.5 Experiment Evaluation
4.5.1 Experimental Setup
Dataset. We used two real-world datasets to evaluate the performance of our
method. The Reference Energy Disaggregation Data Set (REDD) contains specific in-
formation about the electricity consumption of many real homes over several months.
MHEALTH [112] is a mobile health dataset, which contains more than 1 million
records, each comprising the data from 24 different sensor signals. Given each signal
is at the same scale, we randomly chose one type of signal for evaluation.
Metrics. We used the mean absolute error (MAE) to evaluate the accuracy of
the results, defined as follows:
MAE =
1
m
∑
Qi∈Q
| ˆQi(D)−Qi(D)|, (4.5.1)
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where Qi(D) is the true aggregation result for one query, and ˆQ(D) is the perturbed
aggregation result that calculated through our aggregation framework. A lower MAE
represents a higher accuracy.
Comparison. Within our proposed aggregation framework, multifunctional ag-
gregation could be achieved very simply using a traditional Laplace differential privacy
method (LapDP). The fog node could be used as regional storage and to release the
query results used in the aggregation function calculations. Hence, we compared our
machine learning-based method (MLDP) to the traditional LapDP method.
Parameters. Table 4.3 lists the parameter settings for our experiment.
Table 4.3: Parameters
Parameter Description Value Default
T Size of training set 1− 500 200
Qs Size of query set 1− 100 100
 Privacy budget 0.1− 1 1
σ Percentile query parameter – 0.3
4.5.2 Experiment Results
To compare the performance of the proposed method with LapDP, we assessed the
results of several aggregation functions - sum, max, min, σ-percentile and average -
in terms MAE with a number of different conditions. These were:
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Figure 4.3: Performance with different sizes of query set
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Figure 4.4: Performance with different sizes of query set
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Performance by varying size of query set
The query set is used to calculate all aggregation functions. This experiment exam-
ined the performance of the proposed method on both the REDD and MHEALTH
datasets with query sets Qs ranging from 1 to 500.
Fig. 4.4 shows the impact of the size of the query set on the performance of
both methods in terms of MAE. With all aggregation functions on all the datasets,
LapDP’s MAE linearly increased as the size of query set grew, while MLDP remained
stable. This is because, given a fixed privacy budget, the sensitivity in LapDP in-
creases linearly with the growth of query set and, in turn, the amount of noise added
to the query result also increases linearly. However, because MLDP satisfies differ-
ential privacy during the training process, the size of the query set has no effect on
performance with a fixed privacy budget.
We also observed that LapDP showed better performance than MLDP with a
small enough query set. But MLDP significantly outperformed LapDP as the size of
the query set grew. For example, Fig. 4.4h shows the performance results for the max
function on the REDD dataset. At Qs < 20, MLDP has a higher MAE than LapDP,
whereas at Qs > 20, MLDP’s MAE is lower than LapDP. Similarly, Fig. 4.3d shows
MLDP with a higher MAE than LapDP up to Qs ≈ 18, at which point it starts to
perform better than LapDP. We find the same results for other aggregation functions
on both REDD (Figs. 4.4g-4.3f) and the MHEALTH dataset (Figs. 4.6g-4.6l). For
example, LapDP performed 50% better than MLDP with the min function on the
MHEALTH dataset, with an MAE of 42.2 compared to MLDP’s 94.1 at Qs = 5.
However, at Qs = 14, LapDP and MLDP show similar performance, with an MAE of
96.4 and 94.3, respectively, and at Qs > 20, MLDP significantly outperforms LapDP.
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Figure 4.5: Performance with different privacy budgets
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Figure 4.6: Performance with different privacy budgets
92
These results indicate that MLDP performs well, and significantly outperforms the
traditional Laplace method, when calculating aggregation functions on large datasets.
Varying the levels of privacy budget
The privacy budget determines the amount of noise that is added to the training set
and the query results. To determine how the privacy budget contributes to the final
aggregation results, we changed the budget from 0.1 to 1 in steps of 0.1 for both
datasets and fixed the training and query sets.
Fig. 4.6 shows the variations in the tendencies of all aggregation functions for the
REDD and MHEALTH datasets along with the privacy budget . We observe that
the MAE decreased as the privacy budget  increased with both MLDP and LapDP.
This is because a smaller privacy budget  means more noise needs to be added.
Correspondingly, as the privacy budget increases, less noise needs to be added, which
means the results are less perturbed, leading to higher accuracy and a smaller MAE.
In addition, we observed that our method consistently outperformed LapDP, with a
lower MAE for all aggregation functions. As shown in Figs. 4.5b and 4.5c, when
 = 0.2, LapDP scored an MAE of 1156 and 2941 for the max and min functions,
respectively, while MLDP scored 47.61 and 48.17 - a significant improvement. When
 = 0.8, LapDP resulted in an MAE of 236 for the max function and 667 for the
min function, which is much larger than the MAE values of 34.24 and 60.00 for our
method. We observed similar results for the other aggregation functions, as shown
in Figs. 4.5a, 4.5d, 4.5e, and 4.5f. In addition, we observed that varying the privacy
budget had a tremendous impact on LapDP’s performance, while MLDP only showed
small changes in performance. For example, in Fig. 4.5e, when  = 1, LapDP’s MAE
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was 190 for average aggregation, yet at  = 0.1, LapDP’s MAE rose to 1781 - an
increase of around 90%. In contrast, MLDP’s MAE rose from 171 to 180 - an increase
of only around 6%. Figs. 4.6g - 4.6l show the results for the MHEALTH dataset with
similar observations. This is because LapDP has a much higher sensitivity than
MLDP to begin with, which means it adds much more noise to the original data.
Hence, when the privacy budget is halved, the amount of noise doubles. In LapDP’s
case, this doubling results in a huge amount of noise which significantly impacts
accuracy, while for MLDP, doubling the small level of initial noise does not result in
nearly as great a drop in accuracy.
Performance by varying size of training set
Our theoretical analysis indicated that the size of the training set would play a vital
role in the accuracy of the aggregation result. To observe the change in performance
with different sized training sets, we increased the number of instances from 1 to 500
and tested all the aggregation functions using MLDP on both datasets. We then
compared the results to the MAEs for the LapDP method with both a fixed privacy
budget and fixed query set size.
Fig. 4.8 shows the results for the REDD and MHEALTH datasets, illustrating
that the performance of the proposed method is greatly improved by increasing the
size of the training set, initially, but once the training set reaches a certain value, the
MAE reaches its nadir and become stable. As shown in Fig. 4.7e, the MAE continues
to decrease until the training set contains 120 record where, at MAE = 4.0, the MAE
reaches its lowest point. Subsequent increases in the size of the training set result in
an MAE that fluctuates around 4. Fig. 4.7f shows the results for the σ - percentile
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aggregation. When the size of the training set is below 100, the MAE is very high but
decreases significantly as the size of the training set increases, but at T > 150, the
MAE no longer decreases. Similar results were observed on the MHEALTH dataset,
as shown in Figs. 4.8g - 4.8l.
Given MLDP’s performance is impacted by a mixture of noise and model errors,
when the size of the training set is small, the sensitivity and noise levels are small, so
the model errors play a more dominant role. Hence, the MAE decreases significantly
with an increase in the size of the training set. However, beyond a certain threshold,
a large training set carries too much sensitivity and noise to offset the increase in
accuracy size brings. At this point, noise reduces the utility of the model and the
MAE stops decreasing.
4.6 Related Work
Existing data aggregation methods typically use homomorphic encryption when ag-
gregating data to ensure privacy [52, 78, 170, 174–176]. Zhang et al. [176] proposed a
solution based on peer-to-peer protocols, called VPA, to preserve privacy in people-
centric urban sensing systems. VPA supports a wide range of statistical additive and
non-additive aggregations, but cannot defend against the differential attacks common
to most data aggregation scenarios. Zhang et al. [170] proposed a priority-based ag-
gregation solution for health data (PHDA), which includes privacy protection and
also improves the cloud aggregation efficiency of the cloud service and the privacy of
data privacy in WBANs. PHDA uses the relationships between its users and fixed
social spots to choose the best relay for providing reliable data aggregation. In ad-
dition, PHDA can also withstand both internal and external forgery attacks, but
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it does not handle differential attack very well. Li et al. [78] proposed an efficient
privacy-preserving protocol, called EPADA, which calculates sum aggregations from
time-series data. The protocol uses additive homomorphic encryption and a novel key
management technique to support a large plain-text space. Although the proposed
method is easily extendable to min aggregations with just one round of communica-
tion, it is more difficult to adapt to compute multifunctional aggregations, especially
non-additive aggregate functions, such as percentile and average. Han et al. [52] pro-
posed a privacy-preserving multifunctional aggregation mechanism, also for health
data. The cloud server is able to calculate multiple statistical functions and provides
a range of services, each with privacy protection. This method supports both additive
and non-additive aggregation functions.
However, all these schemes using encryption technology to protect the user’s data
and, since encryption usually results in a significant computational overhead, they are
not practical for use with energy-limited sensors like smartphones. In addition, the
computational burden on the cloud server is heavy, especially when aggregating data
that is reported with high frequency. A fog computing architecture allows computing
services to reside at the edge of the network. Hence, a local aggregation device can
be used to calculate the query results, which reduces the communication and compu-
tation overheads on the cloud server. Several papers have already explored privacy
problems related to data aggregation in fog computing [44, 60, 88, 102]. For exam-
ple, Huang et al. [60] proposed a model that filters multiple encrypted XML streams
and performs aggregation operations without decryption in a fog node. Lu et al. [88]
proposed a lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for fog computing-
enhanced IoT devices. However, most also include homomorphic encryption schemes,
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which does not solve the problem of sensors with limited energy resources.
Different from the existing method, the proposed method applied differential pri-
vacy technology, which significantly reduced the computation overhead compared
with encryption-based method. In addition, we transfer the sensory data to a learn-
ing model, which allows multiple types of query while preventing differential attack.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a privacy-preserving multifunctional data aggregation
method based on machine learning. Within the method, a training dataset com-
prising the aggregation queries is used to train a machine learning model, which in
turn predicts the aggregation results. The method allows for multiple aggregation
functions without disclosing a user’s privacy. The framework operates within a fog
computing architecture, which means the computationally heavy aggregation tasks
are distributed to the edge of the network, alleviating this burden from the cloud
server. Additionally, only the aggregation results are sent to the server rather than
all the sensory data, which significantly improves communication efficiency. Experi-
mental results prove that the proposed method answers various aggregation queries
with high accuracy.
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Chapter 5
Privacy-Preserving in
Location-based Services
5.1 Introduction
The pervasive diffusion of GPS-enabled devices has provided tremendous opportu-
nities for the development of location-based services (LBSs). A typical example is
providing recommendations about nearby points of interest (POIs). A user queries
an LBS with their current location, and the LBS returns the corresponding POIs.
Even though LBSs provide great benefits, they come at the cost of exposing a user’s
location. Where a person is, is sensitive information. It can easily be linked to highly
confidential details, such as their home address, and their religious practices. There-
fore, devising a solution that allows users to benefit from LBSs while guaranteeing
the privacy of their location is highly desirable.
Numerous location privacy protection methods have been proposed in the last
decade. Most solutions proposed in the literature are based on location obfuscation.
The basic idea is to transform the user’s exact location into a region large enough
to thwart attacks, also known as cloaking region [75]. Unfortunately, most location
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obfuscation techniques proposed rely on syntactic approaches such as k-anonymity,
which cannot provide rigorous privacy [159]. For example, Hashem et al. [?] identi-
fied an overlapping rectangle attack based on the obfuscated location information. In
addition, Dewri et.al [28] highlighted the inadequacy of cloaking regions in prevent-
ing location privacy breaches when the adversary grasps some approximate location
knowledge about the user. Another class of technique is Private Information Retrieval
(PIR), which uses cryptography to protect the user’s location information [36]. This
technique allows a user to query POIs without revealing any information about the
query. However, while LBS queries based on PIR provides strong cryptographic
guarantees, they are often computationally and communicationally expensive and
not practical in addition to requiring different query plans to be designed for different
query types [159].
Differential privacy, a powerful privacy model, is widely accepted for providing
rigorous privacy guarantees for aggregate data analysis [35]. It ensures that one
individual cannot significantly affect the output of a query. Differential privacy is
normally achieved by injecting random noise to the result of the query. Applying
differential privacy for location protection is still at its early stage [159]. Dewri [28]
proposed a differential location perturbation method that added Laplace noise to the
x and y coordinate separately. Andres [18] introduced a generalized privacy notation
geo-indistinguishability to formalize the problem of location privacy preserving. Palia
and Tandon [109] further considered the impact of prior information about POIs on
the utility. All of them need to add significant noise to hide the user’s exact location
in the safe region, which reduces the accuracy of returned POIs. In addition, as all
existing methods are designed to operate in client server structures, shown in Fig.
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LBS Server
Attacker
Figure 5.1: Client-server structure
??, users inevitably expose partial information to the service provider in exchange for
usable services. Once the attacker has acquired appropriate background knowledge,
a user’s location privacy will be violated. For example, Huo et al. [?] inferred the
users’ location information by using their check-in history. Therefore, any method
based on a client-server structure is highly unlikely to provide strict location privacy
preservation.
In this chapter, we propose a new Johnson Lindenstrauss transform based location
privacy protection method. The Johnson Lindenstrauss lemma states that a small
set of points in a high dimensional space can be embedded into a much lower dimen-
sion that the Euclidean distances between the points can be nearly preserved [27].
Therefore, the basic idea of the proposed method is that transfer the user’s exact
location together with the map into another dimension in such a way that the adver-
sary have no idea the user’s exact location but the relative distances between POIs
are maintained that helps to find nearby POIs.
There are several challenges in applying Johnson Lindenstrauss transform in the
location privacy protection. First, how to evaluate the privacy level protected by the
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Johnson Lindenstrauss transform? Jeremias et al. [16] proved that the Johnson-
Lindenstrauss transform preserves edge differential privacy in graph sanitization.
Based on this finding, we show that it also guarantees differential privacy in a lo-
cation dataset. Second, how to return the accurate POIs without disclosing it to the
service provider? We solve this challenge by introducing a semi-trusted third party
who in charge of transferring the map and return anonymized encrypted POIs. In
such way, the service provider only access the transformed dataset, while the third
party access the original POI information, the exact queried POI information can be
returned to the user by third party and service provider intersection without disclosing
location privacy to either party.
Overall, our contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We propose a new privacy framework that introduces a semi-trusted third party
to protect user locations regardless of adversaries background knowledge.
2. We present a location perturbation method based on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
transform that satisfies differential privacy. The proposed method not only
guarantees rigorous privacy preservation but also allows LBS providers to pro-
vide accurate services.
3. We systematically analyze how the proposed method can defend against various
background knowledge attacks while providing high-quality services.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We propose our privacy preserva-
tion framework and apply it to two basic POI queries in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3
respectively. Section 5.5 details the results of the experiments. Section VII discusses
the related work and Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.
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5.2 Location Privacy Preservation Framework based
on a Third Party
5.2.1 Notations
Let U = {u1, u2, ..., un} be a set of users. Each user has a true location and a per-
turbed location. The true location coordinates are denoted as lt(x, y), the perturbed
location is denoted as an m dimension location vector lp(c1, c2, ..., cm). M is the map
matrix, whose records are POI location coordinates, Assume there are t POIs in the
map, then M ∈ Rt×2. Mˆ ∈ Rt×m is the perturbed map matrix. Important symbols
used in this section and following parts of the chapter are listed in Table 5.1 for
reference.
Table 5.1: Notations
Parameters Description Parameters Description
lt User’s true location lp Perturbed location
X Transition matrix m Dimension of X
M Map’s location matrix Mˆ Perturbed map matrix
POIs Set of POIs POIsa Anonymized POI set
r Radius rˆ Perturbed radius
k Number of POI Mˆa Anonymized Mˆ
5.2.2 Problem Definition and Assumption
Problem Definition. In this chapter, we consider the location privacy problem in the
popular location-based service where the user queries the LBS server for nearby POIs.
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However, the service provider may be untrusted and attacked by outside attackers.
Therefore, we define the problem as follows:
Problem 1. Given a user who has a location lt(x, y), P{p1, p2, ..., pk} is the nearby
POIs of the user. Design a location privacy protection method, through which, the
service provider has no idea the user’s exact location, while the returned POI set P ′
should have the following character: the value of |P 4P ′| should as small as possible.
Assumptions. To make the problem clear, we can make a few reasonable assump-
tions.
1. The third party will hold the map information.
This is reasonable as many LBSs use public maps, e.g., Google Maps. The third
party could even be a map provider.
2. The third party is semi-trusted.
We assume the third party in our privacy framework is semi-trusted with fol-
lowing characters:
• It curious about the user’s location information;
• It follows the process of POI queries;
• It does not collude with the service provider.
5.2.3 Framework
The proposed location privacy preservation framework contains three components as
illustrated in Fig. 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Location privacy framework
Users: Users are people with GPS-enabled devices who ask for location-based
services. They prefer to mask their exact locations. Therefore, location information
will be perturbed before sending from the device. User devices are assumed to be
trusted. Any malicious software would not be able to access the position sensor [45].
LBS Server (Service Provider): Service providers are application platforms that
provide location-based services, such as Google Maps, Foursquare, and Yelp. These
providers require a user’s location to deliver high-quality services to an individual.
Service providers may be untrusted. In our proposed framework, a service provider
receives a query directly from a user and returns the encrypted POIs received from a
third party.
Third Party: The third party is semi-trusted and does not collude with the service
provider. It holds a portion of the location information and acts as a bridge between
the user and the service provider. The third party may acquire the map used by the
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service provider to provide location-based services, and it also has the essential tasks
of perturbing the map and helping the service provider return highly accurate POIs.
As a basic outline of the entire process: (a) a user perturbs their location locally
using the transition matrix X; (b) the user query the service provider for nearby POI
and query the third party for map sanitization; (c) the third party perturbs the map
accordingly; (d) the service provider searches for anonymized POIs, asks the third
party for exact POI information and forwards them back to the user.
5.2.4 Privacy Protection Scheme based on Johnson-Lindenstrauss
Transform
In this section, we introduce a perturbation method based on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
transform that operates within the proposed privacy framework. Jeremias et al. [16]
show that the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform allows us to publish a sanitized graph
that preserves edge differential privacy. Based on that, we prove that the Johnson-
Lindenstrass transform preserves differential privacy for location dataset as well. Ac-
cording to the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma, the transformation can keep the relative
distances between points. Therefore, it works well for answering POI queries, which
is based on Euclidean distance. The details of the procedure are explained in the
following parts.
a. A user has access to their location coordinates through their GPS-enabled
devices, and these are perturbed by a linear transition matrix X ∈ Rm. The details
are shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 shows the proposed location perturbation method. First, a random
transition matrix X is generated, which is constructed in Steps 1 to 5. X is a 2×m
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Algorithm 2 Location perturbation
Require: user ui’s location lt(xi, yi), projected dimension m.
Ensure: perturbed location lp, transformation matrix X ∈ R2×m.
1: for i = 1 to 2 do
2: for j = 1 to m do
3: Sample X[i, j] from Gaussian distribution N(0, 1);
4: end for
5: end for
6: lp ← ltX;
7: return lp, X.
matrix and the entries for X are sampled from a 0 mean Gaussian distribution. We
perturb the user’s location by multiplying the original location coordinate with X at
Step 6. Step 6 is the process of Johnson Lindenstrauss transform. After transforma-
tion, the user’s location information is changed from a location coordinate (x, y) to a
meaningless location vector (c1, c2, ...cm). We prove that the transformation satisfies
- differential privacy in Section. 5.4.1.
b. The user chooses one region R that he/she feels comfortable with and gen-
erates a key pair (sk, pk). Then, he/she queries the LBS nearby POIs using the
perturbed location, and query the third party for map sanitization by sending the
transition matrix X, region R, public key, and queries type to the third party. As the
user’s location coordinates are perturbed by matrix X, to guarantee the utility, the
map should also be perturbed by the same matrix, after which the relative distances
between user and POIs can be preserved. Both the service provider and the third
party hold partial location information about the user. None of them can obtain the
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location of the user with only partial information.
c. Once the third party receives the map sanitization query, it transforms the
region R’s map with queried POI type using X. The relative distances between the
records and user can be maintained because they have been transferred using the same
transition matrix. The perturbed map is anonymized, after which it can be sent to
the service provider. Fig. 5.3 shows an example of the map sanitization results.
Restaurant Location
Sofia (2,5)
Thai Yim (4,3)
Taste dumpling (1,7)
Geppetto's (3,8)
Chpaati (6,5)
Restaurant Location
1 (10.5019,6.2377)
2 (11.3109,1.8529)
3 (11.4821,9.9476)
4 (16.4452,10.1153)
5 (17.6587,3.5381)
Original map
Perturbed map with 
anonymization
Figure 5.3: Map sanitization
Assume the user queries the nearby restaurants. The table on the left shows the
sampled original map. Each restaurant has a geographic location coordinate. Assume
the transition matrix is 2-dimensional, denoted by X =
[
1.7892 −0.6749
1.3847 1.5175
]
, resulting
in perturbed location vectors shown in the right-hand side table. The location of the
restaurants are totally changed and the names are replace by the meaningless number.
d. The service provider searches for POIs based on the perturbed locations and
send them to the third party together with another K − 1 sets of POIs within safe
region, where K is the number of POI set. As the POIs found by the service provider
are the meaningless number with the perturbed location, the third party will need to
find the corresponding POIs by searching a mapping list. To avoid the third party
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gets the queried POIs by the user, the POIs calculated by the service provider are
protected by k-anonymity technology shown in Fig. 5.4. The left hand side table is
the searched POIs, denote as set 1. the right hand side table is the K-anonymized
POI sets. There are totally K sets. The right hand side figure shows that the K − 1
sets of POIs are randomly chosen from the safe region. Therefore, the third party has
no idea which sets are the queried POIs. The value of K is determined by the user.
The probability of identify the user queried POIs is 1/K. A bigger value of K means
harder to identify the returned POIs for the third party. Users can choose it according
to their own privacy consideration. The upper bound of K value is controlled under
20, which is big enough to prevent the POIs being identified. K sets of real POIs
information will be returned to the service provider. In order to prevent the service
provider from obtaining the accurate POIs information, the returned K sets of POIs
are encrypted using user’s public key. And the queried POIs are filtered according to
the POI ID and returned to the user by the service provider.
ID POIs
1 lp1
2 lp2
... ...
k lpk
ID POIs
1 lp1
2 lp2
... ...
Kk lpKk
{
 {
 
Set 1
Set 1
Set K Set 2
Set KSet i
R
Figure 5.4: The process of k-anonymization
The service provider is ”blind” during the whole POIs query process. As shown
in Table. 5.2, it knows nothing about the user’s query. The service provider only
receives a location vector. Therefore, it has no idea the user’s exact location. During
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the searching POIs process, the service provider just accesses to the anonymized
meaningless records. Therefore, it has no idea what the type of these POIs and
which POIs these records refer to. For the third party, it needs to transform the
map according to the user’s requirement. Therefore, it knows the user’s query type,
such as restaurants and cinema. However, the third party has no idea the user’s
location and returned POIs as well, because the third party never receives any location
information of the user and only access the k anonymized POIs. Besides, using this
privacy framework, the service provider can return very accurate POIs due to the
Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform’s ability to maintain relative Euclidean distances
between records.
Table 5.2: Information access
Queried POI type User’s location Returned POIs
Service provider × × ×
Third party
√ × ×
User
√ √ √
In the proposed privacy preservation method, the third party needs to encrypt
the received POIs. Assume the number of queried POI is k, the third party needs to
compute Kk encryptions, where K is the number of sets of POIs. In addition, the
user needs to compute 1 decryption. Therefore, the total computation complexity for
encryption is O(Kk+ 1) exp. As the number k is small, the computation complexity
caused by the encryption part is acceptable. The proposed privacy framework sup-
ports the two most popular spatial queries: k-nearest POIs queries and range queries.
In Section 5.3, we present the details of how these queries are processed in our privacy
model.
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5.3 Privacy Protection Algorithms for Two Basic
POI queries
5.3.1 K-nearest POI Queries
Consider an application that the user wants to query the k-nearest POIs around his
location. The query can be ’where is the k nearest restaurants’.
k-nearest POIs query generation
It has two main operations for user: location perturbation and query generation. The
specific steps are shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 k-nearest POIs query (User)
Require: user ID, ui’s location lt, POI number k, POI set number K, dimension m.
Ensure: k-nearest POIs POIs.
1: Perturb user’s location information using location perturbation method, get the
perturbed location lp.
2: Query LBS provider POIs with perturbed location lp.
3: Generate a key pair sk and pk using RSA algorithm.
4: Choose a safe region R.
5: Query the third party map sanitization with user ID, transformation matrix X,
safe region, queried POI type, and public key.
6: return Obtain POIs from the service provider
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• Location perturbation. The user’s location lt can be transferred into a meaning-
less location vector lp using a Johnson transformation matrix (Step 1).
lp ← f(lt,m), (5.3.1)
where m is the dimension of the new location vector, which is specified by users.
f is the function of the transformation.
• Query generation. The query sent to the service provider is in the following
form:
query ← 〈userID, k, lp, K〉 , (5.3.2)
where k is the number of queried POIs, and K refers to the number of POIs
sets.
User query k-nearest POIs using perturbed location lp (Step 2). As lp is a 1×m
vector, the service provider cannot find any relationship between this vector
and the user’s location without the transition matrix X.
The user generates a key pair in Step 3, which is used to encrypt the POI
information. A safe region R is chosen by the user in Step 4. The safe region
means the user does not mind other people knows that he/she is in region R.
While defining a safe region helps the third party transformed less data, which
increase the algorithm efficiency. The query sent to the third party is in the
following form:
query ← 〈userID,X,R, POI − type, pk〉 . (5.3.3)
The public key together with the transition matrix, safe region, and POI type
are sent to the third party for map sanitization in Step 5. The user ID is also
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included in the query, such that the service provider can find the corresponding
perturbed map for each specific query. At the end, the user can get the queried
POIs from service provider shown in Step 6.
To guarantee utility, the map should be perturbed by the same transition matrix
as the user’s location. However, if the service provider knows the perturbed location
vector and the transition matrix at the same time, the true location coordinates of
the user would be disclosed. Therefore, this task is assigned to the third party.
Map sanitization
After the third party gets a query from the user, it starts to sanitize the map. Algo-
rithm 4 shows the process.
First, the third party samples a small map according to the received user’s safe
region R and the queried POI type in Step 1 and perturbs it using received transition
matrix X in Step 2. To avoid the service provider inferring the real POIs information,
the transformed POIs are anonymized by replacing the identifiers by meaningless
numbers in Step 3. The sanitized map is sent to the service provider for k-nearest POIs
calculation in Step 4. After that, the third party will get K sets of k nearest POIs from
the service provider. In step 5, the service provider finds the POIs real information
according to the mapping function f , and encrypt it using encrypt algorithm in Step
6. The encrypted POIs are in the format of < ID,Enc(POIs) >. At the end, the
encrypted real POIs information is sent back to the service provider.
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Algorithm 4 Map sanitization (Third Party)
Require: map M, user ID, transformation matrix X, queried POI type, safe region
R
Ensure: POIs.
1: Sample a small map M with same POI type required in the query in region R
from the map M.
2: Perturb the map M . f : Mˆ
X←−MX,
3: Anoymize the perturbed map Mˆ . Mˆa ← Mˆ .
4: Send the map Mˆa to LBS provider with the user ID.
After getting the k anonymized POI sets POIsa from service provider :
5: Find the real POIs information according to the mapping function f .
6: Encrypt the POIs information: Enc(POIs) ← POIs, and send the encrypted
POIs back to the service provider.
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Search nearby POIs
After receives the user’s POI query and the sanitized map, the service provider
searches the nearby POIs blindly.
Algorithm 5 Response POI Queries (LBS Server)
Require: User ID, ui’s perturbed location lp, user’ query Q anonymized perturbed
map Mˆa.
Ensure: POIsa.
1: Find the corresponding map Mˆa according to the user ID.
2: for i = 1 to length(Mˆa) do
3: dis(i)← Euclidean distance between lp and Ma(i);
4: end for
5: POIsa ← find the POIs corresponding to k smallest dis;
6: Send POIsa to the third party;
7: POIsa ← find other K sets of k closest POIs randomly within the map.
8: Send POIsa to the third party.
After getting the encrypted accurate POI information from the third party
9: Filter out the queried POI information according to the ID and return them back
to the user.
10: return POIsa
Algorithm 5 shows how to find the k-nearest POIs based on the perturbed infor-
mation. First, the perturbed map Mˆa is searched according to the user’s ID if there
are multiple query users at the same time. Then, the distances between the perturbed
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Figure 5.5: JL transform for k-NN queries
locations of the POIs and the user’s perturbed location are calculated in Steps 2 to
Step 4. The k-closest POIs and another K sets of k closest POIs are chosen in Step
5 and 6 separately. All of them are sent to the third party in such way, the third
party has no idea the returned POIs to the user and cannot infer the user’s exact
location. After getting the encrypted accurate POI information, the LBS server will
filter out the records corresponding to the POIs obtained in Step 5 and return them
to the user. The user can get the accurate POI information by decrypting it using
the private key.
Although the server has no idea where the user is, the k-nearest POIs can still be
found accurately. Fig. 5.5 provides an example. The blue dots are the true locations
of restaurants around user u. The red dots are the perturbed restaurant locations.
The different restaurants are denoted as ri for simplicity. Although the geographic
positions are changed after the transformation, the relative distances are essentially
unchanged. For example, in the original map, the two nearest restaurants are r3 and
r4, while in the perturbed map, we reach the same conclusion.
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5.3.2 Range Queries
An example of a range query is ’List all restaurants within 100m of the user.’ In this
section, we present how the proposed privacy framework to process range query.
Range query generation
A privacy-preserving range query process is similar to k-NN query. However, the
queried radius r cannot be used on the perturbed map directly because even though
the relative distance is essentially the same after the transformation, the actual dis-
tance between any two locations has changed. Therefore, directly using the radius r
would introduce a large error. Fig. 5.6 shows an example.
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Figure 5.6: JL transform for range queries with radius r
Assume a user queries restaurants within a radius r. In the original dataset,
there are four restaurants 〈r1, r3, r4, r5〉. If the server calculates the POIs using r
on the perturbed dataset, we can see only r4 would be returned to the user, which
is wildly inaccurate. Therefore we need to find the mapping f : r → rˆ, to make
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the relationship between rˆ and the perturbed locations relatively consistent with the
relationship between r and the original locations.
Algorithm 6 Range queries (user)
Require: user ID, ui’s location lt(x, y), range r, dimension m, transformation matrix
X, queried POI type, safe region R, K.
Ensure: POIs in range r POIa.
1: lp ← f(lt,m);
2: si = (x+ xcosθi, y + ysinθi);
3: sˆi ← f(si,m);
4: rˆ =
∑
dsi,lp
|si| ;
5: Query1 ← 〈userID, rˆ, lp, K〉;
6: Generate a key pair sk and pk;
7: Query2 ← 〈userID,X,R, POI − type, pk〉
8: LBS Provider ← Query1;
9: Third Party ← Query2;
Algorithm 6 shows the details. First, similar to the k-nearest POI queries, the
user’s location coordinates lt(x, y) are perturbed to a location vector lp(c1, c2, ..., cm)
using location perturbation method in Step 1. To construct the effective radius rˆ
for the perturbed location, few points are chosen randomly from the edge of the
queried range in Step 2. Where θ ∈ [0, 2pi], to make the result more accurate, we
choose more than 4 points. Identically, we get the perturbed value set sˆ by applying
location perturbation algorithm again in Step 3. In Step 4 calculates the average
distance between the perturbed location lp and the points in set sˆ, which is the
perturbed radius rˆ. The first query is generated in Step 5, which includes the user’s
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ID, perturbed radius rˆ, and perturbed location. The user sends the range query with
this perturbed radius rˆ to the service provider in Step 6. Step 6 generates a key pair
for POI information encryption and the second query is generated in Steps 7. The
second query is a map sanitization query, which includes user ID, transition matrix,
safe region, POI type, public key. These two queries are sent to the service provider
and the third party separately in Step 8 and Step 9 respectively.
Map sanitization
The third party perturbs the map using the same method as in Algorithm 4 for the
k-nearest POI queries. A smaller map is sampled according to the user’s safe region
and query type. Then, perturb it using received transition matrix and send it back
to the service provider for POI searching. The specific steps are shown in Section.
5.3.1.
Search nearby POIs
The service provider processes the range query with Algorithm 7.
As shown in Algorithm 7, the distances between the user and all the POIs are
calculated in Steps 1 to 2. As long as the distance d(i) 6 rˆ, the location is added to
the set POIsa in Step 4. Another K−1 POIs are randomly selected within perturbed
map Mˆa(i) in Step 7, and the corresponding nearby POIs are calculated in Step 8.
All of the POIs are sent to the third party. After that, the user can get the queried
POIs by the same way for k - nearest queries. Fig. 5.7 shows an example of utility
maintenance. After perturbation, the radius rˆ accurately includes the POIs queried
by the user.
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Algorithm 7 Response range query (LBS server)
Require: User ID, ui’s perturbed location lp, radius rˆ anonymized perturbed map
Mˆa.
Ensure: anonymized POI POIsa.
1: for i = 1 to length(Mˆa) do
2: dis(i)← Euclidean distance between lp and ˆMa(i);
3: if d(i) < rˆ then
4: POIsa = POIsa ∪ ID(Mˆa(i));
5: end if
6: end for
7: Ps = {P1, P2, ..., PK}, where Pi ∈ Mˆa;
8: Repeat step 1 to 5 for each Pi;
9: Third Party ← POIsa;
10: return POIsa
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Figure 5.7: JL transform for range queries with radius rˆ
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5.4 Privacy and Utility
5.4.1 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 9. Algorithm 2 guarantees -differential privacy.
Proof. We prove that the output of the perturbation is indistinguishable regard-
less of the input location. That is
Pr[M(L) ∈ Ω] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(L′) ∈ Ω] . (5.4.1)
We observe that the perturbed location vector Lp is composed of m identically
distributed variable. Each variable is created by multiplying the true location coordi-
nate Lt with a vector Mc ∈ R2. Therefore, we proof theorem 9 by showing that each
variable of the output satisfies 5.4.1.
As the entries of vector Mc are sampled from iid Gaussian distribution N(0, σ
2),
vector Mc follows the multi-dimensional Gaussian distribution N(0,Σ), where Σ =[
σ2
σ2
]
. According to the linear combination property of multi-dimensional Gaus-
sian distribution, the transformed variable Lpc v N(0, LtΣLTt ). Let Lt = (x, y),
therefore, LtΣL
T
t = (x
2 + y2)σ2. Denoted by λ2 = LtΣL
T
t , then, Lpc v N(0, λ2). Let
L′t(x
′, y′) be the neighbouring dataset, L′pc v N(0, λ
′2) We have
Pr[M(L) ∈ Ω]
Pr[M(L′) ∈ Ω] =
PDFL(x)
PDFL′(x)
=
1√
2piλ
exp(− x2
2λ2
)
1√
2piλ′ exp(− x
2
2λ′2 )
=
λ′
λ
exp(
x2
2
(
1
λ′2
− 1
λ2
)) . (5.4.2)
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When variance λ2 > λ
′2,
Pr[M(L) ∈ Ω]
Pr[M(L′) ∈ Ω] ≥
λ′
λ
=
λ−∆
λ
= 1− ∆
λ
. (5.4.3)
0 = −ln(1− ∆λ ).
When variance λ2 < λ
′2,
Pr[M(L) ∈ Ω]
Pr[M(L′) ∈ Ω] ≥
λ′
λ
=
λ+ ∆
λ
= 1 +
∆
λ
. (5.4.4)
1 = ln(1 +
∆
λ
).
As
1 − 0 = ln(1 + ∆
λ
) + ln(1− ∆
λ
)
= ln(
λ2 −∆2
λ2
) < 0 . (5.4.5)
0 > 1, Therefore,
e−0 ≤ Pr[M(L) ∈ Ω]
Pr[M(L′) ∈ Ω] ≤ e
0 . (5.4.6)
Let  = 0, therefore, the proposed method satisfies -differential privacy, where
 = −ln(1− ∆
λ
).
5.4.2 Utility Analysis
For POI queries, the returned POIs are based on the relative distance between the
users and the nearby POIs. Therefore, the utility is evaluated by comparing whether
the relative distances between the users and the POIs have changed.
As shown in Fig. 5.8, given a user u, and two POIs a and b around u, assume
‖ u − b ‖= t ‖ u − a ‖ and t > 1, where ‖ u − a ‖ is the Euclidean distance du,a
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Figure 5.8: Location placement
between u and a. After the Johnson Lindenstrauss transform, the distances between
a and u and b and u are ‖ f(u) − f(a) ‖ and ‖ f(u) − f(b) ‖ separately. Then the
probability of causing an error is Pr[error] = Pr[‖ f(u)− f(a) ‖≥‖ f(u)− f(b) ‖].
According to Lemma 3.3.1,
Pr[‖ f(u)− f(a) ‖≥‖ f(u)− f(b) ‖]
≤ Pr[‖ u− a ‖ √1 + δ ≥‖ u− b ‖ √1− δ]
= Pr[
‖ u− b ‖
‖ u− a ‖ ≤
√
1 + δ√
1− δ ]
= Pr[t ≤
√
1 + δ√
1− δ ] (5.4.7)
(5.4.8)
As 0 < δ < 1
2
, therefore, 1 <
√
1+δ√
1−δ <
√
3. Variable δ is defined by the user,
therefore, the value of δ can be chosen uniformly from (1,
√
3). So, we assume the
variable δ obeys uniform distribution.
Case 1: For a given δ, 1 <
√
1+δ√
1−δ <
√
3. As t > 1, when t ≥ √3, Pr[t ≤
√
1+δ√
1−δ ] = 0.
When t <
√
3, we assume t obey uniform distribution in (1,
√
3), which is reasonable,
because t is the ratio of distances between two POIs to the user. It can be an arbitrary
value in the range of (1,
√
3) according to different POI locations selection. Therefore,
Pr[t ≤
√
1+δ√
1−δ ] =
√
1+δ√
1−δ−1√
3
. Equation 5.4.7 can be written as
124
Pr[error] ≤
0 t ≥
√
3
√
1+δ√
3
√
1−δ −
√
3
3
t <
√
3
As
∂(
√
1+δ√
3
√
1−δ −
√
3
3
)
∂δ
=
√
3
6
√
1 + δ +
√
1− δ
1− δ > 0, (5.4.9)
Therefore, for a given δ, when t ≥ √3, the probability of cause an error is 0;
when t <
√
3, the greater the δ is, the higher the error probability is. According to
the Johnson Lindenstrauss Lemma, m = Ω(log(n)/δ2). We can infer that for a fixed
n, m ∼ 1
δ2
. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that greater value of m helps to
reduce the error probability.
Case 2: For a given t, where t > 1. Equation 5.4.10 can be written as
Pr[‖ f(u)− f(a) ‖≥‖ f(u)− f(b) ‖]
≤ Pr[t ≤
√
1 + δ√
1− δ ]
= Pr[δ ≥ t
2 − 1
t2 + 1
] . (5.4.10)
As 0 < δ < 1
2
, when t
2−1
t2+1
≥ 1
2
, that is t ≥ √3, Pr[δ ≥ t2−1
t2+1
] = 0. When 1 < t <
√
3,
Pr[δ ≥ t2−1
t2+1
] = 3−t
2
t2+1
. Equation 5.4.10 can be written as
Pr[error] ≤
0 t ≥
√
3
3−t2
t2+1
t <
√
3
As
∂ 3−t
2
t2+1
∂t
= − 8t
(t2+1)2
< 0, when t <
√
3, the error probability is monotonically
decreasing with the increasing of t. Which means the larger the proportional distance
between two POIs, the higher the accuracy achieved.
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Overall, when t ≥ √3, the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform cause no error. When
t ≤ √3, the greater the m and the greater the t, the smaller the error rate.
5.5 Evaluation and Discussion
We evaluated the performance of our privacy framework through an extensive set of
experiments. First, we present the experiment settings, and then discuss the experi-
mental results.
5.5.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. We used two real-world datasets. SimpleGeo Places dataset [1] and Yelp
business dataset [2]. We extracted 8275 business entries in the area of Sydney from
SimpleGeo dataset, and 22830 business entries in Las Vegas from Yelp dataset.
Metrics. The effectiveness of the proposed method was evaluated by comparing
the similarities between the result sets. We evaluated the accuracy of our method in
terms of displacement, resemblance [72] and recall.
1. Resemblance. Let P = {p1, p2, ...pk} be the POI set retrieved by the POI query,
relative to the true location lt of the user u, and P
′ = {p′1, p′2, ...p′k} be the
retrieved POI set based on the perturbed location. Resemblance measures the
fraction of POIs in the actual result set that is included in the approximated
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result set.
Resemblance =
|P ∩ P ′|
|P | , (5.5.1)
where |P | is the size of the set P .
2. Displacement. Displacement measures how closely P is measured by P ′ on
average. It shows the average difference between the real POIs distance across
the mismatched POIs on k −NN query.
Displacement =
Σki=1‖lt − pi‖−Σki=1‖lt − p′i‖
|P | , (5.5.2)
where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean distance between the true location of the user and
the location of the POI.
3. Recall. We use recall to evaluate the proportion of relevant POIs retrieved on
range query.
Recall = Resemblance =
|P ∩ P ′|
|P ′| , (5.5.3)
where the length of P can be different from P ′.
Experimental Setup. We used 1000 users to retrieve the k-nearest POIs and POIs
in a region with an r radius corresponding to the true and perturbed locations. For the
SimpleGeo dataset, we choose Restaurant and Shopping locations as interesting POIs
and 1000 users were chosen randomly from the Professionals attribute. For the Yelp
dataset, we choose Nightlife and Beauty & Spas as interesting POIs and 1000 users
were chosen randomly from Restaurants. All of these query strings reflect different
POI densities. Given the proposed method is based on a random mapping, we repeat
each experiment 20 times and used the average to ensure accuracy. All algorithms
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Table 5.3: Parameter settings
Parameter Description Value range Default
m dimension of transition matrix 2 ∼ 50 10
k number of queried POIs 1 ∼ 50 20
r radius of range query 100 ∼ 1000 400
 privacy budget – 0.5
R privacy protection radius – 2km
were implemented in Matlab on a PC with 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 Processor and 8 GB
Memory. Table 6.2 shows the parameters used.
We compared our method to two other differential privacy-based methods with
a client-server structure, as no other similar technique applying a semi-trusted third
party.
1. The Geo-indistinguishability method. This concept was proposed by E. A.
Miguel et al. [11] in 2013. It states that for any x and x′ within radius r,
the distance d(K(x), K(x′))between the corresponding distributions should at
most be l, where the mechanism K is a probabilistic function for selecting a
reported value, and l = r. One idea proposed by K. Chatzikokolakis et al. [21]
for achieving geo-indistinguishability is that whenever the actual location is
x0, instead, a point x is randomly generated instead, according to the planar
Laplace noise function.
2. A simple Laplace method. In this approach, the user’s location is perturbed by
adding Laplace noise to the x and y coordinates independently. The noise is
determined by the privacy parameter  and sensitivity s, where the sensitivity
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equals the radius r, so that the user cannot be distinguished with from other
users within r.
To make these methods comparable, we assumed the neighbor location l′(x′, y′) in
our method was within the radius r of true location l(x, y). Then, ∆ = |
√
x′2 + y′2−√
x2 + y2| λ. Therefore,   1. We made  = 0.5 for all methods. The maximum
radius calculated in paper [21] is 2km; therefore, r = 2km in the simple differential
privacy method. Our method and the two other methods are denoted as JL, GEO,
and DP, respectively.
5.5.2 Performance of the Proposed Method
k-NN query
We examined the performance of the proposed method in relation to the number
of queried POIs k for k-NN queries in terms of resemblance and displacement. We
varied the number of queried POIs between 1 and 50 in Step 1 on both datasets.
The resemblance values corresponding to different values of k for both the Simple-
Geo and Yelp datasets are shown in Figs. 5.9a, 5.9b, 5.9c, and 5.9d. It is clear that
JL significantly outperformed GEO and DP in all configurations. As shown in Fig.
5.9a, when k = 5 and nearby Restaurants were queried from the SimpleGeo dataset,
GEO achieved a resemblance of 0.2560, DP achieved a resemblance of 0.0850, and JL
achieved a resemblance of 0.8582, which outperformed GEO by 60% and DP by 77%.
A similar result was also observed when measuring resemblance on the Yelp dataset.
Obviously, GEO and DP performed very badly when k < 10 on both datasets, but
they were greatly improved by increasing the value of k. However, the number of
queried POIs had little effect on JL in terms of the resemblance metric. The JL
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Figure 5.9: k-NN query performance
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Figure 5.10: k-NN query performance
method always performed well, even when k was small, because its utility is related
to the dimensions m and t, as shown in Section 5.4.2. For a fixed m, a larger t helped
maintain a higher accuracy and was not affected by the size of k.
The displacement values corresponding to different values of k on both the Sim-
pleGeo and Yelp datasets are shown in Fig. 5.9e, 5.9f, 5.10g, and 5.10h. We observed
that JL had a much lower displacement value than both GEO and DP when querying
all attributes on the two datasets. Additionally, we observed that the size of k did
not affect the performance of JL significantly in terms of the displacement metric,
while GEO and DP increased faster when k decreased from 20 to 1. For example, in
Fig. 5.13a, the displacement JL achieved across all values of k was under 20m. How-
ever, when k = 5, GEO and DP achieved displacements of 181.4295 and 642.0554,
respectively, much larger than the displacement values of 83.3879m for GEO and
367.0430m for DP when k = 20. A similar observation was found in Fig. 5.9f, 5.10g,
and 5.10h. This indicates that a smaller k means a larger difference between the
returned POIs based on the true location and the false location for both the GEO
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Figure 5.11: Range query performance
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Figure 5.12: Range query performance
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and DP methods. JL had no such problem. The same observation was made when
considering performance in terms of the resemblance metric.
The proposed JL method has such excellent performance because it simultaneously
perturbs the user’s location and the POI locations by mapping them to different
dimensions instead of reporting false locations. And the relative distances between
records are nearly preserved. However, any method that reports a false location will
have a large margin of error when querying only a few nearby POIs, especially when
the distribution of the queried POIs is compact. It is easy to deduce that the closest
POI to the true location is not the closest one to the false location.
Range query
We further examined the performance of the proposed method in relation to the
radius r for range queries in terms of resemblance and recall. We varied the radius r
between 100m and 1000m in steps of 100 on both datasets.
The resemblance results of the three methods on the SimpleGeo and Yelp datasets
are shown in Fig. 5.11a, 5.11b, 5.11c, and 5.11d. Obviously, JL had a higher resem-
blance value than the other two methods-irrespective of the value of r. For the JL
method, the resemblance metric was stable and close to 1 even with an increasing
r, which indicates the dataset’s utility was not overly sacrificed, and the accuracy
of the returned POIs was mostly enhanced. However, as shown in Fig. 5.11a, when
r < 600, neither GEO nor DP maintained good utility. Specifically, when r = 800,
GEO and DP achieved resemblances of 0.8291 and 0.2712, respectively. JL achieved a
resemblance of 0.9569, an improvement of 13% and 68%, respectively. When r = 300,
JL achieved a resemblance of 0.9001, outperforming GEO by 60% and DP by 84%.
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These improvements by JL were observed on the Yelp dataset. As shown in Fig.
5.11d, when r = 400, GEO and DP achieved resemblances of 0.2560 and 0.2347,
respectively. JL outperformed them by 70% and 72% with a resemblance of 0.9548.
When r = 800, JL achieved a resemblance of 0.9521, which is an improvement of 43%
and 66% over GEO and DP’s resemblances of 0.5291 and 0.2935, respectively. Figs.
5.12g, 5.12h, 5.11c, and 5.11d show the results for the SimpleGeo dataset in terms
of recall. We observed that the performance of the three methods was similar to the
results of the resemblance metric. JL outperformed GEO and DP across all r values.
JL was relatively stable compared to GEO and DP - they changed significantly when
varying the radius r.
We attribute the reason JL performed so well to the properties of the Johnson-
Lindenstrauss transform. The distances between the locations were almost fully pre-
served after the transformation, regardless of the queried radius r. However, in the
GEO and DP methods, if the queried range is very small, it is possible for there to
be no overlap between the true POIs and the perturbed POIs. So, the JL method
outperforms GEO and DP significantly when r is small.
5.5.3 The Impact of POI Density
To examine the impact of POI density on the three methods for both k-NN queries
and range queries. We choose three attributes that reflect different POI densities in
the SimpleGeo and Yelp datasets.
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Figure 5.13: The effect of density on the k-NN and range queries
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Figure 5.14: The effect of density on the k-NN and range queries
k-NN queries
The resemblance and displacement values corresponding to the three methods in two
datasets by querying three different k-NN POIs when k = 20 are shown in Figs. 5.13a
- 5.13d. The POI density had little effect on JL; however, it affected the GEO and
DP significantly. As shown in Fig. 5.13a, JL’s resemblance value increased slightly
when increasing the POI density, while the resemblance value decreased significantly
for the GEO and DP methods. Specifically, in Fig. 5.13a, JL achieved approximately
0.83 resemblance for all POI queries on the SimpleGeo dataset. While, when querying
Restaurant, the resemblance achieved by GEO was 0.6730. When querying nearby
Shopping and Health Service, GEO achieved resemblances of 0.1960 and 0.1159, re-
spectively, a decrease of 48% and 8%. The resemblance achieved by DP decreased by
approximately 30% and 5%. The resemblance results on the Yelp dataset closely re-
sembled those on SimpleGeo, shown in Fig. 5.13c. Accordingly, the displacement de-
creased slightly for JL and increased significantly for both GEO and DP. As shown in
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Fig. 5.13b, JL achieved displacements of 20.0431, 6.0760, and 3.9532 for Restaurant,
Shopping, and Health Service, respectively. While GEO achieved 83.3879, 199.6278,
and 236.7437, an increase of around 116 and 27 when increasing the POI density. DP
achieved 367.0430, 670.1029, and 689.0549, an increase of 303 and 19.
Because for GEO and DP methods, when the density increased, more mismatched
POIs reduced the accuracy. However, for JL method, the k nearest POIs were much
closer to the user as the density increased. Therefore, the proportion of the distances
became slightly larger compared to low-density distribution. According to our utility
analysis, accuracy increases as the distance proportionally increases between two POIs
and the user.
Range Query
The effects of the POI density on the range query are shown in Figs. 5.13e - 5.14h.
It is clear that the POI density had no obvious impacts on JL for both datasets. For
example, JL achieved a resemblance of approximately 0.89 for all three different POI
queries in Fig. 5.13e on SimpleGeo dataset, and achieved a recall of approximately
0.86 in Fig. 5.13f. Similar results can be observed in Fig. 5.14g and Fig. 5.14h on Yelp
dataset. However, there was a different result for GEO and DP. Both resemblance
and recall slight changed on SimpleGeo dataset, but had a significant reduction in
the performance when increasing the POI density of the queries on Yelp dataset. For
instance, the GEO method achieved a resemblance of 0.5600 when querying nearby
Nightlife; however and reduced to 0.2560 when querying Beauty & and Spas. The
performance was much worse when querying Restaurants, which has the largest den-
sity. The DP method had similar results. Fig. 5.14h shows a similar trend in terms
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of recall.
As we mentioned, for a given m, the performance of JL is only related to the ratio
of distances between the user and POIs t. The change of POI density cannot affect
the JL performance significantly for range query.
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Figure 5.15: The effect of m on k-NN and range queries
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5.5.4 The Impact of Transition Matrix M
In the proposed method, m is an important parameter that determines the length of
the perturbed location vector. To determine how m contributed to the results, we
changed the value of m from 2 to 50 in steps of 4 on both the SimpleGeo and Yelp
datasets.
The results on SimpleGeo and Yelp for the k-NN queries are shown in Fig. 5.15.
JL’s performance was greatly improved by increasing the value of m. When the
dimension of the transition matrix increased, resemblance showed an upward trend
on both datasets. As shown in Fig. 5.15a, when m = 2 for SimpleGeo querying
nearby POIs resulted in a resemblance of 0.7. When m is increased, the resemblance
increases rapidly. When m = 14, the resemblance = 0.9. Performance started to level
off with an m higher than 14. A similar result is observed when querying nearby
POIs on the Yelp dataset. As shown in Fig. 5.15b, when m is in the range of [2, 14],
the changes in resemblance are significant. The query result is much more accurate
when the dimensions of the transition matrix are much higher. When it reaches a
threshold, performance is not expected to improve dramatically. Fig. 5.15d and Fig.
5.15d show the results of the range queries on two datasets. We can observe that the
increasing parameter m has a positive effect on performance. For instance, in Fig.
5.15c, when m = 2, resemblance is around 0.82. When m = 10, a resemblance of 0.91
is achieved.
The relationship between the two fixed POIs did not change, which means t is
invariable. According to the analysis in Section 5.4.2, when t is fixed, the probability
of an error decreases with the increase in the value of m. Therefore, when m becomes
larger, the error probability is reduced, and better performance is achieved.
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5.5.5 Overhead Analyses
In this section, we analyse the computational cost, query process delay and transmis-
sion overhead induced by the proposed privacy framework. There are three processes
may cause the delay: map sanitization, POI encryption, and POI decryption. Be-
cause in the map sanitization process, only the queried POIs in the safe region are
transformed by the transition matrix, the time cost is very short that can be ignored.
Therefore, we tested the computational cost of POI encryption and POI decryption
under the proposed privacy framework by varying the number of queried POIs and
number of dummy POI sets.
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Figure 5.16: Computational cost of the proposed method
Fig. 5.16 shows the results. The dark blue regions in the bars indicate the
computational cost at the third party for encrypting the POI information. The yellow
regions in the bars indicate the computation burden at the user side for decrypting
the received POI information. Therefore, the whole bars indicates the overall query
response time, that is the delay induced by the proposed privacy framework.
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Fig. 5.16a shows the computation time cost by varying the number of queried
POIs, where K = 3. We can observe that the time cost is increasing with the increase
of the number k, no matter the encrypt time or decrypt time. This is because when
the number of queried POIs increases, the number of POIs needed to be encrypted
and decrypted increases. Therefore, both time costs are increasing. Fig. 5.16b shows
the computation time cost by varying the number of dummy POI sets, where k = 5.
We observe that the encrypt time increases with the increase of number K, however,
the decrypted time does not change. This is because the user only needs to decrypt
the queried POIs. When the number of queried POIs does not change, the time cost
caused by decryption does not change.
It’s clear that the whole query response time is very short that was controlled
within few seconds. The delay induced by the proposed privacy framework is neg-
ligible compared with tradition encryption-based method. This is because in the
proposed method, the encryption technology is only used to hide the POI informa-
tion. It was never used to calculate or search the POI records. In addition, only
few POI records are encrypted instead of the whole region. Also, there is no big
transmission overhead, because only the queried POIs in a safe region and limited
encrypted POIs are transmitted between the service provider and the third party.
5.6 Related Work
Numerous techniques have been provided to protect a user’s location privacy [40,53,
83, 109]. The current main techniques for preserving privacy in LBSs are described
in the following review.
Most proposed methods are designed to operate in client-server structures. In
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dummy location methods, multiple false locations along with the user’s true location
are sent to the LBS server such that the true location cannot be distinguished from
the false locations [53]. Obfuscation techniques try to protect a user’s location by re-
ducing the precision of the position information, reporting a region to the LBS server
instead of the precise user location [164]. Beyond the cloaking method, Gutscher
et al. [50] proposed a coordinate transformation method. The user performs some
basic geometric operations over their positions, such as shifting and rotating, before
sending it to the LBS server. Lin et al. [?] proposed the so-called Policy-Embedded
Bx-tree (PEB-tree), which organizes objects based on both spatial proximity and pri-
vacy policy compatibility. Differential privacy-based perturbation methods have also
been proposed. Dewri [28] proposed a method that perturbs the user’s location by
adding Laplace noise to the x and y coordinates independently. Andre et al. [11] in-
troduced the notion of geo-indistinguishability to formalize the problem of protecting
a single user’s position. It achieves privacy by adding controlled noise to the user’s
location making the user’s location indistinguishable within a radius r [21]. Private
information retrieval-based protocols [167] were also proposed for POI queries. This
technique allows a user to retrieve a record from a database server without revealing
any information about the query. However, such cryptography-based approaches rely
on heavy cryptographic mechanisms, which are often computationally and commu-
nicatively expensive.
A few privacy-preserving techniques have attempted to user trusted third parties
(TTP) for location-based services. The most commonly used TTP approaches rely
on an anonymizer to create a spatial region that includes at least k− 1 other users to
hide the true location [40]. Because k-anonymity is achieved, an adversary can only
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identify a user’s true location with probability no higher than 1/k. Papadopoulos et
al. [110] employed trusted hardware to perform PIR for LBS queries. Their hardware-
aided PIR technique relies on a trusted third party to set a secret key and permutate
the database. However, the third party is aware of the precise user positions and
is, therefore, vulnerable to misbehavior by the fully-trusted third party. Recently,
Schlegel et al. [126] proposed a dynamic grid system to provide privacy-preserving
continuous LBS. They introduced a semi-trusted third party, responsible for simple
matching operations. However, their method is based on complicated cryptographic
functions, which is, as previously mentioned, carries a heavy computational burden.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a new privacy preservation framework that in-
cludes three elements: a user, a third party, and the LBS server. The third party
is a semi-trusted entity based on a weak assumption that it does not collude with
the LBS server. In addition, we propose a novel privacy protection scheme, based
on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform. Moreover, the user’s exact location is per-
turbed by Johnson-Lindenstrauss which satisfies the definition of differential privacy,
and maintains high level application utility at the same time. The combination of
privacy preservation method and client-bridge-server structure ensure that none of
the party is aware of the user’s exact location. Our method supports two very popu-
lar queries: k-nearest-neighbour queries and range queries. Performance is evaluated
through extensive experiments, and our proposed method is further compared to
two representative differential privacy-based methods. The results demonstrate that
our framework provides better privacy guarantees and is more efficient in terms of
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resemblance, displacement, and recall.
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Chapter 6
Privacy-preserving in
Crowdsensing System
6.1 Introduction
Crowdsensing as a new trend of development in the Internet of Things (IoT) takes
advantage of pervasive sensor-equipped mobile devices to collect and share data. The
phenomenon has given rise to numerous large scale, real-world applications, which
have the power to create awareness about a specific large-scale phenomena and to
ignite crowd intelligence [12], such as environment monitoring [121], traffic condition
detection [97], and point-of-interest characterization [23]. In a typical crowdsens-
ing platform, participants are registered as candidate workers. A centralized server
(hereafter, the Server) selects workers to complete a data-collection task, and they are
paid a reward for doing so. The selected workers then travel to a predefined location
to collect the required data. However, to be able to assign tasks more efficiently,
workers need to submit their exact location to the Server. Disclosing one’s location
raises serious privacy concerns as the Server may not be trusted. Given a lack of
privacy protection may affect worker uptake of such systems, ensuring the privacy of
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the worker locations is highly desirable.
Numerous techniques have been proposed to protect the privacy of user locations,
such as dummy locations, k-anonymity, obfuscation methods, and differential privacy.
Of these methods, differential privacy has been widely accepted because of its ability
to provide rigorous privacy protection. Differential privacy ensures that no single
individual, whether included or excluded from the dataset, can significantly affect
the output of a query. It is normally achieved by injecting random noise into the
query results. The process has already been well-implemented for location-based
queries; however, many weaknesses remain in its application to spatial crowdsensing.
The current typical solution of differential privacy protects location privacy by
introducing a trusted third party [141]. The third party partitions the domain of
worker locations into small cells and hides each worker in a cell. The method is
based on the assumption that workers are uniformly distributed within the domain.
We argue this assumption is unreasonable, unless the cell size is very small. If the
cell size was large, workers would likely be seen as clusters, as aggregation is a basic
feature of human society; worker locations would be distributed more realistically as
communities. However, this uneven distribution would cause significant errors during
the task assignment process. In addition, this existing method means the partitioning
process needs to satisfy differential privacy, known as privacy spatial decomposition.
Yet adding Laplace noise to each cell at each level consumes too much of the privacy
budget and generates a significant volume of noise. Therefore, applying differential
privacy introduces two challenges as discussed next.
The first challenge is how to more accurately measure the distance between the
workers and the task. This factor is crucial for an efficient task-matching system. To
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preserve privacy in current crowdsensing systems, only a noisy count of the workers
in each cell can be released. Therefore, the distance between a worker and a task
is normally assumed to be equal to the average distance between the task and each
of the four corners of the cell. If the workers are distributed uniformly in the cell,
the distance measurement would be closer to reality. Hence, we propose a privacy
data release method that partitions the domain of worker locations based on worker
density and ensures the distribution of workers within a cell is as uniform as possible.
The second challenge is guaranteeing the success rate of task assignment while
reducing system overhead. In this chapter, system overhead refers to the distance
workers must travel to complete a task and the number of workers who are notified.
Under the veil of differential privacy, an exact count of workers in each cell cannot be
released to the Server, so the Server cannot be sure of the exact number of workers that
are notified about a task. In fact, it is possible for there to be no workers in a cell. As
a result, the Server needs to allocate tasks to a large number of workers within a cell
to guarantee a task assignment success rate, and this can increase system overheads.
To solve this problem, we propose a two-pronged approach. First, a privacy budget
is assigned to each cell when releasing the data. This reduces the noise and increases
the accuracy of the released data. Second, to balance the task assignment success
rate and the system overhead, the model is constructed by solving a geocast region
optimization problem. The proposed method takes both travel distance and the
number of notified workers into account, balancing the task assignment success rate
and system overhead very well.
Overall, this chapter makes the following contributions:
1. We propose a privacy protection data release method based on worker density
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that achieves differential privacy. The sanitized data is able to accurately rep-
resent the original distribution of the data, which contributes to a high task
assignment success rate.
2. We introduce a geocast region selection method, which ensures highly efficient
task assignments and adequately balances task assignment success rates with
system overheads.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce the
fundamentals of crowdsensing. We propose our privacy crowdsensing method and the
theoretically analyze privacy and utility in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively. Section
6.5 details the results of the experiments. Section 6.6 discusses related work, and
Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Fundamentals of Crowdsensing
In this section, we present the basic concepts of crowdsensing, followed by a typical
privacy framework for mobile crowdsensing
6.2.1 Crowdsensing
Crowdsensing is a technique where a large group of individuals with mobile devices
equipped with sensors collectively share sensory data to measure, analyze, or infer any
any processes of common interest. Specifically, the requester posts the sensing tasks,
the workers finish the task and send it to the requester for rewards. Crowdsensing has
two models of task assignment, Worker Selected Tasks (WST) and Server Assigned
Tasks (SAT).
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In WST, the server publishes the tasks and the workers autonomously select their
favourite tasks. The advantage of this model is that the workers do not need to reveal
their exact location information and the server does not know which tasks the workers
take. That is, the server has no idea where the worker is (the worker’s exact location)
and where the worker is going to (the location of the assigned task). The drawback
of this model is that the server doesn’t have any control over the allocation of the
tasks. The workers prefer to choose tasks based on their own objectives (e.g., choose
k closest tasks to reduce the travel cost), which may result in low task assignment
success rate.
In SAT, the workers report their location information to the server, and the server
assigns tasks to the worker according to their locations. The advantage of this model
is that the server can control the process of task assignment. Not only assign the
nearby tasks to the worker, but also maximize the task assignment success rate. The
drawback is that the server knows both the worker’s location and the tasks assigned
to the worker, which brings strong privacy concern.
6.2.2 Framework
Fig. 6.1 shows the private framework for spatial crowdsensing, which includes three
entities: the workers, the cell service provider (CSP) and the Server.
Workers: The workers are the participants who are actively involved in collecting
and contributing data. Workers must submit their location to the CSP, travel to the
location designated for the task and collect data using their sensor-equipped device.
CSP: The CSP collects locations from workers and releases data in sanitized form
to the Server for task assignment. The CSP has a signed agreement with the workers
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Figure 6.1: A framework for private spatial crowdsensing.
through a service contract, so a trust relationship exists between the CSP and the
workers.
The Server: The Server queries the CSP for a sanitized dataset once it receives
a task. It then assigns the task to suitable workers, through the CSP, according
to a task assignment algorithm. The algorithm helps the Server choose appropriate
workers, balancing a high task assignment success rate with a low system overhead.
6.3 Mobile Crowd sensing under Differential Pri-
vacy Protection
6.3.1 Problem Definition and Assumptions
Notations
Let D denote the domain of all worker location. SD = {c1, c2, ..., cm} is the spatial
decomposition result of D. SSD = {r1, r2, ..., rm} is the sanitized version of C. Given
a task t, dw,t represents the distance between a worker and the task, then the pw,t is
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worker wi’s acceptance rate.
Further notations are detailed in Table 6.2:
Table 6.1: Notations
Parameter Description
dw,t Distance between a worker and a task
dc,t Distance between a cell and a task
dmtd Maximum travel distance
pw Acceptance probability of a worker
pc Task assignment success rate with a cell
par Acceptance rate
ESR Expected success rate
Problem definition
Consider a location privacy problem in a crowdsensing system during the process of
task assignment, and we consider the server assigned tasks model where the workers
need to report their locations to the server, and the server will assign the task to
appropriate workers. However, the Server may be untrusted. In typical privacy-
preserving crowdsensing architectures, as shown in Fig. 6.1, workers submit their
location to the CSP, the CSP applies an appropriate privacy protection method,
and releases sanitized statistical data to the Server. Our goal is to design a data
release method that accurately represents the distribution of the workers and helps the
Server efficiently match workers with tasks without compromising the privacy of their
locations. In addition, we need to develop a geocast region construction method that
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allows the Server choose appropriate workers based on a sanitized dataset, resulting
in high task assignment success rate and a low system overhead.
Assumptions
To clarify the problem, a few assumptions are necessary. First, we assume the Server
is malicious; the participants do not trust the Server. Second, we assume the CSP is
trusted and will not disclose worker location information.
6.3.2 Sanitized Data Release
The basic idea of private data release is that the domain of worker locations is parti-
tioned into small cells and Laplace noise is added to the count of workers in each cell
to achieve a differential privacy guarantee.
Density-based partition
Previous literature assumes the worker locations are distributed uniformly, and the
workers in each cell have the same acceptance rate, which is not the case in real-world
scenarios. Partitioning the data domain into a uniform grid would result in sizeable
errors. Therefore, we propose a recursive partitioning process based on worker density.
The aim is to identify dense regions and sparse regions and make the distribution of
the workers in each smaller region as near to uniform as possible. Multiple space-
partitioning data structures can assist with this process. For the purposes of this
chapter, we used quadtree for the partitioning as it makes a good trade off between
utility and efficiency.
Traditional quadtrees recursively subdivide cells into four equal-sized subcells until
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(a) The standard quadtree (b) The density based quadtree
Figure 6.2: Partition data domain
the cell satisfies a stop condition. A cell becomes a leaf node if it can no longer be
divided. In a data domain, this represents a region. Fig. 6.2a shows the traditional
quadtree method. Note that the midpoint is always chosen to partition the parent
cell. The drawback of this methods is that the partition is data-independent. Workers
may be clustered together in a small area of the cell, which could reduce the accuracy
of the data release. However, that problem can be solved by applying the quadtree
technique in a data-dependent way, i.e., by partitioning the cells according to the
density of the workers as shown in Fig. 6.2b.
First, several initial partition points in the location domain need to be selected.
The differences in density between the subcells partitioned by each partition point are
calculated, and the subcells with the biggest differences in density are then chosen as
partitions. This process is repeated for each subcell until the stop condition is met.
Algorithm 8 presents the details of this density-based partitioning process.
Algorithm 8 Density based partitioning
Require: Dataset W
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Ensure: Spatial decomposition SD.
1: SD = φ;
2: cell = W ;
3: m =
√
Scell/α;
4: n← number of workers in cell;
5: if n < 1 ‖ m <= 1 then
6: SD = SD ∪ cell;
7: else
8: Generate m partition points randomly within domain;
9: for i = 1 to m do
10: Subcells set C ← partition cell;
11: for each cell cj ∈ C do
12: Calculate the workers density in cell cj;
13: end for
14: Calculate ∆di = max{den(cj)} −min{den(cj)};
15: end for
16: if max{∆d} > β then
17: Partition the cell at the point with biggest ∆d into four subcells C =
{c1, c2, c3, c4};
18: for ci ∈ C do
19: cell = ci;
20: Go to step 3;
21: end for
22: else
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23: Determine whether the cell needs to be partitioned further by calculating
m′ = d
√
n√
2
e;
24: if m′ > 1 then
25: Partition cell to m′ ×m′ subcells ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
26: SD = SD ∪ ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
27: end if
28: end if
29: end if
30: return SD
Stop condition The stop conditions are very important in the partitioning process,
as they have an important effect on the assignment success rate. Traditional quadtrees
require the data publisher to specify the height of the partitioning. It is difficult to
calculate an effective height with non-uniform partitioning, so we defined three stop
conditions for this scenario to improve efficiency and utility.
• If no workers exist in the cell, no further partitioning is needed as that cell
cannot contribute to the task. Therefore, the cell is marked as a leaf node, as
shown in Steps 3 to 6.
• If a cell is too small to be further partitioned, a stop condition is met. The
parameter α in Step 2 controls the area of this cell (Scell <= α
2). The smaller
the cell, the more uniform the distribution of workers within it.
• If the distribution of workers in a cell is relatively uniform, a stop condition
is also met. We use maximum density difference ∆d to measure whether the
worker location distribution is uniform.
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Partition point The selection of the partition point directly affects the results of
partitioning. It decides whether the distribution of workers in each cell is uniform.
Therefore, m initial partition points are randomly generated within the cell. The
parameter m is decided by the area of the cell being partitioned. Step 3 shows the
calculation method. The intent is to find the best partitioning point that can divide
the cell into four subcells with maximum density difference from the initial partition
points. Therefore, more initial partitioning points mean more accurate segmentation.
All initial partition points are denoted as p ∈ {p1, p2, ..., pm}. The score function
for selecting each partition point is evaluated by the density difference, which is
calculated as follow:
∆d(cell, p) = max
ci∈C
{den(ci)} −min
ci∈C
{den(ci)}. (6.3.1)
Steps 9 to 15 calculate all the density differences based on the partition points.
The partition point p with biggest density difference is chosen as a candidate. If the
biggest density difference ∆dp is greater than the threshold β, the cell is partitioned at
point p (Steps 16 and 17). The entire process is repeated for the partitioned subcells
until no further cells can be partitioned (Steps 18 to 21). Otherwise, the cell will not
be partitioned as the distribution of worker in the cell is already close to uniform.
Yet even after this process, the number of workers in a cell may still be large, adding
to the system overhead. Therefore, Step 23 determines whether the cells need to
be further partitioned into smaller cells with fewer workers. If m′ > 1, the cell is
partitioned into a smaller one of equal size in Step 25 and add them to SD in Step
26.
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Differential privacy data release
As previously mentioned, a noisy count of the number of workers in each cell is
released to protect the privacy of worker locations. Algorithm 9 shows the details of
this release.
Algorithm 9 Differential privacy data release
Require: Spatial decomposition SD
Ensure: Sanitized data SSD
1: for ci ∈ SD do
2: ni ← number of workers in ci;
3: Ni = n+ Laplace(
s

);
4: end for
5: return SSD = {r1, r2, ..., rm}
First, Step 2 calculates the number of workers in each cell, then Laplace noise is
added to the count in Step 3. In Step 5, the sanitized SD, say SSD is released. ri
represents a region with a sanitized count of workers in the cell. According to the
definition of differential privacy, whether or not a worker within a specific cell cannot
be identified. Therefore, worker location privacy is preserved.
6.3.3 Task Assignment
When the server receives the sanitized data, it determines a geocast region GR to
disseminate the task to the workers in GR. The goal is to reach an expected task
assignment success rate, while reducing system overhead at the same time, such as
the distance workers need to travel and the number of workers notified of the task.
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Worker acceptance probability
The distance a worker has to travel to complete a task is an important issue to consider
in task allocation because it has a significant impact on both worker acceptance
probability and the task assignment success rate. Not only may workers be unwilling
to accept tasks with long travel times but organizers might also have to pay higher
incentives to workers who are further away. Therefore, worker acceptance probability
pw as is modeled as a function of distance dw,t, as follows:
pw = f(dw,t). (6.3.2)
Two cases are considered. In the first case, a worker’s acceptance probability decreases
linearly with an increase in the distance between her location to the task location, as
shown in 6.3.3.
f(dw,t) =

dmtd−dw,t
dmtd
, dw,t ≤ dmtd
0, dw,t > dmtd
. (6.3.3)
where dmtd is the maximum distance that most workers will travel.
In the second case, we use the nonlinear hyperbolic tangent function [10], a non-
linear function.
y(x) =
ex − e−x
ex + e−x
. (6.3.4)
with the property y ∈ [0, 1), when x ≥ 0. The acceptance probability is defined as:
f(dw,t) =
y(
c
dw,t
) dw,t ≤ dmtd
0, dw,t > dmtd
. (6.3.5)
where c is the parameter that regulates drops in the acceptance rate with increase in
the travel distance.
159
Assuming there are n workers in a cell, the probability that workers in the cell
will accept a task is
pc = 1− (1− pw)n. (6.3.6)
Geocast region selection
There are two important standards when selecting the geocast region. First, the
worker’s travel distance should be short. Second, the worker acceptance rate over the
geocast region should achieve the expected task assignment success rate. Although the
acceptance probability is based on the travel distance, we cannot say the cell with
higher acceptance probability has a shorter distance to the task location. Assume
there are two split cells A and B, and the distances between these two cells and
the task location lt are da,t and db,t, also da,t > db,t. If cells A and B contain the
same number of workers, cell B has a greater acceptance probability. However, if
there are more workers in cell A, it is possible that the acceptance probability of A is
greater than B. Therefore, the problem of geocast region selection can be formalized
as follows:
• The number of notified workers should be as small as possible, and the worker’s
travel distance should be as short as possible.
• The acceptance probability of the geocast region should reach the expected task
assignment success rate.
• The distance between the selected cell and the task should be within the max-
imum travel distance of the workers.
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To achieve our objective, we propose the geocast region selection method shown
in Algorithm 10.
As shown in Step 1, the partitioned cells are sorted in increasing order according to
the distance to the task. Initially, the closest cell to the task is chosen as the first GR
in Step 2. If the acceptance probability does not reach expectations, the GR continues
to expand by adding the closest cell to the task from the remaining cells until the
acceptance probability reaches the expected goal or the cell’s distance is beyond the
maximum travel distance dmtd, as shown in Steps 3 to 5. This method ensures the
worker’s travel distance is short. However, reducing the number of notified workers
requires some exploration. A cell that can satisfy the expected task assignment success
rate with the best balance between distance with worker numbers needs to be found.
As it is not known which users will accept the task at this stage, Step 6 estimates the
travel distance as an expectation of the distance of the selected cells, while Step 7
calculates the number of notified workers. Step 8 locates the cells with an acceptance
probability higher than the expected acceptance probability and with fewer workers.
If such cells exist, and their distance is under the threshold dmtd, the cell ri ∈ S with
the shortest distance is chosen as the candidate. If the expected travel distance of
pridri,t < Ed, the candidate ri is chosen as the geocast region (Steps 9 to 16).
6.4 Privacy and Utility Analysis
6.4.1 Privacy Analysis
User location information is preserved by hiding it in partitioned cells, and the san-
itized data is released by adding Laplace noise to the statistical results of each cell.
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Algorithm 10 Geocast region selection
Require: SSD
Ensure: GR
1: Order SSD = {r1, r2, ..., rn}, where dr1,t ≤ dr2,t ≤ ... ≤ drn,t
2: Choose r1 as the initial geocast region GR.
3: repeat
4: Expanding GR by adding the closest cell in the remaining cells one by one;
5: until par < ES or dri,t > dmtd
6: Calculate the expectation of travel distance: Ed =
∑m
i=1 pridri,t;
7: Calculate the number of workers in GR: N =
∑m
i=1 nri ;
8: S ←find ci that pri > ES, nri ≤ N and dri ≤ dmtd;
9: if S 6= ∅ then
10: for ri ∈ S do
11: find the cell ri has the shortest distance to lt;
12: end for
13: if pridri,t < Ed then
14: GR = ri;
15: end if
16: end if
17: return GR
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Theorem 10 shows that the proposed data release method satisfies -differential pri-
vacy.
Theorem 10. For a given dataset D, each record represents a user’s location informa-
tion, and the records are independent of each other. The proposed privacy preserving
method can provide - differential privacy.
Proof. Assume the proposed method partitions the map into m disjoint cells.
A set of Laplace mechanisms {M1,M2, ...,Mm} are performed on each cell, and the
assigned privacy parameter for each cell is i. Each cell satisfies i-differential privacy.
The composite properties of the privacy budget are applied to the whole dataset to
analyze the privacy guarantee, which is defined below.
Theorem 11 (Parallel Composition [93]). Suppose we have a set of privacy mechanisms
M = {M1,M2, ...,Mm}, and each Mi provides i privacy guarantee on a disjoint subset
of the entire dataset, M provides max(i)− differential privacy.
Theorem. 11 can be used to directly analyze the privacy guarantee of the proposed
method. As mentioned earlier, assume the assigned privacy parameter for each cell is
i, and the cells are disjoint and independent of each other. According to Theorem. 11,
the set of privacy mechanisms {M1,M2, ...,Mm} will consume the max{1, 2, ..., m}
privacy budget. In the proposed method, we assign each cell the same privacy budget
; therefore, the proposed method preserves -differential privacy.
6.4.2 Utility Analysis
In this section, we apply a well-known utility definition suggested by Blum et al. [17]
to measure prediction accuracy.
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Definition 17 ((α, β)-useful). A database access mechanism M is (α, β)-useful with
respect to count query, if for every database D, with a probability of at least 1 − β,
the output of the mechanism M satisfies
Pr[max| ˆM(celli)−M(celli)|≤ α] ≥ 1− β. (6.4.1)
Theorem 12. The output error of the count query on each cell caused by the proposed
method is less than α with a probability of at least 1 − β. The proposed method is
satisfied with (α, β)-useful when α ≤ − sln2β

.
Proof. The error caused by the proposed method is only the noise, and is denoted
as λ, and λ ∼ Laplace( s

).
Therefore,
Pr[max| ˆM(celli)−M(celli)|> α]
= Pr[Laplace(
s

) > α]
=
∫ ∞
α
1
2b
e−
x
b dx. (6.4.2)
Let
∫∞
α
1
2b
e−
x
b dx = β, we have ∫ ∞
α
e−
x
b dx = 2bβ
⇒ −be−αb |∞α = 2bβ
⇒ be−αb = 2bβ
⇒ −α
b
= ln2β
⇒ α = −bln2β. (6.4.3)
As b = s

, therefore, α = − sln2β

. That is, when α ≤ − sln2β

, the error introduced by
the privacy operation is controlled within α with a high probability.
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6.5 Experiment Evaluation
We evaluated the performance of our method through an extensive set of experiments.
First, the experimental settings are presented, followed by a discussion of the results.
6.5.1 Experimental Setup
Dataset. We used two real-world datasets.
1. SimpleGeo Places dataset [1]. This dataset contains information on more than
20 million places in 63 countries around the world. We extracted 8275 business
entries for the most populous city in Australia, Sydney. We randomly chose
1000 locations as tasks, and the rest of the locations were used as workers.
2. Yelp dataset [2]. The Yelp dataset includes a business dataset, a check-in
dataset, a user dataset, and so on. We used the business dataset, which in-
cludes information about local businesses in 11 cities across 4 countries. We
chose the businesses located in Las Vegas, using the restaurant locations as
workers and 1000 random shopping locations as the tasks.
Metrics. The effectiveness of the proposed method can be evaluated by the success
rate and efficiency of the tasks assignment. Therefore, we use the following metrics:
1. Task assignment success rate. Let T = {t1, t2, ..., tm} be a set of tasks. Each
task was assigned to a group of workers to be accepted with a specific probability.
Assume there are n tasks to be confirmed by the workers; the task assignment
success rate can be represented as follows
TASR =
n
|T | , (6.5.1)
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where |T | is the number of tasks.
2. Average travel distance. Assume Ts = {t1, t2, ..., tn} is a successfully allocated
task set, and the set W = {w1, w2, ..., wn} are the corresponding workers who
performed the task. Then
ATD =
∑
ti∈Ts,wi∈W d(ti, wi)
|Ts| , (6.5.2)
where d(ti, wi) is the Euclidean distance between the task and the worker, |Ts|
is the number of tasks that assigned successfully.
3. Average notified workers. For each task ti ∈ T , there were ni workers are
notified about the task. We calculated the average number of notified workers
as follows:
ANW =
∑|T |
i=1 ni
|T | , (6.5.3)
where |T | is the number of tasks.
Comparison. We compared our method with the uniform partition method,
which was proposed by To et.al. [141]. They proposed partitioning the space in sparse
regions using a two-level grid by modifying the state-of-the-art adaptive grid method.
All the partition processes were uniform across the data domain. We considered
two scenarios within a uniform partition during the geocast region selection process.
First, the cell with the closest distance to the task was preferred when expanding the
geocast region. Second, the cell with the highest acceptance rate was chosen at each
step in the construction of the geocast region. In the experiment, we considered both
linear and nonlinear acceptance probabilities.
Parameters. Table 6.2 shows the parameter settings of our experiment; the
default values are highlighted.
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Table 6.2: Parameter Setting
Parameter Description Value
 Privacy budget 0.1− 1.0
MTD Maximum travel distance 1km− 5 km
ESR Expected success rate 0.3− 0.9
The privacy budget is a very important parameter. It determines how much noise
is added to the released dataset, which affects utility. We set the privacy budget to
 ∈ [0.1, 1.0], and show the changes in performance. The default value was 1.0. The
worker’s maximum travel distance was changed from 1km to 5km, and the expected
task assignment success rate was varied from 0.3 to 0.9.
6.5.2 Experiment Results
Performance by varying 
We examined the performance of the three methods in relation to the different privacy
budgets  for an assigned task in terms of ANW, ATD, and TASR. We varied the
privacy budget  between 0.1 and 1 on both datasets using the linear and nonlinear
acceptance rates. DP-GRB refers to the proposed method. UP-GRB represents the
method with uniformed partitions and a balanced geocast region construction. UP-
GRS gives priority to the task assignment success rate.
Performance on ANW Figs. 6.3a-6.3d show the results in terms of ANW. We
observed that ANW decreased as the privacy budget  increased for both DP-GRB
and UP-GRB with a reverse trend for UP-GRS. This is because a smaller privacy
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Figure 6.3: Performance by varying .
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Figure 6.4: Performance by varying .
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budget  means more noise needs to be added to each cell; therefore, more workers
need to be notified to achieve the expected success rate for both DP-GRB and UP-
GRB. Correspondingly, when the privacy budget  is increased, less noise needs to
be added to each cell, which means more workers need to be selected to achieve a
higher task assignment success rate. In addition, we observed that our method always
outperformed the other two methods, which have lower ANWs in all configurations.
Specifically, as shown in Figs. 6.3a and 6.3b, when  = 0.3, our method, with linear
acceptance rates, achieved an ANW of 5.3431 and 9.2615 for the Yelp and SimpleGeo
datasets, respectively, UP-GRB achieved 7.7044 and 12.5312, an increase of around
50% and 30%, respectively and UP-GRS achieved 6.3847 and 16.7064, an increase of
around 20% and 80%, respectively. When  = 0.8, UP-GRB and UP-GRS achieved
ANWs of 4.8993 and 7.7132 for the Yelp dataset and 11.0441 and 20.0814 for the
SimpleGeo dataset, which are much larger than the ANW values of 3.4231 and 8.7352
of our method. A similar observation was found in Fig. 6.3c and Fig. 6.3d. This
is because the distribution of workers in each cell is not uniform in the UP-GRB
method; however, their acceptance rates are considered to be the same, which causes
some errors. Conversely, the proposed method partitions the worker domain based on
worker density, which makes worker distribution in each cell close to uniform. That
helps to choose more accurate cells for task assignment. Because UP-GRS always
chooses the cell that produces the highest success rate at each step, more workers are
needed to achieve a higher success rate.
Performance on ATD Figs. 6.3e-6.4h show the change in ATD with a varied
privacy budget. We observed that the ATD does not significantly increase with
a reduced privacy budget in either our method or UP-GRB. However, the privacy
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budget had a significant effect on ATD for UP-GRS when  < 0.4. This proves
that the proposed GR construction method did a good job in selecting which cells
to balance the assignment of tasks and system overhead. Additionally, the added
noise had a significant effect on the cell selection when achieving a high ASR. The
UP-GRS method had a greater ATD compared to the other two methods under all
configurations. This is because the construction of UP-GRS prefers to choose the cells
with a higher utility regardless of the distance to the task, as long as the task is within
the worker’s maximum travel distance. In addition, we observed that the ATD value
of our method was always lower than UP-GRB, which means tasks can be completed
within shorter distance using our method. Specifically, our method achieved an ATD
of around 1km for the Yelp dataset with a linear acceptance rate, as shown in Fig.
6.3e, and it outperformed the UP-GRB method by approximately 300m. Fig. 6.4g
shows the results for the Yelp dataset with a nonlinear acceptance rate. Our method
achieved an ATD of around 0.12km, while UP-GRB achieved around 0.145km, which
is an increase of 250m. Figs. 6.3f and 6.3f show the results on the SimpleGeo dataset.
The performance of the three methods are similar to the results for the Yelp dataset.
Performance on TASR The TASR values corresponding to the different methods
used on both the Yelp and SimpleGeo datasets are shown in Figs. 6.4i, 6.4j, 6.4k,
and 6.4l. It is clear that the TASR values achieved by our method are basically
around 0.8, which is the expected success rate (ESR). UP-GRB achieved a TASR of
around 0.9, 10% higher than expected. The TASR achieved by UP-GRS significantly
increased as the privacy budget increased. Specifically, as shown in Fig. 6.4i, when
 = 0.1, our method achieved a TASR of 0.7734, only 3% below the ESR, while
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UP-GRB achieved a TASR of 0.9190, approximately 11% higher than the ESR. UP-
GRS achieved a TASR of 0.5858, which is a decrease of about 22% compared to
the ESR. When  = 0.8, our method and UP-GRB achieved a TASR of 0.8119
and 0.9335, respectively, which is slightly greater than the TASR achieved by both
methods when  = 0.1. This indicates that a greater privacy budget means a higher
task assignment success rate. UP-GRS achieved a TASR of 0.9690, which is much
higher than the other two methods. The performance of the three methods in terms
of TASR with nonlinear acceptance rates is shown in Fig. 6.4k. Similar to the result
shown in Fig. 6.4i, the TASR achieved by our method was around 0.8, and UP-GRB
achieved a TASR of around 0.9, which was much higher than expected. The TASR
value changed significantly when the privacy budget  varied. Figs. 6.4j and 6.4l
show the results for the SimplGeo dataset. We were able to observe that the higher
TASR was at the cost of increased overhead more notified workers and a longer travel
distance to the task destination. Our method achieved a good trade off, achieving
the ESR while reducing the number of notified workers and their travel distance.
Performance by varying MTD
We evaluated the performance of the proposed method on both datasets by varying
the maximum travel distance (MTD). Fig. 6.5 shows the results when the acceptance
rate has a linear distribution. The results with a nonlinear distribution show similar
performance. We observed that when the MTD was small, more workers were required
to achieve the ESR. For example, as shown in Fig. 6.6a, with  = 0.5, when MTD =
1km, more than 8 workers were needed to guarantee an 80% success rate on the Yelp
dataset. While only around 4 workers were sufficient when the maximum travel
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Figure 6.5: The performance by varying MTD
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distance was increased to 5 km. This is because a worker has a higher probability
of accepting a task at a fixed distance when the maximum travel distance is longer.
Meaning, fewer workers are needed to achieve the ESR. Fig. 6.6b shows a similar
trend when increasing the MTD for the SimpleGeo dataset. We also observed that
changing the MTD had little effect on the ATD, irrespective of the dataset, which is
shown in Figs. 6.6c and 6.6d, respectively. The value of ATD basically remained the
same, especially, when the added noise was smaller. This trend affects the MTD’s
influence on ATD.
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Performance by varying ESR
The variations in the tendencies of ANW and ATD for the Yelp and SimpleGeo
datasets along with the parameter’s ESRs are shown in Fig. 6.6. We observed that
a higher ESR results in both higher ANW and ATD. Fig. 6.6a shows the effect of
ESR on ANW for the Yelp dataset with linear acceptance rates. We can observe that
when  = 0.5, and ESR0.7, 3.6 workers are enough to achieve a 0.7 success rate.
To achieve a higher ESR, more workers need to be notified. Fig. 6.6b shows similar
results for the SimpleGeo dataset in terms of ANW. Figs. 6.6c and 6.6d indicate the
impact of increasing the ESR for ATD. When the ESR = 0.3,  = 1, a travel distance
of 0.085km was needed to finish the task in Fig. 6.6c. However, when the ESR = 0.9,
the travel distance was increased to 0.096km. This is because obtaining a higher task
assignment success rate requires more cells to construct a larger geocast region, which
leads to an increased travel distance as well as an increase in the number of notified
workers.
6.6 Related Work
Location privacy has been studied extensively. For example, dummy locations [53]
were proposed to protect user locations by adding false positions to the true locations;
cloaking region techniques [13] transform the exact location to a sufficiently larger re-
gion to reduce location precision; the transformation method [50] performs some basic
geometric operations over a user’s location; private information retrieval [167] uses
encryption to protect a user’s location; and differential privacy-based perturbation
methods [11] have also been proposed.
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These techniques have largely been used and studied in location-based services.
However, only a few studies focus on crowdsensing [84]. Kazemi et al. [69] presented
a privacy framework in which each participant forms their own cloaked region by
computing a Voronoi cell in a distributed fashion. Then, a voting mechanism is
devised to select the set of representative participants and send their cloaked regions to
the server. The query results are subsequently shared with the rest of the participants.
Similar to the method proposed by Kazemi et al., Hu et al. [58] employed a peer-
to-peer cloaking technique to cloak worker locations among k − 1 other workers. In
addition, Bin et al. [180] presented a clustering method in which the location of
the virtual cluster center is reported to the server by the cluster head. Once the
cluster head receives the task from the server, tasks are assigned to the chosen cluster
member according to their exact location. However, none of these obfuscation-based
techniques provides a rigorous privacy guarantee. Their reliability is highly dependent
on an adversary’s background knowledge. Once the attacker obtains a key piece of
background knowledge, such as a location the user visits frequently, the user’s location
can easily be inferred. Shen et al. [128] applied an encryption technique and proposed
a privacy framework that performs worker task matching in an encrypted domain. In
particular, they introduced a semi-trusted third party to provide privacy functionality
and collect encrypted data from workers. The server communicates with the third
party in the encrypted domain to find workers at a minimum cost. The advantage is
that it can provide a strong privacy guarantee. However, encryption-based technology
is often computationally and communicationally expensive.
Differential privacy is a powerful privacy model that satisfies privacy regardless of
the attacker’s background knowledge. It is also less computationally expensive. With
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this privacy definition, To et al. [141] proposed a privacy-aware framework to protect
user’s location information in spatial crowd-sourcing by introducing a cellular service
provider (CSP) as a trusted third party. The CSP collects workers’ locations and then
partitions the entire spatial region into a grid of indexed cells by applying the CSP’s
partition algorithm. Laplace noise is added to the count of each cell, and the sanitized
data are released to the service provider. Latter, they also presented a tool box [142]
to display the framework in a visual, interactive environment. Their recent work [140]
was extended in a further solution, addressing dynamic worker datasets [141] that in-
vestigate privacy budget allocation techniques across consecutive releases and employ
post-processing based on Kalman filters to improve the accuracy. Yanmin et al. [46]
proposed a similar differential privacy framework for task assignment in ad hoc mobile
clouds. They not only consider location privacy but also service quality, which con-
siders the mobile servers’ reputation. In addition, Wang et al. [151] propose a location
privacy-preserving task allocation framework with geo-obfuscation to protect users’
locations during task assignments, which make participants obfuscate their reported
locations under the guarantee of differential privacy. Ping et al. [162] presented a
differentially private allocation mechanism for reward-based spatial crowdsourcing.
They presented a contour plot to characterize location distribution and proposed an
optimized-reward allocation method to achieve a specified probability of assignment
success.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a privacy-preserving data release method based on worker
density. This method satisfies differential privacy and enables workers to participate
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in crowdsensing platforms without disclosing their location. In addition, the proposed
method improves the accuracy of the released data. We also proposed an optimal
geocast region selection strategy that considers the distance workers must travel and
the number of workers that are notified of available tasks. The proposed geocast
region selection strategy not only achieves the expected task assignment success rate
but also reduces system overhead. We evaluated the performance through extensive
experiments, and the results prove that our method achieves a better balance between
task assignment success rate and system overhead with the same privacy guarantee.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
The research presented in this thesis mainly discusses the privacy problems in var-
ious fields. It consists of four parts: the first part discusses the privacy-preserving
problem in the recommendation system, mainly focuses on the privacy disclosure in
neighbourhood-based collaborative filtering; the second part focuses on the privacy
problem of aggregation on the Internet of Things; the third part concentrates on
the privacy problems in location-based services; the fourth part discusses the privacy
problems in crowdsensing system. The privacy problems are identified in each chapter
and the corresponding solutions are proposed. The proposed solutions aim to protect
the data privacy with guaranteed privacy level, while enhancing the data utility. This
chapter summarizes the main contributions of this thesis, and several open issues for
future research have also been identified.
7.1 Contributions
We summaries the main contributions of this thesis as follows:
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Figure 7.1: Key contributions of the proposed methods under four application sce-
narios
• We proposed a privacy-preserving collaborative filtering method, which pro-
tects the users’ rating records without compromising the recommendation ac-
curacy. Specifically, we introduced a randomization method, called Johnson-
Lindenstrauss transform, which project the records in a high dimension to a
lower dimensional space while the distances between records are preserved.
Though this randomization transform, the data utility is enhanced, especially
for the sparse rating datasets. In addition, we prove that the transformation
on the rating dataset satisfies differential privacy, which provides provable and
rigorous privacy protection.
• We proposed a privacy-preserving data aggregation method under fog comput-
ing architecture. To allow the flexible aggregation queries to meet the diversified
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aggregation goals, we propose using the machine learning algorithm to train the
learning model to predict the query results, and allocate the aggregator at the
fog center to report the aggregation results to the cloud server. In addition, we
make the training process satisfy differential privacy by adding Laplace noise
to the query results in the training dataset. Therefore, the proposed method
can effectively defend the differential attack, which often appears in most ag-
gregation functions. The experiments show that the more queries, the better
performance the proposed method presented compared with traditional Laplace
mechanism.
• We proposed a location privacy-preserving framework for location-based services
(Point of Interest query). The main idea is applying the Johnson-Lindenstrass
transform to the location coordinates. Through the random transformation, the
user’s and PoIs’ location coordinates become high dimensional location vectors,
but the relative distances are maintained. Therefore, the user’s location privacy
is protected locally, nobody knows the user’s exact location. Also, we proved
that the process satisfies differential privacy, which not only guarantees rigorous
privacy preservation but also allows LBS providers to provide accurate services.
• We proposed a privacy-preserving data release method for crowdsensing system.
The proposed method includes three phases, worker density-based partition, dif-
ferential privacy data release and geocast region selection. The proposed worker
density-based partition method considers the workers’ real location distribution,
which contributes to a high task assignment success rate. In the differential pri-
vacy data release process, the Laplace noise was added to the statistical result
of each grid to hide the worker’s location information. The proposed geocast
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region selection method ensures the balance between task assignment success
rates and system overhead. The systematic theoretical analysis and extensive
experimental results show that the proposed method has better performance
with the same privacy-preserving level.
To make it much clearer, we summaries the key contribution of the proposed
methods in each scenario as shown in Fig. 7.1.
7.2 Future Works
Although the proposed methods solved some privacy issues in various application
scenarios, there are still some problems that need to be addressed. This section
discusses the open issues as the extensions of the presented work in the thesis.
Recommendation system. We discussed the privacy problem in the recommenda-
tion system, and proposed a Johnson-Lindenstrass transform based privacy-preserving
method to protect the user’s rating history. The proposed method only concen-
trates on neighbourhood-based collaborative filtering. However, other recommen-
dation techniques, such as matrix factorization, still suffer from privacy disclosure.
Therefore, the future work should consider the privacy-preserving problem in other
recommendation techniques. In addition, one limitation of the proposed method is
that it assumes the service provider is trusted, which is a very common assumption
in existing works. It cannot defend the malicious information disclosure by service
provider and server attack. Therefore, for the future work, we would like to develop
the privacy framework under the untrusted server setting. Make it robust to malicious
users as well as untrusted service provider.
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Location-based services. For location-based services, the most existing privacy-
preserving methods are designed under Client-Server structure, users inevitably ex-
pose partial information to the service provider in exchange for usable services. Once
the attacker gets appropriate background knowledge, users’ location privacy would be
violated. For example, if the attacker knows that the user is a staff member in Deakin
University at Burwood campus, he can confidently infer that the user is in Deakin at
working time when the user is at Burwood region. Therefore, to defend such strong
background knowledge attack, even the user located region should not be disclosed.
In chapter 5, to protect the user’s location information, we introduced a semi-trusted
third party and combined with multiple privacy-preserving techniques. Though the
server has no idea the user’s location information, the third party knows some clues
about the user’s location. However, the John-Lindenstrass transform gives a good
start for blind matching that allows distance calculation with perturbed location in-
formation. For the future work, we would like to develop a more strict location privacy
protection strategy, which can prevent the strong background knowledge attack.
Crowdsesing system. In chapter 6, we proposed a location privacy-preserving
method in the crowdsensing system. Though the proposed the method improves the
task assignment success rate significantly, the proposed method is still based on the
trusted third party. The main weakness of the trusted third party is the single point
of failure. Therefore, we would like to explore the new location privacy preserving
method that can protect the worker’s location locally without consuming the utility.
In addition, the proposed method only consider the privacy disclosure during the
location reporting and task assignment process, the payment process would disclose
the worker’s location as well. As the payment information is associated with the real
183
identity of the worker. The server can infer in which task a particular worker is by
observing the payment. Therefore, the location privacy disclosure in the payment
process is another research direction in the future.
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